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Many of the narratives bear the lingering spirit and 
influence of the ideology imposed on the veterans by 
their respective governments. Some of the veterans 
still follow official accounts, glorifying the Communist 
victory in Vietnam or praising Western political 
involvement in the war. Among the stories are several 
Communist accounts that humanize and contextualize 
the war’s events while shedding light on aspects of 
the war previously unknown to Western scholars. 
An interview with a former KGB agent reveals that 
Russia’s support of North Vietnam was far greater 
than Western historians previously have speculated. 
Another account, by a captain in the Chinese army, 
details the experience of the Chinese troops who 
fought alongside the North Vietnamese.
While much of the scholarship on the Vietnam War 
focuses on battles, political maneuvering, and combat 
strategies, Xiaobing Li presents a collection of stories 
from people who witnessed the war firsthand. Voices 
from the Vietnam War focuses on personal combat 
experiences, offering a deeper understanding of 
America’s longest war. 
XIaObIng LI, professor of history and director of the 
Western Pacific Institute at the University of Central 
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War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese 
Soldiers. He served in the People’s Liberation Army  
in China.
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F or more than thirty years, Vietnam was ravaged by war, resulting in nearly 1.5 million military casualties and more than 4 million 
civilian casualties. From the French Indochina War 
(1946–1954) to the Communist victory in 1975, 
the land and people were the victims of constant 
battle and were irrevocably altered by the effects of 
devastating violence. Voices from the Vietnam War: 
Stories from American, Asian, and Russian Veterans 
assembles the accounts of soldiers, spies, and medical 
workers who experienced firsthand the years of 
conflict in Vietnam.
Few oral histories of the Vietnam War allow civilians 
or Communist supporters to tell their stories, 
and the resulting scholarship is often one-sided. 
Xiaobing Li, a native of China and a former soldier 
in the People’s Liberation Army, spent seven years 
gathering hundreds of accounts from survivors of 
the war, filling gaps in the narrative, and providing 
new insights into the events of the war. Voices from 
the Vietnam War offers the personal accounts of 
twenty-two individuals, spanning three continents 
and representing multiple political beliefs and 
perspectives—American, Chinese, Russian, North  
and South Korean, Vietnamese, and Viet Cong.
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Note on Transliteration
Th e Vietnamese names follow the traditional East Asian practice that the 
surname is written fi rst, then middle name, and then fi rst name, as in Ngo 
Dinh Diem and Vo Nguyen Giap. Most people in Vietnam are referred 
to by their given names, therefore President Diem and General Giap. Th e 
exceptions are for a very few particularly illustrious persons, such as Ho 
Chi Minh, who was called President Ho (or Uncle Ho).
Th e Vietnamese names of places follow the spellings in two atlases: 
Tap Ban Do Hanh Chinh, Viet Nam (Vietnam Administrative Atlas) and 
Michael P. Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam: A Comprehensive Guide to 
the Firebases, Military Installations and Naval Vessels of the Vietnam War, 
1945–75. For some popular names of places, traditional well-known spell-
ings appear in parentheses aft er the current spelling, such as Ho Chi Minh 
City (Saigon).
Th e hanyu pinyin Romanization system is applied to Chinese names of 
persons, places, and terms. Th e transliteration is also used for the titles of 
Chinese publications. Names of individuals are written in the Chinese way, 
the surname fi rst, such as Mao Zedong. Some popular names have tradi-
tional Wade-Giles spellings appearing in parentheses aft er the fi rst use of 
the hanyu pinyin, such as Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), as do popular names 
of places like Guangzhou (Canton).
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Introduction
Th e Long War
Huynh Van No was sweating as he showed us the War Remnants Museum 
on one of the comfortable spring days in Vietnam. Over sixty and reti-
cent, Mr. No was not a typical tour guide in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly 
Saigon). We worried about him aft er we scrambled into the underground 
Cu Chi tunnels. “I’m OK,” he said, “I have this problem for years.”1 As a 
Southerner, Huynh served as a staff  sergeant in the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN) during the Vietnam War. Aft er the Northern victory, the 
Communist government sent all the former ARVN soldiers and offi  cers to 
prison or labor camps. Huynh survived seven castigating years, from 1975 
to 1982, and lost his health and most everything else: his parents, three 
brothers, his wife, and two of his three children.2 One thing good came 
out of the war, Huynh joked with a complacent smile: he had learned how 
to speak English during his three-month training in the United States as a 
Battalion Maintenance Offi  cer. With workable English, he could now make 
$3 a day as a guide to foreign tourists to support his handicapped daughter 
at home.
Th e lengthy war claimed 3 million Vietnamese lives. For the Vietnamese 
veterans like Staff  Sergeant No, the war lasted for thirty years, starting with 
the French Indochina War, 1946 to 1954; then an insurgent rebellion sup-
ported by the North against the South from 1955 to 1963; then the confl ict 
known as the American War in 1963–1973; and fi nally, the civil war ending 
in the Communist takeover in 1975. Other ARVN veterans we met in the 
southern provinces had similar stories. Th ey grew up with the war, fought in 
it, and then lost almost everything to it. Lt. Nguyen Yen Xuan described the 
war not as an event, but as his life and family history.3 Th is is also true for 
Vietnam War veterans from other parts of the world, including more than 
2 million Americans. Th ey became part of the war and it changed them in 
a multitude of ways. Numerous personal memoirs have been published in 
the United States, including many excellent oral histories.4
2 Voices from the Vietnam War
Th is book, as an oral history collection, tells twenty-two personal 
stories of American, Vietnamese, Chinese, Russian, and Korean soldiers 
and offi  cers. It shares the lives of international veterans, whether a U.S. 
Marine or a Chinese major, a Korean captain or a Russian spy, and reveals 
ironic similarities and diff erences. In their own words, they share fi rsthand 
accounts of their war experiences in Vietnam as well as their family life 
before and aft er the war. Th e book provides Communist stories from “the 
other side of the hill,” including those of a general of the People’s Libera-
tion Armed Forces (PLAF, or Viet Cong), offi  cers of the North Vietnamese 
Army (NVA, or offi  cially the People’s Army of Vietnam, PAVN), Chinese 
soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA, China’s armed forces), and 
a Russian offi  cer. Th ese stories bring fresh insights from Communist veter-
ans, examining their motivations, operations, and perceptions. Th eir nar-
ratives humanize and contextualize the war’s events while shedding light 
on aspects of the war previously unknown to Western scholars, and pro-
vide an international perspective for readers to have a better understand-
ing of America’s longest war.
Th e Bear vs. the Dragon
For the fi rst time in English, this book provides personal accounts of Rus-
sian and Chinese Communist veterans, including three Chinese PLA 
offi  cers and two Russians, a missile training instructor and a KGB spy. 
Western strategists and historians have long speculated about the inter-
national Communist role in Vietnam, but these stories indicate the extent 
of outside involvements. Between 1964 and 1974, Vietnam became a bat-
tlefi eld, a testing ground, and even a training site for two of the largest 
Communist forces in the world. Th e international Communist support 
to North Vietnam, including troops, equipment, fi nance, and technology, 
provided a decisive edge that enabled the NVA and Viet Cong to resist 
American forces and eventually subjugate South Vietnam. Th e Soviet and 
Chinese support prolonged the Vietnam War and made it very diffi  cult, if 
not impossible, for South Vietnam and the United States to win.
Aft er Nikita Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964 and Leonid Brezh-
nev’s succession, the Soviet Union shift ed its Vietnam policy from “staying 
away” to “lending a hand.” In February 1965, Soviet premier Alekei Kosy-
gin visited Hanoi and signed an agreement with the North Vietnamese 
to increase Russian aid to 148,500 tons, including 55,000 tons of military 
Introduction 3
aid, by year’s end. North Vietnam also requested a Soviet missile combat 
brigade, comprised of four thousand Soviet troops, to arrive that spring.5 
Aft er 1965, the Soviet Union continuously increased its aid to Vietnam, 
particularly intensifying its military assistance. Chinese historian Li Dan-
hui describes Moscow’s primary goal as being to “infi ltrate politically 
and win control over the strategically important Southeast Asian region, 
and Vietnam presented the best avenue whereby this objective might be 
achieved.”6 In 1967, Russia increased its military aid to Vietnam to over 
$550 million, exceeding that provided by the Chinese.7 From 1965 to 1972, 
the Soviet Union provided a total of $3 billion in aid to Vietnam, including 
$2 billion in military support.8
Th e Soviet Union felt compelled to use all means possible to win Viet-
nam over as a political ally against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
the international Communist movement. Beginning in 1958–1959, because 
of complicated domestic and international factors (the most important of 
these being whether Moscow or Beijing should be the center of the interna-
tional Communist movement), the Sino-Soviet alliance, the cornerstone of 
the Communist international alliance system, collapsed.9 Th e great Sino-
Soviet polemic debate in 1960–1962 undermined the ideological foun-
dation of the Communist revolution. Historian Chen Jian states that, in 
retrospect, few events played so important a role in shaping the orientation 
and essence of the cold war as the Sino-Soviet split.10 Moscow lost its total 
control of the international Communist movement. Th e confl icts between 
the two Communist parties extended to their strategic issues in the 1960s. 
Th e 1964 transition in the Soviet leadership from Khrushchev to Brezh-
nev did not improve Sino-Soviet relations. China’s bellicose rhetoric in the 
early 1960s and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution sweeping across 
China beginning in 1966 completely destroyed any hope that Beijing and 
Moscow might continuously regard each other as “comrades in arms.”11 As 
the Sino-Soviet relationship worsened, it gradually moved from hostility to 
outright confrontation during a border war in the late 1960s.
China did not want to see Soviet infl uence increase in Southeast Asia. 
To keep the Soviets out and North Vietnam on its side, China was will-
ing, at fi rst, to provide more military assistance to North Vietnam. In 
1963, China provided about $660 million in military and economic aid to 
Vietnam, nearly 30 percent of its total foreign aid.12 Th is valuable support 
included enough weapons and ammunition to arm 230 infantry battalions. 
Th e massive contributions to North Vietnam enabled North Vietnamese 
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Introduction 5
leader Ho Chi Minh to send more NVA troops to the South. Aft er 1964, 
China increased its aid to Vietnam. From 1964 to 1973, China provided 
about $20 billion in aid to Vietnam, and it remained the largest supplier of 
war materials to North Vietnam among the Communist states until 1967, 
providing about 44.8 percent of the total military aid that year.13 Historian 
Shuguang Zhang determined that between 1965 and 1970, aid to North 
Vietnam made up 57.6 percent of China’s total foreign aid.14 China’s mas-
sive aid certainly helped North Vietnam survive a protracted war of attri-
tion with the United States. Beijing did not want to see a U.S. success or 
North Vietnam soft ness when the Johnson administration escalated Amer-
ican involvement. China’s interest was best served by backing up the North 
and keeping the ground war in the South.
Meanwhile, China began to send its troops to the Vietnam War. On 
April 17, 1965, the fi rst PLA troops entered North Vietnam.15 By March 
1966, China had dispatched 130,000 troops to Vietnam, including surface-
to-air missiles, antiaircraft  artillery (AAA), railroad, combat engineering, 
mine-sweeping, and logistics units. Th ree years later, according to Gen. 
Zhang Aiping, former defense minister of the PRC, China had rotated in 
twenty-three divisions, including ninety-fi ve regiments plus eighty-three 
battalions, totaling 320,000 troops.16 Th e Chinese forces in North Viet-
nam enabled Ho Chi Minh to send more NVA troops to the South to fi ght 
American ground forces and to intensify warfare in the region.17 China’s 
military involvement may have also restrained the Johnson administration 
from further U.S. military escalation, which could have triggered a large-
scale Chinese intervention like that in the Korean War in 1950–1953. Jung 
Chang and Jon Halliday point out, “It was having China as a secure rear 
and supply depot that made it possible for the Vietnamese to fi ght twenty-
fi ve years and beat fi rst the French and then the Americans.”18
Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam between 1965 and 
1973 did not improve Sino-Soviet relations, but rather created a new front 
and new competition as each attempted to gain leadership of the South-
east Asian Communist movements. North Vietnam knew that the Soviet 
Union and China were rivals in the Communist camp, competing for the 
leadership of the Asian Communist movement, including Vietnam. Each 
claimed itself a key supporter of the Vietnamese Communists’ struggle 
against the American invasion. Military historian Spencer C. Tucker states 
that therefore the Vietnamese brought both Communist nations’ troops 
into North Vietnam, increasing the competition between the Chinese and 
6 Voices from the Vietnam War
Soviet Communists.19 Th e Chinese high command ordered its AAA troops 
to intensify their training in order to shoot down more American airplanes 
than the Soviets could. Maj. Guo Haiyun recalled that the Chinese AAA 
troops had two enemies in North Vietnam: “the American imperialists in 
the sky, and the Soviet revisionists on the ground.”20
Th e Vietnamese government and the NVA offi  cially deny any foreign 
involvement in the Vietnam War. Other Communist and former Commu-
nist countries, like Russia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Poland, have main-
tained a similar position. Th e Russian government has concealed the 
participation of the former Soviet Union’s military in the war. Soviet offi  -
cial records are closed to the public and scholars. Most Russian veterans 
do not want to talk about their experience in Vietnam, and those who are 
willing are diffi  cult to reach. Because of the unavailability of sources and 
language barriers, there is an absence of an oral history that provides voices 
directly from these Communist veterans. Even though a few historians 
have covered Soviet and Chinese policies and involvement in the Vietnam 
War, no personal accounts of the Russian and Chinese veterans are avail-
able in published books in the West.21
Interviewing Communist Veterans
Between 2001 and 2008, I interviewed more than ninety Communist vet-
erans in Vietnam, China, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Hong Kong, and 
the United States. Th e accounts from Russian veterans came from my four 
interviews in Kazakhstan, three in Russia, three in Ukraine, two in Amer-
ica, and two in China. Five of the Russian veterans were offi  cers, six of 
them soldiers, and three former KGB agents. All of them agreed to be inter-
viewed only on the condition that their names would not be used. During 
the interviews of Russian veterans, the same questions were asked from 
a standard list concerning their training, service experience, most vivid 
memories, worst thing, and scariest moment in their war experiences. Th e 
standard questions also included how much they knew about the Ameri-
can and ARVN forces, what they thought of their combat eff ectiveness, and 
the biggest lesson they may have learned from their war experience.
Before each trip, my contact persons made arrangements with the Rus-
sian veterans who had agreed to be interviewed. I fl ew from Urumqi, the 
capital city of China’s western border province Xinjiang Uygur Autono-
mous Region, either to Astana, capital city of Kazakhstan; to Moscow, Rus-
Introduction 7
sia; or to Kyiv, Ukraine, in separate trips. Most of these Russian veterans 
answered the questions in their own languages with a translator. Two inter-
views in America were in English and conducted in Maryland and Texas.22 
Th ese interviews off er an important source of information from the former 
Soviet Union and diff erent viewpoints for interested readers in America. 
To check the accuracy of the Russian recollections, I consulted with pri-
mary and secondary sources in Moscow and Hanoi. Since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, the Communist governmental and diplomatic 
documents in Moscow have gradually opened up, especially since 1995, 
fi lling in some gaps in the cold war historiography.23 We can now present 
some of the fi rsthand accounts of Russian veterans to fi ll part of the gap in 
the Vietnam War history.
Among the Communist countries, only China has acknowledged its 
intervention in 1965–1970. In the spring of 1979, aft er China lost its brief 
war with Vietnam and withdrew its 200,000 troops, Beijing published 
many details about its military aid and engagements in the Vietnam War 
between 1965 and 1970. Th e government tried to prove in the 1980s that 
China had been friendly, generous, exacting, and sacrifi cing, only to be 
betrayed by an odious, aggressive, and greedy Vietnam. Continuing quar-
rels between Beijing and Hanoi brought a considerable number of war 
memoirs to Chinese readers in the 1990s. Some are books, others appeared 
as journal and magazine articles, or as reference studies for restricted cir-
culation only. With offi  cial permission, I conducted individual and group 
interviews with forty-eight Chinese veterans in nine provinces, including 
Guangxi and Yunnan, which border Vietnam. I also visited some of the 
headquarters of the engaged AAA divisions during my four research trips 
to China between 2001 and 2008. Since I am a native Chinese and served 
in the PLA in the early 1970s, the interviews went very well and contain 
new information on the Chinese role, previously unavailable to an English-
language audience.
Since the normalization of relations between Washington and Hanoi 
in 1997, scholars have had opportunities to visit the battlefi elds and librar-
ies in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and write on the war. Although the 
declassifi cation process of the war archives in Vietnam has not yet started, 
a few publications became available, including stories from the generals, 
offi  cials, and diplomats.24 Aft er 2002, the NVA and PLAF veterans began 
to talk about their personal experiences in the Vietnam War and to pub-
lish their memoirs, recollections, and war stories, adding a new perspec-
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tive on the subject.25 Th e NVA and PLAF veterans were also more willing 
to share their wartime memories. No matter how politically indoctrinated 
they might be, the Communist veterans were culturally bound to cher-
ish the past. More importantly, they felt comfortable in talking about their 
experiences and allowing their recollections to be recorded, written, and 
published in America.26
More than thirty interviews of Vietnamese Communist veterans were 
conducted in seven provinces both in the South and the North during 
my three research trips in 2002–2006. My wife helped with oral transla-
tions from Vietnamese to English if an offi  cial translator was not available. 
Although these stories off er direct testimony from the soldiers themselves, 
their personal stories oft en followed the offi  cial accounts that glorify the 
Communist victory in Vietnam. To ensure the accuracy of these personal 
recollections, I consulted with primary and secondary sources in Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City. I also noted any contradicting accounts, such as the 
number of casualties, whenever it occurred. Although the Vietnamese gov-
ernment still has a long way to go before free academic inquiry becomes a 
reality, the value of the NVA and Viet Cong veterans sharing their wartime 
experiences cannot be underestimated in our research and teaching of the 
Vietnam War.
Th e collection of the Russian, Chinese, and Vietnamese stories has 
outlined a way of war that is diff erent from that of the West.27 For example, 
the Western way of war has a propensity to exclude political party control 
over the military, while the Communist leaders had a tendency to view the 
military aspect as one part of their revolutionary organization, the military 
as a subordinate branch of the whole party. Th e Soviet military brought 
Vietnam the Red Army tradition of the Communist Party’s being in com-
mand, political propaganda, and ideological education. Th e long war 
allowed the Vietnamese Communists to make progress and successfully 
adopt the Soviet military system and technology. Th e Vietnamese Com-
munist force transformed from an irregular peasant army to a professional 
modern army. Th e Soviet training, mobility, technology, and professional-
ism were a major diff erence between the Russian and the Chinese forces. 
Th e Chinese military brought Vietnam their asymmetric combat experi-
ence in guerrilla warfare, in which a weak Th ird World army could fi ght 
against a strong Western force in their country. Th e NVA employed some 
Chinese guerrilla tactics, such as engaging in mobile operations, avoiding 
the usually superior enemy fi repower, achieving surprise whenever pos-
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sible, fi ghting in close combat, and using ambush tactics, tunnel networks, 
and night attack.28 Th us, the NVA could function on both conventional 
and unconventional levels, which the American military, in many ways, 
was not fully prepared to face. Th e advantages of the American forces were 
neutralized by this resourceful foe.
Vietnam Revisited
Teaching Vietnam War history has been the most challenging class in my 
twenty-year college teaching career in the United States. No matter if I 
taught it at private universities, state universities, online graduate classes 
for Norwich University, or the Summer Seminar in Military History at 
West Point, the U.S. Military Academy, I always felt underprepared for 
the students and their questions. Our students have changed. Th ey are the 
grandchildren of American veterans, to whom the war seems far away in 
the past; the second generation of the Southern refugees, who still attend 
ongoing anti-Communist Vietnamese rallies at local churches or temples; 
and international students who were born and grew up in Vietnam, Rus-
sia, and China. Th ey had diff erent questions in the class. What thematic 
topic can reach them all? How can I put all the veterans on the same page 
to compare and explain?
One day, I was surprised by the students’ reaction to my wife’s visit. 
Tran shared her refugee story with the class. As one of the “boat people” at 
twenty-two, she escaped from South Vietnam and survived a pirate attack, 
a long sea voyage, and hardship at the refugee camps in other Southeast 
Asian countries. For nine months, she could not stop, traveling from one 
place to another. She could not die, since she had to take care of her lit-
tle cousin, Sunny, a twelve-year-old boy. Sunny lost his father in the war 
aft er his mother left  Saigon to go overseas. Aft er the war, Tran’s family sold 
everything for these kids to get out of the country on a fi shing boat and 
look for Sunny’s mother.29 Her story was simple, but compelling. It was not 
only about the bloody battle and military technology, but also about fam-
ily, survival, and hope for the future, which touched many students in the 
class. Responsibility, technology, and training can transform a citizen into 
a warrior; passion, patriotism, and belief can also turn an ordinary indi-
vidual into a soldier. An examination of each veteran’s background, educa-
tion, and family life before and aft er the war provides a workable approach 
to understanding and comparing the international veterans. Th erefore, I 
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have chosen social history topics for my class and discussed the war events 
as human experience.
Th is book’s focus moves away from the conventional combat-centered 
war history and instead looks into the relatively neglected subject of men 
and women’s lives beyond the battleground. By examining topics such as 
their religion, marriage, education, and occupation in their home coun-
tries, the work details veteran backgrounds before the war and their civil-
ian life aft er. It puts each veteran in the context of the society, culture, and 
politics. By introducing these young soldiers and junior offi  cers and tell-
ing their stories, this work employs a social history methodology and pro-
vides an impetus to larger issues. It shows from the bottom up that each 
society has its own way to transform its civilians into soldiers, and that the 
people viewed and responded to similar problems diff erently. Oral history, 
of course, has its own weaknesses. Th e book does not intend to present 
a comprehensive coverage of the war, but a “limited” presentation of the 
voices of the international soldiers from all sides. Th eir stories may not be 
the bloodiest, but they will broaden our perspective on the war. Some of 
them are the noncombat stories of people who served in logistics, intelli-
gence, medicine, and engineering, soldiers whose roles and contributions 
are oft en overlooked by historians.
Th e selected chapters present a life story and show the feelings and per-
ceptions of the war by the men and women who lived it. Th e chapters fol-
low the participants’ lives before, during, and aft er their service, to put each 
individual soldier in a common, broader context. To connect each man 
and woman with his or her social and political environment, a vignette is 
included as a background introduction to each personal account. Besides 
the Communist stories, there are fourteen stories of American, South Viet-
namese, and Korean veterans.
It was diffi  cult to select only eight American veterans from my inter-
views of fi ft y-three in fi ft een states. I regret that time and space has not 
allowed me to include the stories of other veterans, who performed their 
duties in Vietnam heroically. Th eir stories have certainly provided a solid 
historical background for comparisons with the others and an analytical 
framework for the discussions of important issues. Th ey also provided a 
large amount of wartime memorabilia, such as diaries, letters, photographs, 
newspapers, recommendation letters, and offi  cial documents.
Th e selection of South Vietnamese stories was based on interviews 
with ARVN veterans both in the United States and in Vietnam. Among 
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the seventy-two South Vietnamese soldiers interviewed, sixty-one veterans 
and their families were in the United States. Th ese ARVN veterans either 
fl ed the country aft er the war in the late 1970s or came to the United States 
later through humanitarian organizations and other American programs 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Some interviews were conducted in English, but 
most were done in their own native language through an interpreter, since 
I did not trust my Vietnamese. Certain words were changed during the 
translation and editing process for clarity. Between 2002 and 2006, I made 
three research trips to Vietnam and interviewed eleven ARVN veterans in 
four southern provinces. My wife helped with translations since the vet-
erans did not feel comfortable with any offi  cial translator or other people 
knowing about the interview and their anti-Communist past. Reluctant 
and hesitant, they oft en avoided details about the lost war that sent them to 
jail for up to seven years. Th ey did not keep many photos, records, and let-
ters from their ARVN service. Some of them only started talking aft er my 
third visit or a dinner at a local restaurant. Some believed that the Commu-
nist government and local authorities still watched them.
Th e chapters are organized in both geopolitical and thematic ways. Part 
One begins with the narratives of six Vietnamese veterans from both sides. 
Th e second part focuses on the Russian and Chinese Communist veterans, 
North Vietnam’s allies. Part Th ree examines Saigon’s allies through four 
Americans’ stories. Th en, the next part organizes the stories to show the 
eff orts of medical personnel, including a doctor, nurse, medic, and hospital 
security captain. Th e last segment examines several diff erent logistical sup-
port persons, including a U.S. Army lieutenant, a U.S. Air Force sergeant, a 
South Vietnamese offi  cial, and a Chinese colonel. Th e conclusion summa-
rizes the perspectives on the war and provides a unique way of understand-
ing Vietnam. In their own words, these former warriors put the readers in 
the midst of wartime life.
Th is page intentionally left  blank.
Part One
A Country Divided
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Chapter 1
A Buddhist Soldier Defends 
a Catholic Government
S.Sgt. Huynh Van No was very aff able and gregarious, even though he had 
a tough time during the war and a fatigued life thereaft er. Before each inter-
view in Ho Chi Minh City, he usually started a conversation with me and my 
wife on an interesting topic like the diff erence between traditional Mahayana 
Buddhism in Vietnam and Westernized Buddhism in America. Sometimes 
they were so engaged that I had to step in by off ering them a cup of “caphe 
sua” (Vietnamese ice coff ee) before they got carried away with their enlight-
ening and serious discussions.
Staff  Sergeant No was serious about the common Western assumption 
that the ARVN failed to defend its own country even with American direct 
intervention in the Vietnam War.1 He argued that this supposition is not fair 
to the ARVN, which he entered in 1962 at eighteen. His testimony suggests 
that the ARVN departed from traditional values and lost popular support 
only aft er the Americans transformed it into a modern army.2 Its modern-
ization or Westernization detached the ARVN from Vietnamese society. In 
other words, while providing advanced technology, military training, demo-
cratic ideas, and even Christianity to the ARVN, the United States should 
also have promoted nationalistic pride as a reason for the South Vietnamese 
soldiers to fi ght for their own country’s independence and sovereignty. Ignor-
ing and overlooking Vietnamese nationalism made the ARVN a hotbed of 
apathy. Staff  Sergeant No felt like he was fi ghting for his Catholic command-
ers, President Diem, and American advisers, not for himself, his family, and 
the Vietnamese people.
In retrospect, the U.S. Vietnam policy was originally aimed at supporting 
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the government and people of South Vietnam in their eff orts against Com-
munist aggression. From the beginning, Pres. John F. Kennedy emphasized 
that the South Vietnamese should fi ght this war “by themselves, for them-
selves, win or lose, it is their war, the people of Vietnam against the Commu-
nists.”3 He authorized $41 million to improve the ARVN and the civil guards 
in 1961. According to Staff  Sergeant No, his unit and other ARVN troops had 
made some progress in carrying out some of President Diem’s policies, like 
the “Strategic Hamlet Program” in 1962–1963.4 Th e program was designed 
to protect the rural population and neutralize Viet Cong insurgents. How-
ever, the battlefi eld failure in 1963–1964 convinced American leaders that 
the ARVN could not protect its government and South Vietnam from fur-
ther attacks by the PLAF and NVA. Th eir assumed failure and incompetence 
infl uenced the Johnson administration’s military escalation of the Vietnam 
War in order to help the hopeless South Vietnamese in an American way.
Approximately 3.6 million South Vietnamese served in the ARVN from 
1963 to 1975. During that time, most of the adult males between seventeen 
and forty-fi ve years old were draft ed into the war and stayed in the army until 
the end.5 Staff  Sergeant No was wounded during the Viet Cong’s Tet Off ensive 
campaign in 1968, but was lucky enough to live to see the end of the war.
S.Sgt. Huynh Van No
First Battalion, Th ird Regiment, An Giang Provincial Command,
ARVN (South Vietnam)
I was born in 1944 into a peasant’s family in Long Hung, a small village 
near Long Xuyen, An Giang Province, South Vietnam. As the youngest in 
the family, I had seven brothers and sisters. Th eir hard work in family farm-
ing helped me through elementary and secondary education in the town of 
Long Xuyen. I enjoyed riding my bicycle along the river to my school every 
morning, waving good-bye to my father and brothers who already worked 
in the rice fi eld. Our teachers talked about the First Indochina War all the 
time, but it seemed far away from our classroom in the late 1950s.
My favorite subject was drawing and painting, both in watercolor and 
oil colors. I had painted a lot of pictures of the rivers, rice paddies, and 
people in my hometown. Th e life was so quiet and peaceful at Long Xuyen 
that sometimes I was even bored to death. I dreamed of leaving our village 
and traveling all over the country.
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I liked visiting the Buddhist temples with my parents and grandpar-
ents either in our village or in the city. I met many people there, including 
my relatives, friends, neighbors, teachers, and those whom I didn’t even 
know. It seemed natural for the Vietnamese families to carry on their reli-
gion from one generation to the next as a family tradition. Like in my fam-
ily, my ancestors were Buddhists, so my grandparents, my parents, and my 
generation just kept it going on and on as the Buddhists forever.6 One of 
the most exciting things during my childhood was riding in the boat (for a 
whole day) down the river and climbing to the top of the Ba Den Mountain 
to see the Buddha statue in the Ba Den temple.
At the beginning of the 1960s, some troops of the Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam [ARVN] moved into Long Xuyen and were stationed in several 
camps along the country roads. Th ey were Buddhist soldiers, since I saw 
them quite oft en at the Buddhist temples in the city.7 Th ey protected the 
villagers from being harassed by the South Vietnamese Communist guer-
rilla troops, or the Viet Cong [VC]. Since we lived nearby the city, I didn’t 
see any Viet Cong during my school years. Also I didn’t know much diff er-
ence between the antigovernment Viet Cong and Pres. Ngo Dinh Diem’s 
government. At that time, I really admired the young ARVN soldiers who 
carried their rifl es in uniform, walked around with a lot of attention in the 
town, and shopped at the market with cash.
In 1961, President Diem called up the young Vietnamese for service in 
the ARVN to fi ght against the Communist insurgents in South Vietnam. 
I answered the call and joined the army in 1962. Reluctant and unhappy, 
my parents had to make a tough decision: either letting me go or losing 
one of my older brothers as their fi eld hands. What made them feel better 
was that I joined the ARVN provincial forces, which stayed in each prov-
ince under its military regional command.8 My training camp wasn’t too 
far away from my hometown, even though I couldn’t go home and visit my 
family at all. My brothers told me later that my parents prayed a lot for me 
in the village temple when I served in the army.
During my three-month training, I remember that everyone was so 
happy when we got paid about $20 per month. It was the fi rst time in my 
life to see so much money in my own hands. We would spend money in 
the market and eat lavishly with our money. At the time, I didn’t know that 
we got only one half of our pay since the corrupt training offi  cers kept the 
other half for themselves. Later I was told that some soldiers might leave 
the army if they had made and saved a lot of money. In fact, my monthly 
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pay of $20 wasn’t enough for me to survive outside the camp for one week 
since the cost of living in our area was $100 per month, or $25 a week. Any-
way, I was happy with the little money I got at the moment. I am a Bud-
dhist, and always satisfi ed with what I have.
Many new recruits were Buddhists just like me. I enjoyed meeting so 
many young men from all of the country. I had never traveled that far in 
my life to know the people from cities like Can Th o and Ca Mau. Friendly 
and kind, they were as scared as I was to go into the war against Viet Cong 
and North Vietnamese Communists. I made some friends at the camp.
During our training, the training sergeants told us that nobody was 
allowed to eat outside the base. We had been warned not to go out into 
the nearby town in our uniform. Th e sergeants and the American advisers 
were paranoid that the food outside the base could be poisoned. I didn’t 
understand why we, as Vietnamese soldiers, were afraid of our own people. 
Anyway, I was not afraid. One day I snuck out with a couple of my friends 
into the town. My friends and I saw corn on the cob and other food sold by 
peddlers in the street. We bought lots of corn and hid it in our tents. Th e 
training sergeants would come in and lift  our blankets and yell at us.
Most of the training offi  cers were Catholic. I knew that our presi-
dent was Catholic, too. Loyal to him, I liked President Diem and wanted 
to fi ght for him, even though I didn’t know much about Christianity. In 
Long Xuyen, there were two small Catholic churches among a couple 
dozen Buddhist temples. It seemed to me that the rich kids and wealthy 
families went to the Catholic churches every Sunday. Th ey had to dress 
up or wore something very nice to go in there. Th ey had to know how to 
read French or English. We didn’t have to worry about our dress or shoes 
when we stopped by at the Buddhist temples. Anybody can go in there 
anytime.
At the training camp, I received a copy of the Bible for the fi rst time. 
Of course, it was in Vietnamese. I could read it, but I didn’t. Th ese Catho-
lic offi  cers were very mean people, who yelled to us every day, beat some 
of the new recruits, and even spit in our soup and then asked us to drink it 
up. Th ey were not nice to us at all. Th ey only wanted to please their supe-
rior offi  cers and the American advisers in the camp. Th ey worked for the 
Americans and got paid by the Americans anyway.
Aft er the training, I was assigned to the First Battalion, Th ird Infan-
try Regiment of An Giang Command, Fourth Tactical Zone. My battalion 
stationed around Cai Dau to protect Route 9, one of the major provin-
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cial roads. It was a little far away from my hometown. From 1962 to 1964, 
we worked on President Diem’s “Strategic Hamlet Program” in the villages 
around Cai Dau. Our company moved into a village and worked with vil-
lage armed teams, or the Popular Force, to build up their defense work. Th e 
“Strategic Hamlet Program” was aimed at separating the Viet Cong’s guer-
rilla troops from the South Vietnamese farmers in order to cut off  their 
supply and recruitment and reduce their harassment.9 Aft er we fi nished 
the defense work construction and trained the local farmers in one village, 
we moved on to another village. It seemed to be working and we felt very 
good by helping the farmers just like us. I liked the policy and enjoyed what 
we were doing for their safety and protection against Viet Cong insurgents. 
I felt that we had accomplished our mission each time leaving a village. I 
became a corporal in 1963. Unfortunately, President Diem was killed later 
that year and then the “Strategic Hamlet Program” was winding down in 
the next year.
In 1965–1966, we began to engage in the battles. Many of these fi ghts 
took place in the hills, forest, or along the river. I had no idea why we were 
sent out in the middle of nowhere. Th e country became ugly because of 
this long war. We saw some forest burned down to the ground, some hills 
turned black because of heavy bombing, and many shell holes all over the 
rice fi eld. I was scared every time we were sent out in the woods or on 
the hills. Our battalion took heavy casualties and some of the men just 
deserted during the operations. I also saw many civilian casualties, includ-
ing women and children who were just like my neighbors and friends in 
my hometown. I prayed every day for Buddha’s mercy through my faith for 
the end of this endless killing and destruction.
More American advisers came to our battalion. Th ey commanded 
many of the battles. We were asked to learn how to speak and read English. 
I started my English study by taking some conversation and reading classes 
off ered in our camp. Because of my educational background, I made a good 
progress in my English learning and soon became a teaching assistant to 
our American language instructors.
Th e year of 1967 was the best year in my service since I was selected 
to receive further training as Battalion Maintenance Offi  cer in the United 
States. For the fi rst time in my life, I took a military airplane and fl ew out 
of the country. Th ere were fi ve other ARVN offi  cers in this training group. 
We studied the curriculum in military technology, communication, and 
management at a U.S. Army base. Th en we took some hands-on training 
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courses. We learned a lot of new things in three months. We had a good 
time during our training in the U.S.
Aft er my return, I got promoted to a master sergeant. Th e year of 1968, 
however, was the worst in my service. We had more casualties and deserters 
than ever before. I tried to take care of my unit during each operation. But 
the battle got tougher and tougher, since we were then fi ghting against the 
well-trained regular forces from the North Vietnam Army [NVA] rather 
than the guerrilla troops of the Viet Cong [NLF]. My friend got shot in the 
back and I got injured in my arm in a battle. Th e bullet was aimed for me 
because I was the one with the machine gun. Th e bullet’s casing chafed my 
arm. I still have a big scar. I remember my friend. He was lying down on his 
stomach right before he got shot in the back. When he was hit, his whole 
body rose almost two feet into the air and he ended up on his back. It was 
so sad to see your friend die.
Th e wound prevented my return to the combat unit aft er my hospital-
ization. In 1969, I was so happy to know that I was reassigned to a train-
ing base near Long Xuyen, my hometown. Since I knew how to speak and 
teach English, I became an instructor of English language and small arms 
S.Sgt. Huynh Van No (left ) and the author in Ho Chi Minh City in 2006.
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in the training programs from 1970 to 1975. My family was happy to see 
me back alive and working as an offi  cer in the city. I also taught English as 
a part-time teacher at a local middle school, which I enjoyed the most, in 
1972–1975. I visited the Buddhist temples with my students and traveled 
to the Ba Den Mountain with my family. You know what happened to me 
aft er 1975.10 As a Buddhist, I am always happy.
Chapter 2
Surviving the Bloody Jungle
Rose always prepared the green tea in the traditional way before each inter-
view. As a sophomore at University of California–Los Angeles (UCLA), she 
took the Vietnamese language class and History of Modern Southeast Asia. 
She learned a lot about the country her parents came from, and tried to 
understand why they could not go back. “I will get a job at LA aft er my col-
lege,” Rose told me behind her father. “I want to move my parents from the 
Twin Cities to California. Th e weather is much warmer there.” Her voice was 
low but adamant. She continued, “I will save some money and take my par-
ents back to Vietnam for a visit. You can tell they really miss their hometown. 
It has been twenty-eight years.” What a wonderful daughter for the ARVN 
veteran! Lt. Nguyen Yen Xuan is so lucky!
Lieutenant Xuan is certainly proud of his daughter and two sons. But he 
did not feel lucky at all, just like so many ARVN soldiers who went through 
the Vietnam War.1 “We could have won the war.” He said it many times. His 
story contradicts some Western assumptions that internal reasons caused the 
weaknesses of the ARVN. Lieutenant Xuan explained that external factors 
played a major role in the ARVN’s failure. Among these external problems 
was the attempt, on the part of the United States and ARVN high command, 
to Americanize the ARVN troops through U.S. aid and training. Th us, U.S. 
aid came with many conditions demanding the Vietnamese fi ght the war in 
an American way. In the meantime, the ARVN became more dependent on 
the Americans. Moreover, the White House and Pentagon did not design or 
expect an ARVN victory for the Vietnamese people, but an American victory 
for South Vietnam’s government.
As a soldier in the Airborne Division, the elite forces of the ARVN, Lieu-
tenant Xuan felt like he was fi ghting the war for the Americans in 1968–1973. 
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Aft er the United States withdrew its troops from South Vietnam in 1973, the 
incomplete Americanization led to the total defeat of the ARVN. He believed 
that the ARVN soldiers should have fought their own war, not the American 
War. In 1968, South Vietnam’s government called up every available man 
for service. By 1969, the ARVN totaled 1 million strong, including 400,000 
national troops in thirteen infantry divisions, 250,000 men as regional or 
provincial troops, and 350,000 local or Popular Troops.2 Among the three 
forces, the national troops were the best combat troops. Th ey received better 
weapons and equipment and had American advisers top down to the battal-
ion levels. Th e national troops, however, suff ered the heaviest casualties since 
they engaged in more battles than other forces. From 1969 to 1971, the ARVN 
averaged combat deaths of 22,000 men per year, and by 1974 it had a total of 
254,256 dead and 783,602 wounded in action.3 Besides the heavy casualties, 
all of the ARVN units also suff ered low morale, poor combat eff ectiveness, 
and high desertion rates.4
Lt. Nguyen Yen Xuan
C Company, Second Battalion, Airborne Division, ARVN 
(South Vietnam)
When the war began, I didn’t know anything about it since I was very 
young. I became aware of the war when my oldest brother enlisted in the 
ARVN, and then another elder brother. Th ey wanted to protect their home-
town from Viet Cong harassment.5 I think they did a pretty good job and 
our family business was growing. I helped my parents’ small shop to sell 
food and goods.
In the late 1960s, however, my brothers and their unit were transferred 
somewhere far away from our town. According to my parents, the war situ-
ation seemed to be turning bad. I was draft ed into the ARVN in 1969 and 
stayed until 1975, when the South lost the war to the North. During the 
fi rst three years, I was trained and served in the Infantry Division, and 
then was transferred to the Airborne Division, one of the strongest units 
in South Vietnam.
In 1969, I received three-month training, including how to fi re a gun, 
operate small arms, and other techniques on how to fi ght. Aft er our basic 
training, we were sent to an ARVN advanced [technical] training base. We 
learned how to ride on helicopters, drive a light truck, and operate some 
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machines. I found that learning experience fun and interesting. One day, 
we were told that the Viet Congs were going to attack our base, and we had 
to be prepared. I was so nervous at that time since it was my fi rst battle. For 
weeks, there was no attack.
I never forget my fi rst battle, which was a surprise attack on our techni-
cal training base. Th at evening, aft er dinner, we were lying in our tent and 
talking to two other guys from my hometown. One of them had shopped 
in our family store before he joined the army. Th ey came to visit me and 
shared some of their survival experiences. It seemed to me they were so 
smart, like big brothers, and not scared of anything, like a role model to 
me. I hoped I could go home together with these new friends.
Not too long aft er their leaving my tent, enemy mortars began falling at 
our base. Th e Viet Cong launched a night attack. I got ready and followed 
the others to the defensive trench positions. I couldn’t see anything in the 
dark outside the base, and I fi red only twice. Th at was probably the reason I 
didn’t get killed that night. I learned later that the Viet Cong snipers looked 
for targets by spotting the gun fi ring points. Th e more you fi red, the bet-
ter chance you could get shot. Th e Viet Cong didn’t take over our base that 
night. Aft er their withdrawal, next morning, we cleared up and gathered 
the men who died last night. Th e two men from my hometown were killed 
when their tent was hit by mortars. I couldn’t believed that a night before we 
were just talking about our families and were looking forward to returning 
to our hometown together. And now they both died. It was really sad.
Aft er the technical training, I was assigned to the Th ird Company, Sec-
ond Battalion, Twenty-third Infantry Division. I made some new friends 
in the company. Since the company was stationed close to the Viet Cong-
occupied areas, we frequently engaged with the Viet Cong troops.
One day, when we patrolled along the road, we were ambushed by the 
Viet Cong. We took cover and fi red back. For fi ft een minutes, we couldn’t 
see the enemy, but kept shooting randomly. One of my friends, who was 
just behind me, got shot and fell down. Everyone thought he was dead. 
About twenty minutes later, we received air support, which pointed out 
the enemy positions. Th e captain reorganized us into small groups to tar-
get diff erent enemy positions. Soon the Viet Cong disappeared into the 
bushes. And, to everyone’s surprise, my friend somehow sat up from the 
ground and waved to us. He had returned to life! I was so happy and helped 
him get up. He was lucky. Our company lost nineteen men in this thirty-
minute battle. We also had thirty-seven men wounded.
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Th ere were more American advisers who came to our battalion in 
1970. I liked the American advisers. Smart and funny, they were curi-
ous to almost everything in Vietnam. I really appreciate their sacrifi cing 
their own lives for the freedom and democracy of the Vietnamese people. 
During the battle, we felt like friends working together. We covered each 
other, helped each other, and shared food and water with each other. But, 
aft er each operation, they went back to their camp and their life, and we 
returned back to our camp and our life. Th at was the reality. We realized 
that the Vietnamese and American soldiers were diff erent people.
Th e American advisers were very young, younger than average Viet-
namese soldiers. In some cases, they didn’t have enough experience in the 
jungle. But they were very bossy and always demanded us to do things 
their way, the American way. If we didn’t follow their instructions, they 
always threatened us by cutting our supplies, or reducing our rations. Th ey 
provided us with weapons, ammunition, and aid with so many conditions 
to make sure we did everything in their way.
Many of our operations were commanded by the American offi  cers. 
And in an operation, we usually were ordered to “follow the Marines!” or to 
“cover the Americans!” or something like that. We felt like we were work-
ing for the Americans. Th e Vietnamese offi  cers in our battalion and divi-
sion commands didn’t question the American advisers’ decisions because 
they needed ammunition, new equipment, and supplies for their troops. 
Th ey used Americans like their supply offi  cers or warehouse keepers. I can 
tell you that some of the Vietnamese offi  cers were interested only in how to 
get money and supplies and tried to avoid the battles. Many ARVN soldiers 
also lost their interest in the war and left  the service. Many of us felt that the 
war was designed by the American leaders in the White House for us not 
to win. Th ey were only interested in America’s victory, not the Vietnamese 
victory. We were fi ghting the American War in Vietnam.
Because of the large casualties and desertions, we received new replace-
ments aft er each battle. You fought with diff erent men next time. It was 
hard to know each other and form some sort of brotherhood. We off ered 
cigarettes and candy bars to each other, and talked about our hometown a 
little bit. Usually, those who were in the army longer played a big brother 
role since we were pretty much the same age. Th e offi  cers, medics, and 
cooks were the older guys in our company. Th ey took good care of us. I 
remember one day, when they were cooking rice, we received an order to 
move out. Th e cooks didn’t want to stop cooking and throw away the rice. 
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Th ey had four guys carry the rice cookers to continue their cooking during 
our march. It was really funny. As soon as we got to the new location, they 
served us a hot meal. Th ey were nice and hard-working guys. Th ey always 
cooked some special dishes to celebrate when no one from our company 
got killed or hurt aft er a battle. It was the best time.
Th en, in early 1972, a group of the experienced soldiers in the Twenty-
third Division was transferred to the Airborne Division. I was one of them. 
We were so happy because the Airborne was the best division of all the 
ARVN forces.6
I was assigned to C Company, Second Battalion. We were sent to Sai-
gon for advanced training for three months. We learned how to ride on the 
helicopters, engage aft er landing, conduct night operations, and surprise 
attack behind the enemy lines. We also learned some new technologies.
We were trained and equipped in the image of our U.S. counterpart. We 
learned how to do things in the American way. We dressed like American 
soldiers, operated like Americans, and were treated as an American unit. 
Th at was the fi rst time I had to learn English, since some of the equipment 
instructions and manuals were in English. We moved frequently from one 
base to another, but most of them in the cities, such as Da Nang, Th uong
Duc, Tung Son, Hue, Deo Phu Da, and Phu Tuc.7 In many cases, our unit 
served as a rescue force to save or safeguard the other ARVN infantry 
troops. We usually stayed at one base for a few weeks, and then we were 
transported to another base. At Phu Tuc, we engaged against the NVA, the 
North Vietnamese infantry regiments.
Th e battle at Phu Tuc was a hard one. Th e NVA proved a better fi ght-
ing force than the Viet Cong. We suff ered heavy casualties, and were sur-
rounded by the NVA for days. Finally, we were relieved by the U.S. Marines 
and returned back to Saigon. Th en we transferred to other diff erent places, 
such as Th anh Noi, Dang Th anh, Nam Giao, Deo Nong Nuoc, and Long 
Khang. Our airborne troops were transported to various bases.
Aft er the American troops pulled out of Vietnam in 1973, the Air-
borne Division didn’t perform as well as many had expected. We were an 
Americanized division, which had depended upon the American mil-
itary system in South Vietnam. Aft er the American withdrawal, we lost 
this highly centralized command and support system, including commu-
nication, transportation, and logistics. We suff ered heavy casualties and 
lost a lot of equipment, but there were not much new recruits, nor new 
replacements.8
28 A Country Divided
Th e toughest battle for me was the one at Long Khang in 1975. One 
of the infantry divisions was under attack by the NVA at Long Khang. We 
were sent by helicopters into the fi ghting zone at night. For three weeks, we 
fought a tough defense against the NVA attack. I thought we would never 
get out of there.
Aft er the battle, we transferred to Son Loc, Phuoc Ty, and Dung Tao. 
When we were stationed at Dung Tao, Gen. Cham Lan and Pres. Duong 
Van Minh ordered all the ARVN troops to surrender.9 We didn’t know why, 
but we obeyed the order and stopped fi ghting.
Aft er that, our unit just fell apart and everyone seemed on your own. 
I didn’t know where to go. Many of my friends got on the trucks heading 
South, back to home. My hometown had already been taken by the Viet 
Cong and I heard about the Viet Cong’s policy of punishing those who had 
served in the ARVN like me. I was afraid of going back home and serving 
jail time. Like the other men, I burned all of my military papers and photo 
pictures taken during my service.
I found a U.S. cargo ship and the sailors allowed some of us to board. 
I had no idea where I was going and what I would do aft er the war. All I 
wanted was to leave the country and avoid any punishment, since I didn’t 
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think I had done anything wrong as an individual Vietnamese. I had served 
my country and protected my people. Why do I have to go to jail for that?
Aft er arriving in America, I didn’t know where to go and what to do. I 
traveled with several others to Minnesota and worked on farms. I was kind 
of like a seasonal handyman and moved from one farm to another. I did 
anything they asked me to. Th en I found a job in a local Coca-Cola bot-
tling company. I have been working there ever since. I missed my parents, 
brothers, and sisters. I missed my hometown and my country, to which I 
never returned. Th e country I loved had disappeared long ago.
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Chapter 3
Electronic Reconnaissance
vs. Guerrillas
Humble and shy, Lt. Nguyen Nhieu always used a low voice during the inter-
views and our conversations. Sometimes my recorder failed to pick up his 
words.1 Th at day, however, I couldn’t believe my own ears when he told me 
that he was getting married the next weekend. “Congratulations,” I loudly 
shouted, trying to overcome the background noise in the Chinese restaurant. 
“Tell me about the bride.” I was excited and curious. “Her name is Nguyen 
Nhi,” Lieutenant Nhieu said, still keeping his voice low. He showed me her 
photo. Big eyes and round face, Nhi is a nice looking and happy woman. 
Lieutenant Nhieu told me that she was well educated and had written a few 
books in Vietnamese. He gave me three of her recent publications at the din-
ner table.2 “All about the war,” his voice got even lower. “You may like them. 
Not me. She is part of it. She lost her legs in the war, and she is in the wheel-
chair.” I was shocked and became speechless. It was hard for me to imagine 
such a happy and intelligent woman rolling down the aisle in a wheelchair at 
her wedding.
Lt. Nguyen Nhieu received his college education and was admitted to 
a law school in South Vietnam. But the ongoing war interrupted his higher 
education and made him an intelligence offi  cer in the ARVN Navy. He 
received his formal reconnaissance training both in South Vietnam and in 
the United States from the best instructors with the most up-to-date tech-
nology.3 Th e U.S. Navy provided technical support and trained Vietnamese 
offi  cers for their intelligence mission.4 Lieutenant Nhieu’s story is notable for 
its details in naval intelligence collection of the South Vietnamese Navy. As 
one of the largest navies in the world, the ARVN Navy had more than 1,400 
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ships and gunboats, with 42,000 soldiers and sailors—seemingly everything 
needed to fi ght against the NVA and Viet Cong along the coast and in the riv-
ers. According to Lieutenant Nhieu, however, the ARVN Navy failed to play 
any signifi cant role in fi ghting the Communist forces and defending South 
Vietnam during the war. He believes the navy had problems similar to those 
of the other ARVN services, including political activity, personal networks, 
and careerism, which weakened the morale of offi  cers and soldiers alike and 
distracted them from their military missions.
Lt. Nguyen Nhieu
Chief, Electronic Reconnaissance Team, Giang Doan and Ham Doi 
Naval Bases, ARVN Navy (South Vietnam)
During my college years, in the spring of 1968, a law school in Saigon 
accepted my application. My mother was so happy since she thought I didn’t 
have to serve in the military, as my father and two elder brothers were doing 
at that time. She also planned for me to apply for the further study overseas 
in the Western countries like the United States. In the fall, however, I found 
out that the war was everywhere and aff ected everybody in the college. Nei-
ther the students nor the faculty members were allowed to travel abroad. All 
the professors talked about the war in their classes. Antiwar fl yers and ral-
lies fl ooded the cafeteria and dorms. Th e students were guessing who the 
secret Viet Cong members were and who the undercover South Vietnamese 
government agents were on the campus. Some students disappeared from 
my classes and never came back. Rumors followed them. Th ese students 
either left  the capital city for the Viet Cong guerrilla force or were assas-
sinated by the secret agents. Everybody worried about the outcome of the 
war, not about their grade in the class. Certainly, your career and your future 
depended upon which side you were on, not how well you were educated.
I just couldn’t learn any more aft er I had fi nished my general education 
in my fi rst year as a freshman. Toward the end of the fall semester in late 
1969, a couple of naval offi  cers visited our classroom for recruitment pur-
poses. Aft er their propaganda and off er briefi ng, I signed up for the ARVN 
Navy without much hesitation. My decision almost blew away my mother, 
who cried and yelled at me, complaining why I didn’t talk to her before my 
enlistment. She didn’t understand why I volunteered when everybody else 
tried to avoid the draft .
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I explained to her that I believed it was a very good off er. First of all, 
the ARVN Navy promised one year of training in a naval academy. All the 
courses I would take were considered as college credits to fulfi ll my degree 
requirement. Th at would include a six-month study in the South Vietnam-
ese naval academy and six-month training in a naval school in America.5 
My mother felt better aft er she knew about the training opportunity in 
America. Second, aft er training, I would be a naval offi  cer working in the 
offi  ce, not a soldier on the front line. Th ird, I had to serve in the military 
before my graduation or before I would start to look for a job. You can’t get 
any government position or any decent job in a law fi rm without a military 
service record in South Vietnam. Eventually, my mother agreed with me.
In January 1970, I joined the ARVN Navy. For the next three months, 
I received some basic training at a naval base in Saigon.6 Th ere were about 
two hundred naval trainees in our class. We drilled every day and learned 
how to use small arms. We visited various ships and gunboats and took 
part in several naval exercises off  the coast. I still remember that one day we 
got on board an American warship outside the Saigon harbor. Th e Ameri-
can ship was equipped with new technology and powerful weapons. And, 
American sailors and offi  cers were very friendly.
Aft er the basic training, they sent me with forty other offi  cer-students 
from our class to a naval academy in Nha Trang City for advanced training. 
For the next four months, I studied electronics engineering, radar opera-
tions, and electronic detection technology at the naval school. Some of the 
instructors were American naval offi  cers. Patient and kind, they taught us 
everything from the books to their combat experience. All of us studied 
very hard. We were told that only the top ten out of forty offi  cer-students 
would go to America for further training and study. I worked very hard 
during these months. My strong English background and solid core curric-
ulum at the college had really helped me all the way to the top of the class. 
By the end of this advanced training, I knew that I was going to America 
for further study, and that I would become a petty offi  cer fi rst class.
In August 1970, I came to America with eight of my classmates from 
the Nha Trang Navy Academy. We went to the U.S. Naval War College 
at Newport, Rhode Island. We were divided into two groups, four of us 
studying naval intelligence.7 I studied electronic interception and detec-
tion of enemy signals, radio messages, and telegraphs. Even though they 
cut our training from six to three months, I learned a lot at the U.S. Naval 
War College. We traveled a lot during this period, including trips to New 
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York, Washington, Philadelphia, Chicago, Norfolk, and Miami. Th at was 
an eye-opening experience, and I began to dream of coming to America 
aft er the war.
Upon my return, I was promoted to lieutenant by the ARVN Navy in 
November 1970. Th e ARVN Navy had two main branches: the off shore sea 
fl eet and the inland river fl eet.8 I was assigned to the river operations at the 
Giang Doan River base. I served two years in the river unit, and two years 
with the sea fl eet at the Ham Doi Naval Base.
From 1971 to 1973, my assignment was electronic information col-
lection along the rivers for the ARVN Naval Intelligence Center. I led an 
intelligence team of about forty naval offi  cers and sailors. We were travel-
ing on a small reconnaissance boat equipped with new electronic devices. 
We were sailing along the rivers with six or eight offi  cers, about three or 
four days for each trip. We collected electronic information by intercepting 
Saigon and Surrounding River Bases, 1964–1975
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radio signals of the NVA and Viet Cong. Th ese Communist radio opera-
tors and communication offi  cers must have been very well trained. It was 
very diffi  cult for us to break their codes and to fi gure out what they were 
talking about. Aft er each trip, we analyzed the information and reported 
the Communist troops’ movements and deployments to the navy intelli-
gence center.
As the collection team chief, I knew my mission and tried to avoid 
any engagement with the Viet Cong and NVA in order to protect my team 
members and electronic equipment. On several occasions, however, we 
had to fi ght our way out of a dangerous situation.
In February 1972, for example, we were sailing along the Go Quao 
River near Rach Gia. On the third day, we discovered information of a 
large-scale movement of the NVA troops. When the Communist troops 
moved, we followed them for two days. On the fourth day, however, we lost 
their radio signals because they had marched too far away from the river. 
In order to fi nd out their destination, I decided to land our team and fol-
low the NVA movements. Before we could relocate these troops, we were 
ambushed by the local Viet Cong from a village. One of the offi  cers was 
killed, and two were wounded. I had a minor injury. It was so sad to see 
your men get killed or wounded because they followed your orders. I still 
feel sorry about those offi  cers today. But at that moment you are sure that 
these men are loyal to you and to our government.
I knew that the Communists considered the U.S. and ARVN intelli-
gence the most dangerous and that our intelligence would be fatal to their 
victory. Th us, they tried everything they could to neutralize our opera-
tions and destroy our units. As a team chief, I was told from time to time 
by my superiors that our security wasn’t perfect and there could be inside 
VC agents, that you needed self-protection and trusted nobody, and that 
you were always prepared for the worst. My offi  cers were transferred fre-
quently, and we changed our team base several times.
In the spring of 1973, aft er the American troops withdrew, I was trans-
ferred to the sea fl eet and led an intelligence collection team on an escort 
ship. Th is was a big gunship, but I had a smaller group, about ten offi  -
cers, working under my command most of the time. I had a similar assign-
ment: collecting electronic information and intercepting radio signals of 
the movements the Viet Cong [PLAF] and NVA forces.
I was unhappy about this transfer, not because of the new assignment, 
but because of a missed promotion opportunity. I was supposed to be pro-
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moted to lieutenant commander during this transfer. But somebody else 
got the promotion. Th at was the problem of the ARVN Navy, in which 
honest people didn’t get promoted or awarded, but those sneaky and dis-
honest people would get all they wanted. I served as a lieutenant for four 
years with the Navy. I never got a promotion.
Nevertheless, we had better electronic equipment and a longer range 
radar system built in the escort ship, which had been operated by the U.S. 
Navy and then was transferred to the ARVN Navy.9 It had an up-to-date 
weapon system with many new technical features. When it patrolled and 
engaged, we sailed as part of its crew out in the seas. We conducted coastal 
and oceanic information collection and analysis.
We engaged in a couple dozen naval operations. Most of them were 
bombarding the NVA coastal positions and supporting our ground opera-
tions. Several of them were rescue missions to transport our ground troops 
out of the Communist attacks. I still remember one confrontation with the 
Chinese Communist Navy near the South China Sea.
During one patrol in the summer of 1973, we identifi ed several Chi-
nese vessels leaving the international waters around the South China Sea 
and approaching our waters. Our fl eet, including two cruisers and one sup-
ply ship, sailed toward the Chinese in order to stop a possible violation of 
our sovereignty. Th e Chinese fl eet, including two cruisers and two destroy-
ers, didn’t stop and continued to sail toward us. Around noon, both fl eets 
met each other near the water boundary [twelve miles off  the coast]. And 
then both stopped face to face in close range. Our cruiser crew rushed to 
their battle positions and prepared for combat. We were ready to destroy 
our code books, manuals, and other documents. Th e standoff  took about 
one hour. Th en the Chinese warships backed down and pulled out. But I 
was surprised that, aft er they sailed away, the Chinese ships turned around 
and fi red on us. We returned fi re. Although the exchange of gunfi re was 
intense, it didn’t cause much damage since we were far enough from each 
other. I didn’t know what kind of game the Chinese Navy was trying to 
play. Our commanders reported our victory against an invading Chinese 
fl eet. My guess was that the Chinese probably did the same thing.
Th is was another problem of the ARVN Navy. Th e commanders and 
offi  cers tended to report victories and make up some good news, and not 
report the real problems or the truth. We lacked the nationalistic spirit in 
our offi  cers, most of whom didn’t dedicate their lives to the cause. Our 
navy and South Vietnamese armed forces needed a strong fi ghting spirit 
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so that we could have stayed on our course. Th e spirit would create mira-
cles. Unfortunately, our enemy forces had a fi ghting spirit, were dedicated 
to their cause, and won the war. Certainly, they had an evil cause, which 
didn’t lead to the salvation of the Vietnamese people, but led to Commu-
nist control.
Aft er the war, I was jailed by the Communist government from 1975 
to 1979. Aft er I was released, I returned to My Th o, my hometown. I was 
treated as a criminal by the neighbors for many years.
Nevertheless, my mother was so happy to see me back home. Aft er my 
father died, I was her only surviving family since she lost two of three sons 
in the war. I looked for all kinds of jobs and worked hard for her.
In 1992, my dream was coming true: I came to America through 
humanitarian organizations’ programs. I regained my human dignity. I am 
proud of my service in the ARVN Navy, and American people here respect 
that. Th ey appreciated our sacrifi ce and loss during our fi ght against the 
Communists. Living in Fort Worth, Texas, I am working hard to try to 
settle down, and then I can bring my mother to America. She has suff ered 
enough, and I am her only family.
Lt. Nguyen Nhieu in the
United States in 1998.
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Chapter 4
Communist Regulars
from the North
Although I met many parents from overseas on American college cam-
puses, I have seen few grandparents from Asian countries. As a grandfa-
ther, Sgt. Tran Th anh traveled all the way from Hanoi to Florida to attend 
his granddaughter’s graduation commencement at the university. “My son 
and daughter-in-law work in the government, so they can’t take off  from 
their offi  ce,” Sergeant Th anh told me. I knew that many Vietnamese offi  -
cials could only come to America for offi  cial business, not for a family visit. 
Complacent and aff able, Sergeant Th anh was very glad to see me and talk 
about his family story and service in the North Vietnamese Army.1 He did 
not mind going into detail on the Communist Party organization, political 
propaganda, mass mobilization, NVA guerrilla tactics, and battles against 
American soldiers. “I told American friends my story,” he said. “Th ey should 
know more about Vietnam.”
Th e Vietnamese Communist force was founded on December 22, 1944, 
during World War II, with a total of fi ve thousand men. In November 1946, 
North Vietnam, then the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), passed its 
fi rst constitution and established its Defense Ministry with Gen. Vo Nguyen 
Giap as its fi rst defense minister and commander-in-chief of the North Viet-
namese forces. In 1950, they were reorganized and renamed as the People’s 
Army of Vietnam (PAVN, or NVA, commonly known as the Viet Minhs dur-
ing the French Indochina War), with 50,000 troops. By the end of the French 
Indochina War in 1954, the Viet Minhs totaled 120,000 regulars. In May 
1955, the NVA established its navy, followed by its air force in September 
1956. Aft er 1958, it formed its armored, antichemical, radar, engineering, 
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and other special forces. Th e NVA had 380,000 troops in 1964, and 1 million 
men by 1972.2
Tran Th anh was draft ed into the NVA like all the adult males between 
eighteen and forty-fi ve in the North. He received formal infantry training and 
learned how to use Russian- and Chinese-made weapons.3 From the early 
1960s, North Vietnam sent its NVA regulars to the South to train and support 
Southern Communist troops, the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), 
to fi ght the ARVN and the U.S. forces in guerrilla operations. From 1964, 
Hanoi infi ltrated an annual average of 100,000 troops, including some of the 
best units, through the Ho Chi Minh Trail to South Vietnam. Th e NVA actu-
ally provided the main force of the Communist insurgency in the South.
In the spring of 1965, Sergeant Th anh’s company was sent to South Viet-
nam. From April to November, he fought in several battles around the Cen-
tral Highlands and the surrounding mountainous areas. By the 1968 Tet 
Off ensive, the NVA/PLAF in the South reached a total strength of 400,000 
troops. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the NVA/PLAF expanded its oper-
ations into Cambodia and Laos. From January 1961 to January 1973, the 
NVA/PLAF suff ered 851,000 military deaths.4 It is interesting to see Sergeant 
Th anh’s views on his South Vietnamese Communist allies, ARVN opponents, 
and the Americans then and now. His story about life in the NVA is valu-
able because there is little information on the North Vietnamese Communist 
forces in English.
Sgt. Tran Th anh
Th ird Company, 174th Regiment, 316th Division, NVA 
(North Vietnamese Army)
I love Connie, my granddaughter. Her parents sent her to study in America 
four years ago. Now I traveled all the way from Hanoi to Florida, attend-
ing Connie’s graduation commencement in Tampa, and helping her move 
to New Orleans, Louisiana. Th is is my fi rst trip to America. Among other 
things, I like southern weather, seafood, and local Vietnamese restaurants 
along the gulf coast. Not many complaints, but, as a smoker, it is hard for 
me to fi nd a “smoking area” by guessing the signs in English and Spanish.
Connie loves Florida, too. Active and dynamic, she participated in 
many international student activities on campus and didn’t miss a local 
Asian community celebration. But she couldn’t attend any Vietnamese 
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Society (Cong Dong Viet Nam) gatherings in the Tampa Bay area, because 
she is from North Vietnam, or Communist Vietnam, now offi  cially the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. I couldn’t believe it when Connie told me 
what happened to her. Th ere are still two Vietnams in today’s America. Th e 
war was over almost thirty years [by 2004]. Vietnam and America normal-
ized their relationship about ten years ago. It’s history. Th ere is no reason of 
disliking us, especially our kids. We can become friends. I always start my 
conversation with an American Vietnam War veteran by saying, “Friends 
are made aft er a fi ght.” Most people here liked it aft er Connie’s translation. 
We truly know each other aft er we fought the war. And both peoples have 
learned that we won’t fi ght again. I just did what the Vietnamese people 
had to do at that time, including the minorities in North Vietnam.
In 1939, I was born to a Black Th ai family in a small mountainous 
village near Lai Chau, North Vietnam. Among Vietnam’s minorities, the 
Black Th ai people are diff erent from the White and Red Th ais. With a total 
of a half million, the Black Th ais are so called for our darker skin color and 
black garb of the women. We dwell mainly in the upland valleys of north-
western Vietnam and northeastern Laos. Our family affi  liation determines 
our status and occupation. While a few families in my village formed polit-
ical and religious elite, others furnished farmers, artisans, and soldiers.
According to the Black Th ai tradition, every man is a soldier. He lives 
a life close to the land and to the warfare. Bravery, self-discipline, physical 
toughness, stoicism, and martial arts are fundamental to his lifestyle. Dis-
cipline, loyalty, and frugality are the ethical values of the mountain war-
riors and have been an active force in the Black Th ai community. For a 
Black Th ai man, his integrity and loyalty are based on the protection he can 
provide to his family and village. It’s a collective eff ort, or a team defense. 
In the past, Black Th ai villages always faced external threats and foreign 
invasions such as Chinese, French, and Japanese conquests and occupa-
tions. Since long, each village organized its men into a “self-defense team” 
to protect its people and land. Th e self-defense team trained the men, orga-
nized village defense, and also sent volunteers or conscripts to the national 
armed forces.
My family has a tradition of service. My father joined the nationalist 
resistance force against the Japanese invaders during World War II. Two 
of my brothers served in the Viet Minh against the French invading forces 
and fought at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.5 Th e Vietnamese Communist Party 
provided a strong military and political leadership that helped the Black 
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Th ai and all the Vietnamese peoples in the North achieve their victory and 
national independence. My father and my brothers became heroes of our 
village since they served the country and the people against foreign inva-
sions. Servicemen are respected. Th ose who were killed in action have 
their names placed in the village temple next to the ancestors. Th ey are 
worshipped by younger generations. My childhood dream was to be a sol-
dier when I grew up.
In 1950, I went to a nearby elementary school about three miles from 
my village. I remember having a one-hour drill every morning, including 
marching, shooting, bayoneting, and martial arts training. It seemed to us 
at the time that joining the army and fi ghting a war would be a lot of fun. I 
learned for the fi rst time about the Geneva Settlement of 1954 in my elemen-
tary school. We were told that the settlement ended French colonization in 
Vietnam (1876–1954). But a corrupted, dictatorial, and brutal government, 
the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), controlled the South and was murdering 
and torturing its people. It made sense to us that the North should liberate 
the South and achieve national reunifi cation by force.
Aft er elementary school, I returned to my village in 1954 and became 
a farmer working in rice paddies and coff ee plantations. As with all the 
males between sixteen and fi ft y-nine, I joined the “Self-defense Force” in 
1955. Th e Self-defense Force was a local militia organization. Based on 
the rice-rooted, traditional “village self-defense team,” it was well estab-
lished in the rural areas across North Vietnam. Th e Self-defense Force in 
my village was under the command of a self-defense committee chaired 
by the village chief. He was under the command of the county self-defense 
committee. Th e county committee was commanded by the provincial self-
defense committee. In my village, each family had two or three militia 
members. Th ree families formed a group, three groups became a team, and 
three teams served as a section. All the section leaders sat on the village 
self-defense committee. I remember that we drilled regularly with light 
weapons, and that we provided local security and emergency or rescue ser-
vices. Women and children under sixteen were encouraged to participate 
in some of our training and activities. Th e most dangerous job, as I remem-
bered, was hunting mountain tigers in the winter when they came down 
from the mountains and attacked villagers and their livestock.
Aft er two years of farming and militia training, I was conscripted by 
the NVA in 1958 as a reservist, like all the adult males between eighteen 
and forty-fi ve in the village. I served two months every year in a Black Th ai 
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battalion stationed at Lai Chau, a small city in northwestern Vietnam. Th e 
reserve was local, ethnic, and based on a rotation system. Our company 
mainly consisted of Black Th ai soldiers who came from my village and sev-
eral surrounding villages. I knew most of the men in the company. We 
came to the same company under the same commanding offi  cers and pre-
formed active duties, including border patrol, city security, political study, 
and intensive training. Th at was the moment of the year for me since there 
were so many new things to learn during each active duty service.
I learned more combat skills and new weapons, including automatic 
rifl es, machine guns, antitank and antiaircraft  rockets, and group-attack 
tactics. Every month, half the company rotated while the other half stayed 
for their second month. In my political education class, the company polit-
ical instructor told the reserves that the American imperialists had invaded 
South Vietnam with a large number of their troops. North Vietnam now 
had two enemies in the South: the corrupt RVN government and aggres-
sive U.S. forces. We should be better prepared for a new war against the 
Americans. Aft er the “Tonkin Gulf Incident” in August 1964, I knew that 
the United States had escalated its ground war in South Vietnam, and had 
shift ed its war eff orts to North Vietnam by increasing its air strikes and 
heavy bombing. Ho Chi Minh, chairman of the Vietnamese Communist 
Party, adopted a new strategy: to defend the North by fi ghting the war in 
the South. At that time, we believed that we could win the war as long as we 
followed Chairman Ho. History has proven he was right.
In the fall of 1964, the NVA sent more infantry troops to the South. In 
the North, the NVA established fi ve antiaircraft  artillery divisions and one 
radar division for air defense. In 1965, it formed two surface-to-air mis-
sile regiments.6 Th e DRV government launched a massive mobilization to 
meet the manpower need for its new operations. Th e NVA divisions began 
to activate their reserves. Each NVA infantry division formed regionally. 
For example, most of the soldiers and offi  cers of the 308th Division were 
from Hanoi, the capital city of North Vietnam. Th e 308th was also called 
the “Capital Division,” as one of the fi rst six divisions established in the 
First Indochina War. Our 316th Division was an ethnic minority division 
in which many soldiers and offi  cers were Th o, Miao, and Th ai minorities 
from the northwestern mountainous region.
In December 1964, the 316th Division command called up all of its 
reserves for active duty. At the division assembly point, I was assigned to 
the Th ird Company, 174th Regiment. I was excited when I reported to the 
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company. I didn’t care what was going to happen next. I was not afraid. 
Two of my best friends, Tuan and Waong, were in my company. We knew 
that we would take care of each other. In a “three-three formation,” the 
316th Division, about fi ft een thousand men, had three regiments, each 
having three battalions, with each battalion having three companies. Th e 
soldiers of the Th ird Company were mostly the Black Th ais from the Lai 
Chau area. During the intensive training for the Southern guerrilla opera-
tion, the Black Th ai soldiers impressed the offi  cers and men by our martial 
arts, shooting, and hand-to-hand combat skills. We earned our nickname, 
the “mountain tigers,” in the company.
In March 1965, the Th ird Company departed for the South.7 We trav-
eled southward by truck along the Black River from Son La, a northwestern 
city, to Linh Cam, a small town in the central region close to the 18th paral-
lel. Th en we rode westward on small trucks entering the Annam Cordillera, 
the Great Mountain Range. I had heard a lot about this forested mountain 
range. As a mountaineer, I really enjoyed traveling up to the great moun-
tain by day and listening to mountain tigers roaring at night.
One morning, Lieutenant Ngu told us that we were going to pass the 
border and enter Laos. He also asked everybody to hand over our personal 
belongings, which might identify our Northern status.8 I surrendered my 
ID papers, a couple of books, and my wallet. But I hesitated about giv-
ing up my girlfriend’s picture since all collected items would be burned. If 
her photo got burned, it would mean bad luck to her, and it could mean I 
would never see her again. I decided to keep her photo. Back on the moun-
tain road, our trucks got slower and slower. At noon, we crossed the bor-
der, where a pine tree separates the two countries with a big bi-lingual sign 
on it, “Viet Nam–Laos.”
Aft er entering Laos, we began our journey on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 
Th e narrow and rocky road was in poor condition through the western 
side of the Truong Son Range in Laos. We had to get off  the truck many 
times and walk through the sections under expansion or repair. Because 
of enemy reconnaissance and air raids, we mostly traveled at night and 
rested by day along the trail. Th e traffi  c at night was very heavy and slow. 
Northern troops, artillery pieces, ammunition, equipment, and supplies 
were lined up for miles, traveling more than fi ve hundred miles, and pass-
ing through Laos from north to south.
In April 1965, the Th ird Company entered South Vietnam from Laos. I 
remember that aft er we moved into the South, we received a couple of new 
Communist Regulars from the North 45
offi  cers as well as a new order from the Central Offi  ce for South Vietnam, 
the NVA frontline command in the South. Th e “new” offi  cers, only new to 
us, were experienced NVA offi  cers in the South for years. Th ey told us that 
we were here to assist the South Vietnamese Communist troops, and that 
we needed to work together with the People’s Liberation Armed Forces 
(PLAF) and the South Vietnamese Communist Party, or the National Lib-
eration Front (NLF). What do you call them, the Viet Cong?
Th en our company was assigned to consolidate and strengthen the lib-
erated villages in the mountainous area not too far from the South Vietnam-
Laos border, or the tri-state region. As a mountain unit, the Th ird Company 
was good at hillside defense work, village underground tunnels, antitank 
positions, and antiaircraft  outpost construction. We worked very hard dur-
ing the spring of 1965. We built the village defense work day and night. We 
also tried to share our defense tactics with the NLF/PLAF villagers. But I 
don’t think they trusted us. Th ere may be a couple of reasons for that.
Th e fi rst reason was a political one between the NVA in the North and 
PLAF in the South. We had a civil war between the North and South. Th en, 
we had a war against America. Th e Southern Vietnamese wanted us to help 
them resist America, but didn’t want us to take over the South. Th ey saw 
the NVA and PLAF as separate entities. We considered them as the one 
Communist force.
Th e second reason may be an ethnic one. Th ey are the Vietnamese 
people, the majority. Some of them were kind of stuck up and didn’t want 
to ask for help from the minorities like the Black Th ais from the North. 
Th ey saw us as the “barbarians.” Th e Vietnamese people, farming the cen-
tral highlands, coastal lowlands, and the deltas of the Red and Mekong riv-
ers, make up 85 percent of the Southern population.
Th rough the spring of 1965, the Th ird Company worked on defense 
work one village at time. Aft er turning each into a fortress, we moved on to 
another village. From time to time, we engaged with the ARVN troops in 
small scale. In many cases, we launched an attack on the ARVN-occupied
village in order to expand our territory. A typical battle began with a charge 
on the ARVN defense point by a squad from the Th ird. Th e ARVN defend-
ers called in their reinforcement, or actually their rescue troops, from the 
nearby town. Th e rescue troops usually provided fi repower strong enough 
to stop our attack and cover the defenders’ withdrawal. During their retreat, 
we just waited for the ARVN defenders to get on their vehicles and run 
away from the village.
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Sometimes, however, the ARVN came back and tried to retake the vil-
lage. One day in 1966, the ARVN attacked one of our well-built defense 
works in a village. Th e Th ird Company got the information ahead of time 
and put together all of its men to defend the village’s underground tunnels. 
Our captain tried to send a message to the enemy troops that we would not 
easily give up our territory. Aft er a two-day fi ght, the Th ird and local Viet 
Cong guerrilla troops successfully defended the village by a joined force. 
Although we won the battle, I lost one of my best friends in it. Waong 
was badly wounded when the ARVN soldiers destroyed part of the under-
ground tunnel and threw several grenades into the section where he was. 
When I saw him aft er the battle, he was covered by blood. He couldn’t 
move at all. We were family friends, and like brothers. I couldn’t help my 
tears while holding one of his hands. “Don’t,” he shook his head, “We are 
the mountain tigers.” Th ese were his last words. We buried him and other 
comrades who were killed in the battle in the village cemetery. Lieutenant 
Ngu told us that we had destroyed one enemy armored vehicle, killed nine-
teen, and wounded thirty-six ARVN soldiers.
In 1968, when our company moved back into Laos, I was promoted to 
sergeant. In Laos, we engaged with the American troops for the fi rst time, 
although most of the battles were in small scale. In 1971, I served as a Black 
Th ai combat training master, or a drill sergeant. We stayed in Laos until 
1973. Our company entered South Vietnam again in 1974 and participated 
in several major off ensive campaigns to liberate our country.9 Aft er we won 
the war in 1975, I retired from the army with honor.
I did what everybody had to do during the war. We did what we felt 
was right for our country and for our family. We did it so they [our kids 
and grandkids] don’t have to go through it. Th e war should be remem-
bered as it was. It’s over, and it’s history. Th e war can’t go on forever. People 
and things are no longer valued on the basis of whether they are “ours” or 
“yours.” Connie is right. Let’s get over it and move on. Well, many Southern 
Vietnamese have left  their homeland. Th ey have a home there. Th ey like to 
express their grievance and justify their residency in a foreign country like 
America. We should understand why they are here. Th ey love America, but 
they don’t have to hate Vietnam. I love my country, and I don’t have prob-
lems with America. Connie loves both countries. I know why she wants to 
fi nd a job here and stay in America aft er her graduation. My son and I don’t 
have any problem with her decision.
Chapter 5
People’s War against Americans
Nicely framed family photos covered the small living/dinning room wall. A 
full-size bed made the room even smaller. Inside an old two-room house 
in the middle of a Southern village, no air conditioning and no computer, I 
couldn’t help but wonder whether Capt. Ta Duc Hao was happy living like 
this as a war hero.1 Excited and a little nervous, Captain Hao showed us the 
enlarged photos on the wall. “Th is is my father, a two-star general,” he said 
as he proudly pointed to an old man in a NVA uniform with many medals 
on his left  chest. Pointing to others, “Th ey are my children.” Captain Hao told 
me their stories one by one in the same complacent way. All three of his kids 
went through their colleges on government scholarships. Two of them worked 
in Ho Chi Minh City as engineers, and one at Da Nang as a lawyer. Satisfi ed 
and smiling, Captain Hao sat down with me. He was happy indeed. Th at’s 
probably what he had fought for: carrying on the legacy and pride from the 
last generation and bringing new opportunities to the next.2
As a young North Vietnamese, Ta Duc Hao was draft ed into the NVA 
in 1965 and sent to South Vietnam that summer via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 
From 1964 to 1968, North Vietnam supported the Viet Cong by sending more 
NVA regular troops to fi ght a guerrilla, or “people’s,” war against the Ameri-
can and ARVN forces in South Vietnam.3 In 1964, the NVA sent infantry 
regiments to the South. In early 1965, the 325th Division entered South Viet-
nam. In May and June, the 305th Division had entered the South via the Ho 
Chi Minh Trail.4 By the end of 1965, the NVA had ten infantry regiments in 
South Vietnam. Aft er 1966, the Northern regular troops joined Viet Cong 
guerrilla troops and became the main strength of the Communist forces in the 
South. When the Tet Off ensive campaign took place in early 1968, the num-
ber of NVA regulars in South Vietnam had reached 400,000 men.5 Both the 
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NVA and the PLAF suff ered heavy casualties. Captain Hao’s story describes 
the engagements with the ARVN and U.S. troops in the Central Highlands 
in general, and emphasizes the Battle of Ia Drang. Th e details provide some 
insight into the NVA military strategy, combat tactics, and operational prob-
lems during the mid-1960s. It may explain why the NVA and PLAF suff ered 
heavy casualties during these battles.
Capt. Ta Duc Hao
First Company, Th irty-fi rst Battalion, NVA (North Vietnam)
I joined the People’s Army of Vietnam [PAVN, or NVA] in early 1965 
because I needed to. First of all, the American air raids [Operation Roll-
ing Th under] against North Vietnam were so intensive that we couldn’t go 
to school anymore. I felt very sad when I saw that our neighborhood was 
burning, and that many people died during the bombings. I agreed with 
our government that we should keep the war and Americans in the South. 
All the teenagers joined the army at that time. Second, my father served in 
the army for most of his life and ranked as a two-star general.6 All of my 
older brothers had joined the services. I must follow the family tradition. 
Th ird, in the North, service was something necessary for your career devel-
opment, like a college degree. No military service, no good job for you in 
the future. You need to earn it by fi ghting the enemy and showing your loy-
alty to the Communist Party and Uncle Ho. Aft er an infantry training for a 
couple of months near Hanoi, I reported to the First Company, Th irty-fi rst 
Battalion, of an infantry regiment. In the company, I learned more about 
small arms, demolition, and basic defense engineering. During that time, 
I also heard the men in my company talking about going down to South 
Vietnam and fi ghting a war against America. I was excited about partici-
pating in the ground war that had been going on in the South for years.
In the summer of 1965, the First Company received the orders that we 
would move to South Vietnam. Our battalion command sent some instruc-
tors to our company talking about the war situation and enemy troops in 
the South. We learned a lot about the American forces and their weapon 
systems. We also knew at the time that we might stay in the South for a 
long period of time. Before the end of the dry season, our company trav-
eled from north to south by train. Th en we entered Laos and continued our 
road trip through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Sometimes we rode in the trucks, 
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and sometimes we walked by foot. We traveled over fi ve hundred miles 
crossing Laos, and entered Cambodia. From there, we crossed the border 
and moved into South Vietnam.
Aft er we arrived in the South, we were under a joint NVA-PLAF com-
mand.7 At fi rst, we engaged mostly with the ARVN troops. When the rainy 
season began in June, our company received a new order from the joint 
headquarters: to destroy the enemy’s “strategic hamlet villages” in the tri-
state region. In the spring of 1965, the “puppet” RVN government and its 
army continued their so-called pacifi cation program design to bring secu-
rity and local self-government to rural South Vietnamese people. During 
the dry season, they occupied many villages, purged the pro-Communist 
farmers, armed the villagers, and helped them to fortify their villages. Th e 
pacifi cation protected the ARVN bases and lines of communication, and 
sought out the Viet Cong and the NVA in the surrounding areas. In the 
rain season, the ARVN troops pulled back to their bases and left  the pro-
government farmers on their own in their “strategic hamlet villages.”
We had a chance to retake these villages during the rain season. It was 
the fi rst time we moved into enemy territory, but there wasn’t much action. 
Th e armed farmers in their strategic villages rarely confronted the North 
Vietnamese regulars. When they saw us coming, they hid their weapons 
and acted as ordinary villagers. We usually gathered the villagers and tried 
to single out the government agents and hostile village leaders. Th en we 
executed the bad guys and destroyed their defense works. As long as we 
didn’t burn their houses and take away their food, the villagers didn’t fi ght 
back.
Th at summer, our company participated in several ambush and small-
scale defensive operations. In 1965, the NVA-PLAF command believed 
that the U.S. and ARVN troops in the South outnumbered NVA troops, 
and that the enemy had superior fi repower and advanced air, naval, and 
armored forces. Th us, our troops avoided a frontal or formal battle with 
the U.S. troops, but engaged in traditional guerrilla warfare tactics, such as 
ambush, hit-and-run, night attacks, cutting transportation and communi-
cation lines, and attacking enemy weak points. We harassed the U.S. and 
ARVN troops, made the war as costly for the Americans as possible, and 
protected the civilian population as best we could.
In mid-July, the First Company was ordered to defend the village of 
An Th eo. It was a strategic point in the area. Aft er losing it to the NVA and 
PLAF in June, the ARVN now tried to take it back. Th e battalion command 
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ordered our company to move into An Th eo overnight. Th en we spent a 
couple of days strengthening the defense works with the help of local Viet 
Cong and villagers.
On July 18, the ARVN troops arrived. Th ey attacked An Th eo a cou-
ple of times in small groups, but our company defeated them. Th en they 
stopped their attack, but did not withdraw. Th ey were waiting for their 
reinforcement. Next day, more ARVN troops arrived with heavy artillery 
pieces and armored vehicles. On July 20, the ARVN launched a larger scale 
off ensive against An Th eo. Th ey had at least three companies with seven 
armored vehicles. Th eir artillery pieces bombed the village with more 
than two hundred 105 mm shells and charged our defense positions sev-
eral times. Th eir intensive artillery shelling destroyed most of our defense 
works. We had to move into underground tunnels to continue our defense. 
Having failed to take over the village, the ARVN troops stopped their 
attacks by the evening. Th ey pulled out their troops and didn’t come back 
the next day. We successfully defended An Th eo. However, our company 
and local Viet Cong suff ered heavy casualties during the three-day battle. 
We received our new recruits regularly from the North.
In the fall of 1965, the NVA developed a new strategy, the so-called 
formality strategy, or a formal warfare strategy. Th e new strategy included 
plans and tactics of frontal engagements, medium-scale off ensive cam-
paigns, attacks on the cities, and elimination of an entire enemy unit, like a 
company or even a battalion. Meanwhile, there were diff erent opinions in 
the command. We heard about the strategic debates at the high command. 
Anyway, the new strategy lasted for almost three years until its peak, the 
Tet Off ensive campaign of February 1968. Both NVA and PLAF suff ered 
the heaviest casualties since the beginning of the war.8 Th en the high com-
mand believed that the off ensive strategy was too costly to continue. Th ere-
aft er, the NVA returned to its traditional guerrilla warfare.
Since the implementation of the new strategy, our company began to 
join other companies and engaged in large-scale operations at battalion 
level. One of the big battles we fought was the Central Highlands Off en-
sive campaign. You called it the Battle of Ia Drang in America.9 At the end 
of October 1965, the PLAF and NVA launched a joint off ensive campaign 
against Plei Me, an ARVN stronghold in the Central Highlands.10 By Octo-
ber 29, the PLAF had completely encircled the ARVN garrison. In early 
November, the NVA and PLAF launched our attack on the ARVN troops 
at Plei Me.
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In order to eliminate all the ARVN garrison, the NVA set up road-
blocks between Plei Me and Pleiku and between Plei Me and An Khe in 
order to stop possible ARVN and U.S. reinforcement or rescue eff orts.11 
Our Th irty-fi rst Battalion was deployed at Hill 558 along Route 21 between 
Plei Me and Pleiku. One day in early November, our company moved into 
our positions at the bottom of the hill. We dug some foxholes along our 
defensive positions between Route 21 and Hill 558. And then we waited. 
Around noon, we were told that the ARVN reinforcements were coming 
from Pleiku on Route 21, including an infantry battalion and an armored 
battalion. We should ambush the ARVN troops at Hill 558 to stop the rein-
forcements and ensure a victory of the Plei Me attack. I was a little bit ner-
vous since we had not yet engaged in such a large-scale battle in the past six 
months. I checked my ammo and medic-aid package again and again.
Before long, a couple of the ARVN helicopters fl ew over our positions. 
Th ey didn’t detect the concealed NVA troops around Hill 558. About 1400 
hours, a long column of the enemy armored vehicles and trucks came along 
the road. We opened fi re when they reached the hill. Th e enemy troops 
were in panic under the unexpected attack. Th ey fl ed to where they came 
from and left  many bodies behind along the road. We were so excited about 
our successful ambush. Captain Ngu, our company commander, ordered 
us to refi ll ammo and send wounded back. He shouted, “Hurry, they will be 
back.” He was right. About one hour later, the enemy troops attacked our 
positions with the help of the American helicopters. Th e American armed 
helicopters from Pleiku attacked our positions with a fi erce bombing and 
shelling. We had to pull out of our roadside positions, and moved up to the 
hill for better coverage.
About 1600 hours, two more ARVN battalions arrived as new rein-
forcements. Th en they charged the hill. Even though our battalion fought 
bravely, we were outnumbered and without any air and artillery support. 
When it was getting dark, our battalion commanders ordered a with-
drawal from Hill 558. We heard next day that the American troops from 
An Khe also broke the NVA roadblock. On November 14, because of 
the failures of blockage, the PLAF stopped its off ensive on Plei Me. On 
November 14, more American troops arrived in the Ia Drang Valley and 
began their counterattacks against the PLAF and NVA. Our command 
decided to concentrate the PLAF-NVA troops to deal with the American 
reinforcement.
From November 14 to 19, our company joined the other PLAF-NVA 
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units and attacked American troops at the Ia Drang Valley. During the 
fi ve-day battle, our company suff ered heavy casualties, including thirty-
one dead and forty-one wounded. We were replaced by our reserve troops. 
Our battalion also pulled out of the attack due to its heavy casualties. On 
November 19, the command decided to withdraw all the units from the Ia 
Drang Valley. Th en we moved west, toward the South Vietnam–Cambodia 
border. Th at was a major withdrawal from the Central Highlands. On 
November 19, our company received new orders to escort a NVA fi eld hos-
pital moving west to the liberated area [the PLAF-controlled areas]. In the 
aft ernoon, the American helicopters discovered the fi eld hospital and our 
battalion headquarters, which retreated with us. Th e helicopters’ fi repower 
infl icted large casualties on our troops. I was shot with multiple wounds on 
my right shoulder and my neck. I was lucky to receive immediate medical 
Capt. Ta Duc Hao (right) and the author in Longxuyen in 2006.
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assistance, since our company was escorting the doctors and nurses of the 
fi eld hospital.
Th e fi eld hospital couldn’t stay anywhere within the borders of South 
Vietnam. It kept moving west, crossing the border, and eventually with-
drew into Cambodia. I and other wounded moved with the fi eld hospital 
and left  South Vietnam in that winter.
In 1966, I recovered from my wounds. I left  Cambodia and returned 
to my unit in 1967 in South Vietnam. I was lucky to be transferred back 
before the American forces intensifi ed their air raids and bombing in 1969 
and eventually invaded Cambodia in the spring of 1970.
Our battalion fought in seven provinces of South Vietnam. I was pro-
moted to sergeant, lieutenant, and then captain. Although I was wounded 
again in 1973, I remained in active duty until the war was over in 1975. We 
returned back to the North in the same year. I retired from the army in 
1976 during the demobilization and I got married in Hanoi later that year. 
I talked to my wife and came down to the South in 1978. I knew the South 
better than the North since I had spent about ten years of my young adult 
life here. Also I could get a better job here aft er we won the war and took 
over everything during its reconstruction in the late 1970s. I worked in the 
village offi  ce in 1979–1985, and then in the town government from 1986 to 
2002. I retired from the government position in 2005. I receive government 
retirement, military pensions, and disability compensation every month. 
I’m very happy living in this village with my wife. We may have to move to 
one of the cities since our children need our help. One of them is expect-
ing their fi rst baby.
Chapter 6
No Final Victory, No Family Life
Th ey are still friends. Ngoc and Tran worked in the same offi  ce in 1975–1976 
at Ty Xay Dung, the largest construction corporation in An Giang Province. 
Ngoc’s father was the CEO, a retired NVA lieutenant general; and Tran was 
from a small business family and soon fl ed the country as one of the “boat 
people.” I was surprised to see their reunion aft er thirty years: emotional hug 
with tears, instant recall of some old-day gossip, and garrulous brags of their 
kids and families. Even though they went separate ways, there was no ani-
mosity, no regret, and no hard feelings. Th ey seemed happy with the ending. 
Lt. Gen. Huynh Th u Truong was happy, too, having seen it all: the end of the 
French Indochina War in 1954, the end of the American War in 1973, and 
the end of the Vietnam War in 1975.1
As a senior artillery expert, Major General Truong’s war experience 
both in the North and in the South refl ects the technological aspects of the 
NVA and PLAF by showing how the Viet Cong adopted new technology and 
trained its offi  cers. During the early years of the 1960s, Hanoi sent many of 
the NVA offi  cers with Southern roots back to the South to participate in the 
NLF and PLAF’s struggle against the ROV government. Some of these offi  -
cers had been recalled to north of the 17th parallel according to the Geneva 
Indochina Agreement signed in July 1954.2 Some had fl ed to the North during 
Diem’s suppressions against the Communists in 1958–1961. While in North 
Vietnam, they received further training in guerrilla warfare, mass mobiliza-
tion, political propaganda, and military technology. Aft er they were sent back 
to the South, these offi  cers played an important role in upgrading the PLAF’s 
weapons and equipment and improving their combat eff ectiveness.
Th e NVA high command began to pay more attention to military tech-
nology in the late 1950s in order to win large-scale, decisive battles against 
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the ARVN forces, establishing artillery and engineering divisions and open-
ing artillery and engineering schools to train their offi  cers and commanders. 
When the fi rst antiaircraft  artillery brigade began its air defense of the capital 
city, Ho Chi Minh wrote to the commander that “Without antiaircraft  artil-
lery, Hanoi is like a house without a roof.”3 In the summer of 1965, the NVA 
established its antiaircraft  missile regiments in the North. Meanwhile, the 
PLAF continued to improve its weaponry by introducing up-to-date military 
technology. In the late 1960s, the NVA transformed from a peasant guerrilla 
army into a modern professional army.4
Lt. Gen. Huynh Th u Truong
Rector, Artillery Training Center, PLAF (Viet Cong, South Vietnam)
I was born into a well-off  family in 1923 in South Vietnam. Aft er high 
school, I enrolled in a French Catholic College at Saigon [present Ho Chi 
Minh City] in 1944. I studied engineering, mathematics, mechanics, phys-
ics, and chemistry. Th e Pacifi c war was over in August 1945, and the Viet 
Minh established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV] in Hanoi 
with Ho Chi Minh as president in early September. Th e Viet Minh had 
been active in the South.
Th e First Indochina War broke out in 1946 when the Viet Minh troops 
clashed with the French forces in the North. Even though we were French 
college students, we didn’t like the French colonial government’s return 
aft er World War II, with their old-fashioned, out-of-date colonial policy. We 
liked national independence and wanted to take Vietnam back from France. 
I joined the student protests against French domination of our country.
Th e Viet Minh members were actively involved in these student move-
ments in Saigon and rapidly developed their party branches all over the 
college campuses. I was approached by one of the party branch members in 
our college, and I became a Southern Vietnamese Communist Party mem-
ber in 1946.5
Aft er my graduation in 1948, I got married and had an engineering 
job to cover my secret mission as an undercover Communist engineer-
ing researcher. I had accomplished several important artillery tests and 
research projects for the People’s Army of Vietnam [PAVN, also known as 
Viet Minh] in the North in my company lab in Saigon. Th e results of my 
research were sent all the way from the South to the North.
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In 1952, the Viet Minh headquarters in the North sent a request 
through the South Vietnamese Party Committee in Saigon and asked me 
to join a newly opened artillery training school in the North. Th e party 
committee asked for my own opinion on this. At that time, I believed that 
I could make more contributions to Vietnam’s Communist revolution by 
joining the army in the North than working as an undercover engineer 
in the South. Certainly, there was a war going on in the North between 
the Viet Minh and France. It meant that my decision would soon lead me 
to danger, hardship, and even death on the front line against the French 
forces. But I thought that the party needed me, and that there was also a 
good opportunity for my career. I left  my job, a comfortable family life, 
and a pregnant wife behind. I walked for two weeks with a small group of 
people all the way to the North until we got to the Chinese-Vietnamese 
border.
Back then, the Viet Minh force was a guerrilla farmers’ army. Short of 
fi nancial sources and military technology, they didn’t have their own artil-
lery instructors and training facilities in the early years of the French Indo-
china War. Th e Chinese Communist forces, the People’s Liberation Army 
[PLA], provided artillery pieces, equipment, and training for the North 
Vietnamese troops. Among the 250 advisers of the CMAG [Chinese Mili-
tary Advisory Group] were eleven artillery offi  cers, who arrived in North 
Vietnam on August 11, 1950. In May 1951, the Chinese helped the Viet 
Minh establish the 351st Division, the fi rst Vietnamese artillery and engi-
neering division.6 In the same year, the PLA also trained the Vietnamese 
offi  cers inside China by opening an offi  cer academy, an artillery training 
center, and engineering schools. While the Viet Minh high command was 
grateful about the Chinese eff ort to train the Vietnamese artillery offi  cers, 
it also worried about the military dependence and Chinese infl uence. Since 
the Viet Minh had grown from two divisions up to seven regular divisions 
by 1952 and was winning the war against the French forces, it should have 
its own artillery training programs.
Aft er arriving in the North, I served as an artillery training offi  cer at 
the Viet Minh’s No. 9 Quan Khu Phao Binh [Artillery] Training Center.7 
Most of the artillery equipment came from China, including 60 mm, 80 
mm, and 82 mm artillery guns. Th eir best artillery technology was the 
Chinese-manufactured six-rocket launchers and 75 mm recoilless guns 
against tanks and defense works.
During the early years at the artillery training center, we translated 
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many technology notes and manuals from Chinese to Vietnamese. I also 
translated many French technical instructions into Vietnamese and helped 
our offi  cers to operate captured French artillery pieces.
Aft er my promotion to a major in the Viet Minh, I took part in writ-
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ing our own training curriculum, offi  cer assessments, promotion require-
ments, and equipment maintenance regulations. At the training center, I 
taught classes, organized routine drills, and assessed joint exercises. We 
also developed our artillery planning, operation instructions, mobile tac-
tics, defense deployment, and off ensive bombardment. Our program 
became more sophisticated, and our classes got bigger. In 1953, we had an 
average of 150 offi  cers on the campus all year long. Th e artillery training 
and tactics played an important role in the major battles, such as the Red 
River campaign in 1953.
During these years in the North, I missed my wife and my little two-
year-old daughter, whom I had never seen. But I knew her name was Ngoc, 
which I’d picked for her before I’d gone to the North. I had to fi ght for our 
victory before I could have my family reunion. We had to fi ght harder and 
win the war by defeating the French.
From December 1953 to April 1954, the Viet Minh forces encircled 
the 15,000 French troops at Dien Bien Phu. Our artillery troops played a 
very important role in the fi nal battle. Th e 351st Artillery Division, rocket 
battalion, and 75 mm recoilless gun battalion eff ectively engaged in the 
off ensives. Many of our artillery offi  cers received their training from our 
center. In March, their successful shelling against enemy airfi elds, supply 
depots, and communication lines had isolated the French forces and also 
diminished their escape chance. By April, the French troops held only three 
points. On May 6, the Viet Minh high command launched its fi nal all-out 
attack. In a couple of days, the French surrendered. Aft er eight years’ fi ght-
ing, we fi nally defeated French colonial forces in Vietnam.
Aft er our victory in the First Indochina War, in the summer of 1954, I 
traveled back to Saigon and looked for my family. Th anks to the Southern 
Communist Party members who had taken good care of my family, my 
wife and my daughter were doing just fi ne. I moved them all the way from 
Saigon to the North. In 1957, I was transferred from the artillery training 
center to the NVA Artillery Academy in Hanoi. My family followed me to 
the capital city. We had a little boy a year later, when I was promoted to the 
rank of lieutenant colonel in 1958.
In the early 1960s, the war between the NLF and the Diem government 
of the so-called Republic of Vietnam [RVN] became intensifi ed. Diem and 
his forces killed thousands and thousands of the Southern Communist 
members and jailed hundreds of thousands of the Communist sympa-
thizers. Chairman Ho always reminded us that “Comparing with the great 
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hardships that the Southern people and army have to endure, your dif-
fi culties remain modest. You have to follow their example, fi ghting more 
valiantly and achieving greater victory.”8 Our party and army decided to 
support the Communist movement in the South by providing military aid 
and training to the South Vietnamese guerrilla troops.
Aft er nine years’ service in the North, in 1961 I was sent back to the 
South and joined the PLAF [People’s Liberation Armed Forces] of the NLF 
to train their artillery troops. Th e Diem government referred to the NLF as 
“Viet Cong,” meaning “Vietnamese Commies.”
I left  my post in the NVA Artillery Academy in Hanoi, and left  my 
family again in December 1961. Aft er we crossed the North Vietnamese-
Laos border, we began to walk on foot. Th en we entered Cambodia and 
walked a long way down south. Th ey told me that it took longer going this 
way, but it was much safer. Th en we entered South Vietnam by crossing 
the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border. Aft er a twenty-three-day jour-
ney, we fi nally arrived at a Viet Cong military base in An Giang Province 
in January 1962.
Th e Viet Cong base was at the top of the Ca Mountain, which has many 
big trees and overlooks the Ca Mau River. Isolated in the forest and less 
populated, this mountainous area was far away from Diem’s controlled 
areas. Th e villagers around the base were supportive to the NLF and the 
PLAF military struggle against the Diem government and the U.S. armed 
forces in South Vietnam.
We opened a PLAF artillery training school and began to off er classes 
to the PLAF offi  cers. I was ranked colonel in the PLAF, an automatic pro-
motion of one level up for most offi  cers who returned from the NVA in the 
North to the PLAF in the South. Th e PLAF command sent its offi  cers to 
our school for training in small groups. Usually we had an average of thirty 
to forty offi  cers in our school. But we got better and more advanced artil-
lery technology.
During the mid-1960s, we began to receive Soviet artillery pieces and 
equipment, including Russian-made 120 mm and 155 mm guns. Even 
though they were not available in the South until 1971, we began to learn 
how to operate and maintain these new weapons. Of course, we also stud-
ied American artillery technology since the PLAF had captured a large 
number of American artillery equipment and supplies. I was promoted to 
the rank of major general in 1964.9
During these years, I missed my wife and my children a lot. It had been 
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more than fourteen years. We could send a letter and received mails with-
out mentioning anybody’s real name. It took about one to two months for 
each mail traveling from the South to the North, or the other way around. I 
believed that we had lost some of our mail. Nevertheless, I had my tears in 
my eyes every time when I received their mail. At fi rst, I saw a small piece 
of my daughter’s or my son’s drawing; then a few words in their handwrit-
ing; and soon a short essay. Th ey could not send any photo picture. Th e 
only photos I had were taken fourteen years ago when they were very lit-
tle. I always wondered if they could remember me and accept me as their 
father who was never there during most of their lives. I really wanted to 
end this war by defeating the enemies so I could have my family back and 
have my own life back.
In the late 1960s, the war situation was getting better and better for the 
PLAF. Our artillery troops began to show their fi repower when the PLAF 
started its off ensive campaigns against the enemy strongholds and military 
bases. Th e main artillery operations in the South occurred in 1968, 1972, 
1973, and 1974–1975, the later part of the war.
Because of the nature of the guerrilla warfare and lack of road control 
and transport vehicles, the Viet Cong did not employ large artillery pieces 
Lt. Gen. Huynh Th u Truong
in Saigon in 1975.
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until much later. Among their favorite guns were small artillery pieces, like 
60 mm mortars and single rocket launchers. We trained them how to repair 
these weapons and how to manufacture the shells. Our training helped the 
PLAF troops win the battles against the ARVN and U.S. forces. I was pro-
moted to lieutenant general in 1974. Eventually, we won the war in 1975.
By 1975, I haven’t seen my family for fourteen years. My wife still lived 
in Hanoi, and she’d survived the American air raids and bombings. My 
daughter, then twenty-three years old, studied in a medical school in China 
on the North Vietnamese government scholarship. My son, seventeen now, 
was sent away from Hanoi to one of the government grade schools in the 
rear areas along the Vietnamese-Chinese border. Th e North Vietnamese 
government tried to ensure the safety of the children of all the high-rank-
ing DRV offi  cials and NVA generals, who were fi ghting the war on the 
front lines. We, as generals and parents, really appreciated that.
In 1975, I retired from the army. I found a position as the Chief Execu-
tive Offi  cer (CEO) at Ty Xay Dung (a construction corporation), one of the 
major companies in An Giang Province. My wife moved from Hanoi to An 
Giang to join me. Our daughter continued her study in a medical school 
in Hanoi. In 1982, I retired from the company. My daughter as a physi-
cian also moved to An Giang to practice her medicine in order to take care 
of us. My son, married with three children, became a chief engineer in a 
petroleum-chemical company, and lives in Ho Chi Minh City with his own 
family. I enjoy our family life and my retirement.
Lt. Gen. Huynh Th u Truong (PLAF, 
ret.) in My Th anh in 2006.
Part Two
Hanoi’s Comrades
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Chapter 7
Russian Missile Offi  cers
in Vietnam
I was panicked and didn’t know what to do in Kyiv, the capital city of Ukraine, 
aft er we were told that “Major T.” could not be interviewed at that time. 
Anthony Song, my contact person and Russian translator, was not.1 Aft er 
several telephone calls, Anthony told me that Major T. had agreed to come 
to see us the next morning. “It’s not me,” the major explained when we met 
at our hotel. “My superior got to take a look at the list of your questions. He 
didn’t want me to get into any trouble.” Loyal and active in the local veteran 
chapter, Major T. also asked me to let him remain anonymous and have no 
picture in the book.2
Th e Soviet Union offi  cially denied any direct involvement in the Vietnam 
War. Since its collapse in 1991, Russia and other former Soviet republics like 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan have maintained the same position. Th e Russian 
government has concealed the participation of the former Soviet Union’s mili-
tary in the war.3 Soviet offi  cial records on the Vietnam War are closed to the 
public and scholars. Most Russian veterans do not want to talk about their 
experiences in Vietnam, and I now know why. In 2007, Moscow published a 
book on the Soviet involvement in the Vietnam War. With offi  cial permis-
sion, for the fi rst time, twenty-nine veterans provided their personal stories of 
the Soviet war experience in Vietnam from 1965 to 1973.4
Aft er the Moscow-Hanoi agreement in February 1965, the Soviet Union 
began sending its SAM missile troops, air-defense radar units, launch site 
technicians, training instructors, pilots, aircraft  maintenance personnel, 
and logistics offi  cers to North Vietnam. Th e total number of Soviet troops 
in Vietnam, however, is still inconclusive due to a lack of accurate sources. 
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Russian archives provide few details about their military operations in Viet-
nam since the defense documents remain closed to the public and scholars.5 
Some Russian historians still use Western sources for their research on this 
topic.6 Th e Chinese sources base their fi gures on the number of Russian offi  -
cers and soldiers who traveled from the Soviet Union to Vietnam by railway 
through China. Th eir statistics show that about 3,500 Soviet military person-
nel entered Vietnam in the spring of 1965. Th e total increased to 4,100 in 
1967.7 Th is number does not include the Russians who traveled to Vietnam 
by air. U.S. intelligence believed that 1,500 to 2,500 Soviet military personnel 
were in Vietnam in September 1965, including 150 pilots and 300 technicians 
engaged in communication and other support activities.8
Major T.
Training Instructor, SAM Missile Training Center, North Vietnam, 
Russian Armed Forces (Soviet Union)
I was born in Ukraine, the former Soviet Union, in 1944. My father was an 
engineer at an aircraft  manufacture company in our hometown. Aft er my 
middle school in 1959, instead of going to high school, I enrolled in a local 
aviation mechanic school, something like vo-tech or a professional school 
in your country. With a strong interest in machinery and aviation technol-
ogy, I did a good job on my grades during the three-year studies. I was also 
recruited by the party branch in the school and became a Communist Party 
member in the last year of my school. Having graduated from mechanic 
school in 1962, I found out that the military service off ered a better oppor-
tunity than other jobs available in aviation industry at that time.
I joined the Soviet Army in 1962. I guess because of my training in 
aviation technology and political credentials as a party member, I was 
assigned to the strategic missile forces, the elite troops of all the services 
in the Soviet armed forces. Our unit stationed around Moscow suburbs. 
As new recruits, we began our intensive training on the new technology. 
Due to my outstanding training records, by the end of 1962 I was selected 
to be sent to the Soviet Antiaircraft  Artillery [AAA] Technology Acad-
emy for further study. Th is academy trained the offi  cers for commanding 
surface-to-air missile troops and operating the air-defense system. I spent 
two years at the AAA Academy. I took many classes, such as physics, chem-
ical engineering, computer science, calculus, statistics, and military history. 
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I remember that our instructors quite oft en used the cases of the French 
Indochina War to explain military strategy vs. technology in a war between 
a Communist state and the Western powers. Th at was the fi rst time for me 
to learn a lot about Vietnam, its Communist movement, and its leader, Ho 
Chi Minh. On the campus, I saw some international offi  cer students study-
ing at the academy. Th ey came from the Communist countries like Poland, 
Cuba, and North Vietnam. Th ey had their own separate classes and much 
shorter training programs.
Our classes were on a fast path, and our daily drills and weekly fi eld 
training were also pretty tough. Several of my classmates did not make it 
and dropped out of the academy. Many of the cadets had a military family 
background, and some had a general or even a marshal father. We all made 
good friends and helped each other in and out the classroom. I remained 
at the top of the class and also served as the party branch secretary for our 
class.
Before my graduation, the war in Vietnam became intensifi ed in 1964. 
Th e superintendent called for “volunteers” to serve in Vietnam. All of the 
cadets, including our graduating class, Class of 1964, signed up for our ser-
vice in the Vietnam War. As new offi  cers of the Soviet strategic force, we 
really wanted to go to war and apply our knowledge and skills to a real-war 
situation. At the prom, however, we heard some rumors that North Viet-
nam had declined the Soviet off er to send in Soviet military volunteers and 
assist the Vietnamese war eff orts against the Americans.9
Aft er my graduation, I returned to my unit and worked at the battal-
ion headquarters as a staff  member in the fall of 1964. A year later, our bat-
talion commander told us that the battalion would select several offi  cers 
as missile instructors to train the NVA missile troops in North Vietnam. 
As a well-trained new staff  member, I was selected in the summer of 1965 
for the missile technology teaching assignment in Vietnam. I was told that 
the teaching mission would last about one year, and that I would return to 
my unit aft er the overseas assignment. I became a missile training instruc-
tor with the rank of captain. At that moment, I had learned that the Soviet 
surface-to-air missiles [popularly known as “SAMs”] had been shipped to 
North Vietnam to fi ght against the U.S. Rolling Th under air campaign. Th e 
Soviet SAM sites became operational in North Vietnam in April 1965. Th e 
Soviet missile troops began their engagements on July 25, shooting down 
three U.S. warplanes that day. Now we needed to train the Vietnamese mis-
sile troops which could join the Soviet SAM operation and shoot down 
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more American airplanes. In the summer of 1965, the Vietnamese estab-
lished their fi rst antiaircraft  missile regiment in the North.
In early 1966, I joined the special Vietnam unit of the Soviet missile 
troops, so called military detachment #31920, under the command of Maj. 
Gen. Alexander Stuchilov. Th e unit headquarters was in Moscow, and it 
provided a two-week preparation for the missile offi  cers and soldiers before 
they were leaving for Vietnam. We learned more about the Vietnam War 
and America’s Rolling Th under air bombing campaign. But we were not 
allowed to tell anyone about our assignment in Vietnam, not even our par-
ents and family members. We were not allowed to wear our uniform with 
ranks and names over there. We were not allowed to carry our handguns 
or any weapons like a military knife with us.
Th en, in May 1966, I got on a train and began my long journey to 
North Vietnam. Our train included two passenger cars and twenty-seven 
cargo cars fully loaded with Russian antiaircraft  missiles, missile launch-
ers, and communication and commanding equipment. Part of our job was 
to keep our eyes on these missiles and make sure that they would get all 
the way to Vietnam safely. I traveled with sixty other offi  cers from Detach-
ment #31920. I was so glad to fi nd out that several of the offi  cers on the 
train were my academy classmates from the Class of 1964. Even though it 
was a long trip, we had so much fun, just like having a college class reunion 
party for two weeks. First, it took one week for our train traveling to the 
Russian-Chinese border. Th en we had to change the locomotive and all the 
cargo and passenger cars at the border since China uses its own rail-track 
system diff erent from the size of Russian tracks. As we waited for the Chi-
nese to unload and reload the missiles, we visited local shops and bought 
more hard liquor and junk food, since the meals on the train were terrible 
in Russia. We didn’t know that the Chinese would provide very good meals 
and drink for us all the way across their country. Aft er another week travel-
ing in China, fi nally, we arrived at the Chinese-Vietnamese border.
At the Chinese-Vietnamese border, we did routine inspections of the 
missiles and equipment for the last time and signed paperwork both with 
Chinese and Vietnamese offi  cers. Th e Vietnamese unloaded the missiles, 
and sent them to diff erent locations in North Vietnam. Th e sixty Russian 
offi  cers were also divided into several groups and traveled to diff erent 
places for diff erent jobs. I knew that some of my classmates would go to the 
combat zones for their operational assignments. I got a little bit nervous as 
I knew that we were in the war.
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I was assigned with a couple of other offi  cers to a training center in a 
mountain north of Hanoi. Established in the spring of 1965, the center had 
sophisticated Russian-made training facilities, including indoor (actually 
in-cave) missile launcher model, operation demo equipment, underground 
classrooms, and comfortable living quarters. Our training program focused 
on the operation and routine maintenance of the CA-75M [or C-75] high-
altitude guided SAM-2 model and later the improved SAM-3 system. More 
than forty Russian instructors and offi  cers had been teaching and working at 
this center for more than a year. Th ey had about three hundred Vietnamese 
students, including commanding offi  cers, headquarters staff , missile opera-
tors, radar operators, technicians, and logistics offi  cers. Th ese NVA offi  cers 
studied missile technology and operation in diff erent programs between one 
and six months. Most of them did not speak Russian. Th e Russian instruc-
tors totally depended on the Vietnamese translators. Some of the Russian 
instructors were happy to see us coming. Th ey thought that we would replace 
them and some of them could go home. Unfortunately, the center just added 
Russian SAM-2 missile in North Vietnam.
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several new positions in order to off er more missile technology courses to 
the Vietnamese offi  cer students. Most of the Russian instructors served in 
the center for two or three years. I did too.
I did not know exactly how many Soviet missile offi  cers worked in 
Vietnam. My guess was at least four thousand Russian missile personnel 
in North Vietnam when I served there. I knew that over one thousand 
Soviet missile technology instructors were training the Vietnamese missile 
force in the late 1960s. I also heard that several Russian missile battalions 
from two strategic divisions took part in the air-defense combat opera-
tions, about two thousand troops. And more than one thousand Russians 
as technical, administrative, and logistic units to support our missile oper-
ations and training in North Vietnam in the late 1960s. Gen. Alexander 
Stuchilov was also the chief commander of the Soviet antiaircraft  defense 
forces in Vietnam in 1967–1969.
During my teaching at the missile training center, the senior Russian 
instructors told me a lot about how to train the Vietnamese offi  cers. Th e 
Russian instructors followed General Stuchilov’s principle in training. 
General Stuchilov always said “do as I am doing.” His principle guided our 
training and worked pretty well. We emphasized basic knowledge, practi-
cal skills, and hands-on learning. Th e Vietnamese offi  cers could pick up 
the Russian missile operating pretty fast by following our moves and mem-
orizing the procedure with a little education or without any missile tech-
nology background. Following our operation manuals, we demonstrated 
missile operation step by step, and showed the Vietnamese offi  cers how.
Aft er basic training, we off ered diff erent classes based upon North 
Vietnam’s needs in their air defense against the “Rolling Th under.” Th e fi rst 
class taught the Vietnamese offi  cers how to use Russian missiles to shoot 
down American aircraft  at the medium height of 2–3 kilometers [1.2–
1.9 miles]. Th e second class was to show them how to target the enemy 
bomber at a high altitude, about 5–7 kilometers [3.1–4.3 miles], like B-
52s. Th e B-52 heavy bombers had been a major problem for the Vietnam-
ese air defense at that time. And then, in the third class, we taught them 
several new methods to shoot down American warplanes at very low alti-
tude, about 300–500 meters. All of the Vietnamese offi  cer-students were 
impressed by our missile technology. Th ey worked hard and learned fast. 
Our evaluations and assessments showed that they had mastered the Rus-
sian missile technology and were capable of operating the Russian radar/
missile system as the major part of the air defense in North Vietnam.
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We also worked with the Vietnamese instructors at the center. Some 
of them had received their technology and language training in the Soviet 
Union.10 Familiar with the Soviet military system and speaking some Rus-
sian, they served as interpreters or teaching assistants for our training 
classes. Th ey also translated a large number of our training textbooks, oper-
ation instructions, and maintenance manuals from Russian to Vietnamese. 
I made many friends with those Vietnamese offi  cers. I even learned some 
Vietnamese for my shopping in the street markets or ordering food in the 
local restaurants.
As a training instructor, I did not see air defense combat since our 
training center was way up in the North. However, we read NVA brief-
ings and their combat reports every day to adjust our training methods. 
We heard stories all the time about our Russian offi  cers and soldiers who 
engaged in the air-defense combat against the American warplanes on the 
front lines. We knew we were in the middle of the war. We were happy to 
see our Vietnamese comrades become skillful in missile air-defense and 
shoot down more and more American airplanes. For example, the U.S. Air 
Force employed their new F-111 fi ghter-bombers in their Rolling Th under 
air campaign in early 1968. On March 17, six F-111s arrived at a U.S. Air 
Force base in Th ailand. A week later, the F-111s began their bombing mis-
sions. Th e Vietnamese learned how to deal with the U.S. high-tech aircraft  
immediately. On March 28 and 30, the NVA missile troops shot down two 
F-111s in Ha Tinh Province.11
Later I learned that, by the end of the war, the Vietnamese had estab-
lished a strong air-defense missile force, including twelve missile regiments 
and four radar regiments. Each regiment had four missile battalions and 
one technical battalion, totaling one thousand troops. In addition, the 
NVA had a total of six air-defense divisions. Each division had four AAA 
regiments, one SAM missile regiment, and one radar regiment. Th ere were 
four air-defense schools, including a missile technology academy and an 
air-defense offi  cer academy. By 1986, Vietnam had sixteen SAM-6 missile 
regiments and six radar regiments. In addition, it had seven air-defense 
divisions, totaling fi ft y thousand troops.
In 1968, I completed my teaching assignment in North Vietnam and 
returned to the Soviet Union. We had a very bad homecoming. Since the 
Soviet government denied any involvement in Vietnam, our war in Viet-
nam was an “unknown” war. Nobody knew anything about our service. 
Aft er we came back, we were not allowed to talk about our experience and 
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contribution to the Vietnam War. Th e former USSR didn’t acknowledge 
our participation in the Vietnam War. Th ere was no medal, awards, or rec-
ognition. Later, I got promoted to a major before my retirement from the 
military.
Our service in the Vietnam War has never been recognized by either 
the Soviet government or the military. Th us, our sacrifi ces are not appreci-
ated by the society and Russian people. Many low-ranking offi  cers like me 
did not receive any pension and privilege for our service in Vietnam, while 
the veterans from all other foreign wars enjoyed their good pensions and 
many privileges for their services. I know a sad story about one of the Viet-
nam veterans. His name is Mr. Boris Verkhoturov. He spent more than two 
years in Vietnam as a radar operator. One day, his radar was bombed and 
he was burned seriously. Aft er hospitalization for a long period of time, he 
retired from the missile force and became a part-time schoolteacher. Aft er 
his retirement, Mr. Verkhoturov did not get any fi nancial compensation 
or healthcare from the government for his wounds and burns. Th e salary 
from his part-time teaching was not enough for him to pay his medical 
bills. Th at is why so many Russian veterans do not want to talk about the 
Vietnam War. Th e war we are not supposed to remember.
Chapter 8
Th e Dragon’s Tale
Chinese Troops in the Jungle
It became a reunion party when the eleven veterans and their families arrived 
at Capt. Zhao Shunfen’s home in Harbin, the provincial capital of Heilongji-
ang, Northeast China. Captain Zhao wanted me to meet his comrades who 
survived the Vietnam War, and whose friendship seems to last forever.1 Aft er 
the potluck dinner, they began to sing together Chinese army songs from the 
1960s. Th ey recalled, so many of them, the lyrics word by word. Th ey had 
songs before their meals and meetings, before each combat, during the drills, 
seeing comrades off  to the hospital or cemetery, and songs to show their loy-
alty and love to their country, party, and Chairman Mao Zedong. Captain 
Zhao told me that they were so sad when China had a border war against 
Vietnam in 1979. Th ey were happy to see that the two countries normal-
ized their relationship in the 1990s and developed new friendship in the early 
2000s. Some of the veterans were planning a trip to revisit Vietnam. Th ey 
wanted to show their families where they had fought China’s Vietnam War.
As a Communist state bordering with North Vietnam, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) actively supported Ho Chi Minh’s war against 
France in the French Indochina War of 1946–1954. Th ereaft er, China con-
tinued to provide weaponry, equipment, and military training to North Viet-
nam.2 China’s massive amount of supplies and strong support helped Ho to 
intensify the guerrilla campaign in South Vietnam in the early 1960s. In July 
1965, China began to send its troops to North Vietnam. Th ese Chinese forces 
enabled Hanoi to send more NVA troops to the South to fi ght the Americans. 
Th e majority of the Chinese troops in Vietnam belonged to the antiaircraft  
artillery (AAA) force. From June 1965 to March 1969, the PLA sent sixteen 
74 Hanoi’s Comrades
AAA divisions into North Vietnam to engage in air defense against America’s 
Operation Rolling Th under.3
As part of the AAA force, Capt. Zhao Shunfen’s unit entered North Viet-
nam in September 1966. He returned to China in 1967, aft er he was wounded 
in combat. His personal account illuminates for the fi rst time the important 
role that the Chinese military played in the Vietnam War. His story reveals 
how the Chinese party organization, basic training, education, and command 
and control operated in the PLA during these years. It also shows the Chinese 
perception of the war situation, combat environment, fi repower, technology, 
and homecoming. Interestingly, as both a political and a social institution, the 
PLA continued to play an important role in domestic and foreign aff airs by 
providing political stability, social order, and technology research and devel-
opment during the Great Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, when China 
was in turmoil. Most young men dreamed of joining the military for their 
education, social mobility, professional career, political security, or just for 
their own survival during the Cultural Revolution.
Capt. Zhao Shunfen
Fourth Company, Th ird Regiment, Th irty-fi rst AAA Division,
People’s Liberation Army (China)
In 1945, I was born in a small village in Northeast China, the fi rst of seven 
children in the family. My childhood dream was to be a city high school 
teacher when I grew up. Wearing eyeglasses, riding a bicycle to work, and 
eating in a faculty lounge were all a country boy could dream of. I studied 
hard in middle school and prepared well for my high school entry exami-
nation. I, however, couldn’t go to high school aft er I passed the exam in 
1961. At that time, the so-called three-year “natural disaster” began.4 Th e 
farmers had a very diffi  cult time, and some of them died of starvation.
I remember that my mother cooked crushed corncobs with apricot 
leaves. We ate everything, but we were still starving. In the summer of 
1961, I decided to stay at home, helping my dad in the cornfi eld by day 
and helping my mom to take care of my six younger brothers and sisters at 
night. Using my old books and newspapers under a kerosene lamp, I taught 
my brothers and sisters math and history at home since they didn’t even 
have a chance to go to middle school.
In the fall of 1964, the country’s economy turned around. My village 
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had the fi rst good harvest in fi ve years. We fi nally had a break. My father 
thought about sending my brothers and sisters back to school. My mother 
began to visit a woman matchmaker in the village and tried to arrange 
my marriage. I was nineteen, and my dream of becoming a school teacher 
seemed fading away. Back then, I was too old to go to high school, and 
there was no job market in the cities. As a farmer’s son, I was supposed to 
be a farmer and stay where I was.
My chance came in November 1964. One day, a recruiting team from 
the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] paid its annual visit to our village.5 All 
of the eligible male villagers, between eighteen and twenty-fi ve, were sum-
moned to the village chief ’s house. Th ere were about forty young men at 
the meeting. I was really interested in the army’s off er. “Our army is a big 
school,” the recruiting offi  cer said. “You will learn a trade through your ser-
vice.” More attractive to me was their retirement plan. “You have choices 
for retirement aft er your service,” the offi  cer promised. “You can either 
retire back to your village here, or choose to work someplace else, like a job 
in the city.” I wanted to join the army to get out of the village, but I was not 
sure of my parents’ opinion.
Surprisingly, my parents supported my decision when I told them that 
evening. My mom, frustrated in her inability in fi nding me a bride due to 
the economic condition of the family and village, thought army service 
may give me a better chance to fi nd my own girlfriend. My dad felt sorry 
for keeping me out of school for so long. Hard manual labor and progres-
sive malnutrition made me short, skinny, and I had developed asthma. Th e 
army would feed me better and address my health problems. I didn’t expect 
this. My parents were relieved that their son joined the army. My younger 
brothers and sisters were envious about my travel by bus and train, hav-
ing my photo taken, and sending it back home. Th ey never dared to think 
about such things. Overnight, two other men and I became the heroes of 
our families and the village. On the day I left  home, however, I saw the tears 
in my mother’s eyes. I knew she was happy. I will never forget that cold 
winter day in December.
Aft er the new-recruit orientation in the spring of 1965, I was assigned 
to the Fourth Company, First Battalion, Th ird Regiment, First Antiaircraft  
Artillery Division, Shenyang Military Region.6 Th e division had fought in 
the Korean War. But our guns and equipment were old. We had the same 
weapons used in the Korean War. We had 100 mm, 76 mm, and 57 mm 
antiaircraft  artillery pieces, and 37 mm antiaircraft  machine guns. Th e 
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Russian-made 100 mm big gun could send its shells up to 30,000 feet alti-
tude. I remember the diff erent guns were mixed to arm each battalion. 
Th e combination could provide a fi re zone from 8,000 to 30,000 feet. Th e 
Fourth Company had 120 men, operating eight artillery pieces and sev-
eral machine guns. As a new recruit, I didn’t get a big-gun post. I became a 
machine gunner to protect the artillery positions, but I had no complaints. 
I enjoyed drilling in the morning, riding on the truck, talking to the men 
across the countryside, and eating in the army mess hall.
My favorite part of the daily routine was the one hour of “political 
study,” or “motivational education.” I called it “reading and writing class.” 
I had so much fun picking up the books again aft er having left  school four 
years previously. Th e company political instructor taught world history and 
Chinese literature in order to help the soldiers understand the Communist 
theory and the thoughts of Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chinese Com-
munist Party [CCP]. Like the Soviet military system, the Chinese army has 
a dual system with a chain of command and a chain of political control. 
Each company had a political instructor, who was usually the secretary of 
the party branch in the company. Th e company political instructor took 
part of the decision-making responsibility with the company commander. 
Each battalion also had a political instructor, who was part of the battalion 
command. Each regiment, division, and army had a political commissar, 
who was the secretary of the party committee and shared the responsi-
bility with the commanding offi  cers. Each regiment, division, and army 
also had a political department to implement political tasks and education. 
Th e political instructor/commissar system has been a major instrument of 
party control and political penetration in the PLA.7
Under that instruction, I learned more Chinese characters and gram-
mar so I could write essays to express my own understanding of the Chi-
nese revolution, exchange my ideas with others, and build my loyalty to the 
party. My fi rst essay, six pages long, was an application for Chinese Com-
munist Party membership. I really wanted to join the party at that time. I 
had no doubt about it. Nobody twisted my arm. I still believe that it was 
a right decision, and that it was probably one of the most important deci-
sions in my entire life. About six months later, my application was accepted 
by the CCP branch in our company. I became a CCP member just before 
our new mission in the Vietnam War.
We learned about Vietnam and the war through our political study in 
the spring of 1965. “China and Vietnam are neighboring countries,” the 
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company political instructor told the men. “We have been good neighbors 
for the past one thousand years. Today, China is a Communist state, and 
North Vietnam also has a Communist government. We are Communist 
brothers in addition to our traditional friendship.” He told us that imperi-
alist America was invading Vietnam. It separated the country into North 
and South Vietnam. America was the common enemy of both China and 
Vietnam. Th e Vietnamese people’s future was dependent on international 
Communist aid and support. Th en he raised a question: “What should we 
do when the bad guy breaks into our good neighbor’s home?” “We should 
help,” the men answered. “Th at’s right,” continued the instructor. “If we 
don’t stop the Americans in Vietnam, they will invade Cambodia next, 
then Laos, Th ailand, and eventually China.”8 Th e instructor told the men 
that assisting Vietnam was defending China. Th e instructor’s interpreta-
tion of the Communist “Domino Th eory” made sense to the men, who 
remembered America’s invasion of Korea and its occupation of Taiwan.
In July 1965, when I became a Communist Party member and cor-
poral, Chinese troops entered North Vietnam.9 China sent surface-to-air 
missile, antiaircraft  artillery, railroad, engineering, mine-sweeping, and 
logistics units into North Vietnam to help Hanoi defend the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam [DRV]. Th e Chinese forces in North Vietnam oper-
ated antiaircraft  guns, built and repaired roads, bridges, railroads, and 
assembled factories. We enabled Ho Chi Minh to send more NVA troops 
south to fi ght Americans.
In October, the First Antiaircraft  Division received an order from the 
PLA high command in Beijing to be prepared for engagement in the Viet-
nam War on a rotational schedule. We learned later that the high com-
mand used Vietnam as a training ground and rotated the Chinese troops 
there. China could rotate all of its antiaircraft  artillery troops within fi ve 
years, according to Beijing’s schedule. Each division was to operate in 
North Vietnam for six months, but no longer than eight months.10 In late 
1965, our company instruction began to introduce the American air force, 
including its fi ghters and bombers. Th rough our training, we learned some 
Vietnamese words, like “Chao ong” (How are you?) and “Cam on” (Th ank 
you), to communicate with local Vietnamese people. I was amazed that the 
pronunciations of many Vietnamese words are the same in Chinese. We 
also learned some English words, like “Don’t move!” and “Surrender or 
die,” which we might need if ever confronted by American pilots.
In the summer of 1966, the division began a cross-country movement, 
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from Northeast to Southwest China, more than 2,500 miles. Th e division 
assembled in early September at Ningming City, Guangxi Province, about 
thirty miles from the Chinese-Vietnamese border. At Ningming, we had a 
four-week foreign war orientation. One thing all the Chinese soldiers and 
offi  cers had to do was to take off  our Chinese uniforms: no Chinese badges, 
no Red Star cap insignia, no PLA rankings, and no Chinese names. We put 
on Vietnamese light green uniforms and gray caps without ranks. Th e men 
laughed at each other. We looked just like the Vietnamese soldiers if we 
didn’t talk. Our division, the First, was renamed the Th irty-fi rst AAA Divi-
sion in the new order of battle for the PLA forces in North Vietnam. Th e 
division headquarters sent some Vietnamese translators to serve at regi-
ment, battalion, and company levels. A searchlight battalion was assigned 
to the division for night operations, and some medics and technicians were 
also added to each regiment.
In the morning of September 28, 1966, my regiment left  China and 
entered Vietnam. Th e traffi  c was very heavy and slow, about twenty or 
twenty-fi ve miles per hour. Supply trucks, artillery pieces, construction 
equipment, and PLA troops were rolling southward, forming a long col-
umn on the road. We crossed the border at the Youyiguan [Friendship 
Pass], which connects the main transportation line between the two coun-
tries. No military vehicles stopped at the pass. Th e traffi  c became even 
slower aft er they crossed the border.
Th at was my fi rst time in a foreign country. Just like the others, I was so 
excited. I found that North Vietnam was just like Southwest China. Many 
palm trees and banana trees were along the road; some rubber plantations 
were in the middle of the bamboo forest. Th e Vietnamese houses, rice 
paddies, and stubble fi elds looked like those in China. And their trucks, 
motorcycles, and tractors were all made in China. But their bicycles were 
French style, looking better than the Chinese brands. Th e Vietnamese 
men, women, and children were very friendly to us. Th ey stopped what 
they were doing and waved to us when our artillery column passed by.
Entering North Vietnam, the Th ird Regiment kept moving south on 
Route 1 highway. We passed Lang Son (a city about twelve miles from the 
border) in the aft ernoon and exited at the “forty-three mile” point on Route 
1, then turned onto a muddy, country road. Aft er a six-hour bumpy ride 
into the mountains, we fi nally stopped before midnight in a quiet, deep 
forest, about seventy miles from the border. In the dark, I was surprised 
to see a nicely built fi eld camp waiting for us in the middle of the forest. It 
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included bamboo shelters, showers, and pinewood beds. In fact, our regi-
ment replaced another from the Beijing Regional Command, which had 
built everything needed for operations before rotating back to China.
Th e Shenyang First Division, renamed the “Th irty-fi rst Column” in 
North Vietnam, provided air defense over Lang Son Province, including 
its cities, railroads, and highways. Lang Son, a northern border province in 
the mountainous area, has only two medium-size cities. Since they are so 
close to the Vietnamese-Chinese border (about twelve and fourteen miles), 
the American airplanes didn’t raid these cities. Americans didn’t want to 
risk a confl ict with the Chinese air force by fl ying into Chinese air space. 
Th us, the Th irty-fi rst Column focused its main eff orts on Lang Son’s trans-
portation network. Two regiments positioned themselves along Route 1, 
a sixty-mile section from north to south through the province. Th e Th ird 
Regiment was assigned to protect a local road and a bridge between Route 
1 and Th ai Nguyen, along the Lang Son-Hao Binh provincial border.11 
Th e rest of the troops and division headquarters were stationed three 
miles off  Route 1, eight miles south of Lang Son City. Th e division’s sup-
ply depot and fi eld hospital were located in the same area. Our battalion 
was assigned to protect that bridge on the local road. We worked all night 
and didn’t sleep the fi rst night. I had to position my machine gun up the 
hill on the south side of the bridge. It was rainy, foggy, and muddy, with 
many insects and thick bushes. My twin-barreled machine gun seemed 
much heavier than it had been. Aft er I’d done my job, I helped others push 
the big guns up the hill, as a CCP member should do. Th ey barely made 
it before dawn.
American airplanes paid their visit the next morning. Th e First Battal-
ion received the call from the regiment headquarters about 0920 hours that 
six F-105 fi ghter-bombers were coming in their direction. At 0935 hour, 
the battalion’s fi rst outpost, about thirty miles south, called in and reported 
that four F-105s, at middle speed and an altitude of 18,000 feet, were fl ying 
from southeast to northwest. Five minutes later, the second outpost, about 
ten miles south of the bridge, called, “Four 105s are coming!” Th e same 
messages were passed on from the battalion headquarters to the company 
commanders.
“Ready,” the captain yelled in the loudspeakers on the hill. Th e approach-
ing jets’ engines sounded like a rolling thunder. Th e captain ordered, “100s, 
76s, fi re!” Th e big guns opened their fi re before I could see the American 
fi ghters. Although we learned a lot about the American fi ghters and bomb-
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ers, I didn’t realize they were so noisy and fast. Th e hill shook, the sky was 
smoking, and the air smelled of burning gunpowder.
I barely heard the captain’s order, “37s, fi re!” Th at was for me. I looked 
hard into the sky. Two of the fi ghters split and seemed intent on striking 
our positions. I aimed at one of them and pulled the trigger. My machine 
gun roared and sent bullets fl ying toward the fi ghters. Th ey didn’t dive, 
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just fl ew over the hill. I turned my gun 180 degrees and kept fi ring until 
the planes disappeared from my sight. “Cease fi re,” the captain ordered. I, 
sweating and out of breath, realized that the whole battle took only min-
utes. “Oah, oah, oah!” We jumped out of our positions and cheered when 
we knew the American fi ghters had gone. Even though the American air-
planes just passed through the area, it was important for us to taste a real 
combat. We now felt confi dent. We knew how combat was, and we knew 
that we could make it. At lunch that day, we toasted each other with tea for 
our fi rst battle.
Our real headache was changing our positions aft er each engagement 
to avoid American retaliation. We had to move our guns and ammunition 
into new positions before the next morning. Aft er our fi rst engagement, 
the company pulled the guns out of the positions on the south side of the 
bridge, moved them down the hill, across the bridge, and into the forest 
north of the bridge.
Th e next morning, American fi ghters and bombers came back. Th ere 
were six of them. We were lucky. Th ey struck our old positions on the south 
side of the bridge. Th e fi ghters fi red rockets from a distance, tearing down 
trees, burning bushes, and starting a wall of fi re no one could escape. Th en 
the bombers dropped heavy bombs on the positions, smashing the rocks 
and wiping out pretty much everything on the hill. Th e American fi re-
power was so fi erce that I became nervous just watching it from my new 
position. I was not scared. I was young, and not scared of death. But what 
had overcome me was the overwhelming fi repower, which somehow had 
neutralized my mind at the moment. My gun seemed useless; I felt insig-
nifi cant. I began to hate the American airplanes, their fi repower, and the 
furious air strikes that had minimized my world and my existence. From 
the north side of the bridge, the Fourth Company opened fi re on the fi ght-
ers and bombers. Surprised, the American airplanes tried to pull out and 
escape from the well-organized Chinese fi re.
I hated the heat and jungle in North Vietnam as much as I did the 
air strikes. All of our men were from North China. Th e weather in Viet-
nam was too hot for us. In October, Vietnam’s dry season began. We oft en 
operated in temperatures between 100–110 degrees. We were sweating all 
day long. Th e next spring, the endless monsoon rains arrived, ensuring we 
stayed constantly wet. Some of us became sick. When I accompanied one 
of our men to the division fi eld hospital, I was surprised to see the hospital 
full of sick soldiers.
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In November, the bridge collapsed during an air raid. Th e engineering 
troops (also from China) worked day and night to repair the bridge. For 
almost two weeks, there were no air raids and no engagements. Somehow 
we didn’t enjoy the relaxation long before the men got bored. Boredom had 
never been considered a problem until then. In December, the air raids 
became intensifi ed again. I was wounded on December 19, when a large 
group of the American warplanes attacked the bridge. Th eir fi rst dive was 
so low that I could see the numbers painted on their planes. Th ey came so 
fast that my gun didn’t get them at all. Th ey fi red upon our positions with 
a rain of bullets.
I could hear my comrades’ screams and cries behind me. I felt bad 
since my 37 mm had failed to protect them. Jumping out of the trench, I set 
up my machine gun at a higher position before the airplanes’ second dive. 
“Come back down here! It’s dangerous there!” someone cautioned me. I 
ignored the warning and stood high without any cover, trying to aim at the 
coming airplanes. I guess I was mad, or crazy, or something just like that.
Th e fi ghters made the second pass one aft er another. I could hear the 
bullets from the aircraft s passing by me and felt the hot air from the jet 
engines’ exhaust. Standing up, I kept fi ring and fi ring, until the captain 
ordered a cease-fi re. A shock of pain struck me as soon as I released the 
trigger. I sat down and couldn’t get up again. Th e terrible pain came from 
my legs. I knew I got shot. Biting my tongue and trying not to scream, I 
looked down, checking my legs. A couple of bullets went through my left  
leg, which was covered by blood. I tried to stop bleeding before the med-
ics found me. “Lay down!” the medics said, “Don’t move!” I just felt so 
exhausted and fell into sleep aft er the medics gave me a shot. I wasn’t the 
only one wounded. I learned in the Chinese fi eld hospital that my com-
pany suff ered twelve dead and thirty-seven wounded in the battle, includ-
ing one of my best friends. Th at was a pretty heavy casualty rate for an 
AAA company.
Aft er my condition became stable, the fi eld hospital decided to transfer 
me from Vietnam to China for further treatment. On January 5, 1967, I left  
Vietnam for China. When the truck passed the Vietnamese-Chinese bor-
der, I said “Chao ba toi ve” (“good-bye” in Vietnamese) to the country and 
people I had been fi ghting for during the past four months. I said “Zaijian” 
(“good-bye” in Chinese) to my friends who came to Vietnam with me, but 
would never return home.
Th e Chinese soldiers had sacrifi ced their lives for a foreign country. 
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Th ey were buried in Vietnam, and their real names were not allowed to be 
put on the tombstone. I just wonder how they can be remembered. Can 
their parents eventually go to Vietnam and visit their sons’ graves? We 
never know. I didn’t know why the tears were in my eyes when I passed the 
border. On the way, I saw more Chinese troops, supplies, and equipment 
were being readied to be sent into Vietnam.
I returned to my company in March 1967 when our division rotated 
back to China. I received an award for my actions in the battle, and became 
a sergeant in that spring. At that time, China was in the middle of the Great 
Cultural Revolution [1966–1976], a nationwide turmoil, which paralyzed 
the civilian governments, started many local confl icts, and caused millions 
of deaths. Mao Zedong decided to employ the PLA to restore order and 
prevent possible civil war in the country. Moving to center stage, the mili-
tary took over civilian governments at provincial, district, city, and town 
levels, sending offi  cers to schools, factories, companies, and farms. Look-
ing for a large number of offi  cers to run the cities in Northeast China, the 
Shenyang Regional Command asked each army, division, and regiment to 
contribute its share and select offi  cers as representatives. Like most of the 
offi  cers, I didn’t want to leave my current duties. But the regimental com-
Capt. Zhao Shunfen (PLA, ret.)
in Beijing, China, in 2005.
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mand developed a list, including my name. As promised, I and most of the 
offi  cers who were going to work with civilians received an immediate pro-
motion. I was promoted to captain.
As a captain, I became a military representative who took part in the 
local administration. I chose to work in a high school at Harbin, capital city 
of Heilongjiang Province, 150 miles from my hometown. My dream fi nally 
came true at the point when I didn’t want it. And my parents liked my new 
job and were so happy to see me back. In the summer of 1968, I became one 
of the three PLA representatives working at the Eighteenth High School in 
the city of Harbin. In 1971, the military representation was terminated and, 
like most of the PLA representatives, I decided to stay at this civilian posi-
tion. I retired from the army in 1972. A year later, I became the principal 
of the Harbin Eighteenth High School. In 1974, at age twenty-nine, I mar-
ried a history teacher at the Eighteenth High School. Busy with two small 
kids, I managed to fi nish high school in 1978. It took me ten years studying 
in evening and weekend classes to get my college degree in history. Since I 
retired from my administrative job in 2002, I have been teaching world his-
tory classes at the Eighteenth High School. I enjoy teaching, and the Viet-
nam War is one of my favorite topics.
Chapter 9
Chinese Response to the
U.S. Rolling Th under Campaign
Maj. Gen. Qin Chaoying was right about Maj. Guo Haiyun when he intro-
duced me to him in Beijing.1 Straight and jocular, Major Guo was a typical 
PLA offi  cer with a good memory of his war-fi ghting in the past and an ada-
mant pride about his experience in Vietnam. He served as battalion chief 
of staff  in the First Regiment of the PLA Sixty-fourth AAA Division, which 
entered Vietnam in April 1967. He, his staff , and their air-defense troops 
fought tough battles during the U.S. Rolling Th under campaign against North 
Vietnam. Th ey also worked hard to fi ll the “technology gap” between the Chi-
nese air defenses and the Russian antiair missile system. According to the 
major, the Chinese could not match the superior Soviet missile technology 
for North Vietnam’s air defense. In 1967, the PLA high command ordered its 
AAA troops to intensify their training in order to shoot down more Ameri-
can airplanes than the Soviets. Major Guo recalled that the Chinese troops 
had two rivals in Vietnam: “the American imperialists in the sky and . . . the 
Soviet revisionists on the ground.”2
To strengthen their air defenses in North Vietnam and compete against 
the Soviet Red Army, the PLA sent more AAA divisions. According to Le 
Duan, general secretary of the Vietnam Lao Dong (Workers’ Party, VWP, 
in 1976 renamed Vietnam Communist Party), by April 1967, the Chinese 
forces in North Vietnam totaled 130,000 men.3 Th is rapid involvement with 
a large number of forces remained undetected by American intelligence.4 Th e 
PLA high command hoped that their numerical superiority might enable the 
Chinese troops to overcome their inferiority in equipment and technology. It 
seemed rational to the Chinese leaders, who believed that a weak army could 
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defeat a strong army by employing tactics such as surprise attacks and an 
active defense. Maj. Guo Haiyun and his staff  had to devise an eff ective air 
defense against the U.S. Rolling Th under.5 Later on, Chinese leaders realized 
that their experience with guerrilla war tactics and the “people’s war” doc-
trine did not help the Vietnamese much in their war against American forces. 
Mao Zedong had to concede situational diff erences to the DRV leaders in 
Beijing in 1968, stating, “You are meeting new situations at present, so a lot 
of your ways of dealing with them are and ought to be diff erent from ours in 
the past. We learned how to fi ght step by step and frequently suff ered defeat 
in the beginning; it was not as smooth as for you.”6
Based upon their Korean War experience, the Chinese high command 
started to rotate their AAA divisions in December 1965. In their rotation, 
each division operated for six to eight months in Vietnam. Most Vietnamese 
offi  cers did not like the Chinese rotation system.7 Th e Vietnamese believed that 
it took a couple of months for a Chinese AAA unit to adapt to the weather, 
terrain, and combat conditions. When the unit became combat eff ective and 
able to shoot down American airplanes in the fourth or fi ft h month, it had 
to prepare for its departure. Th en the new unit would repeat the same cycle 
again.8
Maj. Guo Haiyun
Chief of Staff , Second Battalion, First Regiment, Sixty-fourth AAA 
Division, People’s Liberation Army (China)
I joined the PLA at the age of sixteen in 1948, the last year of the Chi-
nese Civil War [1946–1949], when the PLA needed more new recruits to 
win the fi nal battles against the Nationalist Army. Aft er the civil war, I was 
sent to a PLA artillery school in Shenyang to study artillery technology in 
1949. Aft er the Korean War broke out in the summer of 1950 and China 
sent its troops to Korea in the fall, our school was changed to the Shenyang 
Antiaircraft  Artillery Academy in 1950 in order to establish an air defense 
both in North Korea and in China against the American air power. I stud-
ied aviation technology, radar systems, antiaircraft  defense, and Russian in 
1950–1955.
All of the PLA’s antiaircraft  weapons and equipment were made in the 
Soviet Union back then. China had imported Russian-made 85 mm and 37 
mm antiaircraft  artillery guns since November 1949. More models of 100 
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mm, 76 mm, 57 mm, and 37 mm guns were purchased during the Korean 
War.9 Aft er 1955, the PLA imitated the Russian 37 mm gun and made it 
double-barreled in 1965. In the same year, the Chinese produced copies of 
Russian 57 mm and 100 mm antiaircraft  guns. Th ey were all equipped with 
Russian-made antiaircraft  fi re-control radar.
Aft er my graduation in 1955, I was assigned to the Twenty-fourth 
Army, which stationed in Shenyang Region. In its antiaircraft  battalion, 
I served as a platoon leader, company commander, battalion staff , and 
battalion deputy commander from 1956 to 1965. In the summer of 1965, 
when the PLA began to send its AAA troops to Vietnam, the high com-
mand collected all of its antiaircraft  units from the army, navy, and air 
forces and reorganized them into eleven AAA divisions, which were under 
the command of the air force. Having left  the Twenty-fourth Army, our 
battalion was regrouped into the Second Battalion, First Regiment, Sixty-
fourth AAA Division. I was promoted to the chief staff  of the battalion in 
1965. To meet the rapidly increasing demand from Vietnam, the air force 
established nine more AAA divisions between 1966 and 1969.10 Most of 
the divisions, however, were armed with the 1950s Russian-style 100 mm, 
85 mm, 76 mm, 57 mm, and 37 mm antiaircraft  guns.
To make these newly established divisions combat ready, the General 
Staff  headquarters of the PLA provided three-month training for the staff  
offi  cers at battalion, regiment, and division levels. We spent two months in 
Southwest China, learning new communication technology, radar systems, 
cooperative operations, and Vietnamese. Th en, in early November 1966, 
our group crossed the border and entered Vietnam for further real-war 
situation training. We stayed at the Th ird Regiment headquarters of the 
Sixty-fi ft h AAA Division, learning more about America’s Rolling Th un-
der air campaign, Vietnam’s landscape, command and control, plans and 
operations, and cooperation with the NVA command centers. Our training 
group returned to China in late December 1966.
In retrospect, the Chinese air defense was inadequate in 1965–1967.11 
Obviously, there was a huge technological gap between the American and 
Chinese forces, much larger than in the Korean War. Gen. Yao Fuhe, our 
division commander, who served in the Korean War, pointed out that 
“when the Americans developed the post–World War II jet fi ghters in 1950, 
we used Russian-made World War II radar and AAA pieces. We had a fi ve-
year technology gap in Korea. Now, when the Americans had the most 
advantaged aircraft  in the world by the mid-1960s, we still used the same 
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air-defense weapons. Th ere was a twenty-year technology gap in Vietnam.” 
I had heard the Chinese offi  cers of the Sixty-fi ft h Division complain about 
their out-of-date artillery pieces and inferior radar systems. Th e Chinese-
made 57 mm and 100 mm antiaircraft  guns, the major AAA pieces for the 
Chinese divisions in 1965–1967, did not have high performance in the air 
defense of North Vietnam.
In April 1967, our Sixty-fourth AAA Division began to enter Vietnam. 
As the rotation policy planned, we replaced the Sixty-fi ft h Division and 
took over the air defense of the railways from Lao Cai to Yen Bai, about 140 
kilometers from north to south. Th is was one of the two main railroads for 
China, Russia, and other Communist countries to ship in their economic 
and military aid to Vietnam. Our division headquarters considered Yen 
Bai to be the major defense point, deploying three regiments with 138 artil-
lery pieces and 99 antiaircraft  machine guns. Our battalion was part of the 
air defense of a railway bridge outside the Yen Bai city.
On July 4, we had our fi rst engagement. On that aft ernoon, four Amer-
ican F-105 bombers came to attack the bridge, escorted by four F-4C fi ght-
ers. Waiting until they reached about 4,500 meters from our position, we 
opened fi re. Shocked, all of the warplanes pulled up and fl ed away. All of 
our commanding offi  ces and soldiers were happy about our fi rst engage-
ment without any casualties.
Our next engagement was a large-scale AAA battle against American 
Shrike missiles on July 20. In 1966–1967, the U.S. F-105F and F-105G air-
planes began to employ AGM-45 Shrike antiradiation missiles against the 
Chinese and Russian antiaircraft  radars. A Shrike, usually launched from 
twelve to sixteen miles away, followed the radio waves from a search radar 
or gun-directing radar, and then destroyed the target within fi ft y seconds. 
Shrike missiles infl icted more casualties to the Chinese divisions, and some 
of the units were almost blind due to the loss of their radars. Aft er entering 
Vietnam, for example, the Sixty-fi ft h Division lost seven search radars and 
nine gun-laying radars within three weeks in early 1967.12 Even though 
the PLA high command planned on many new research and development 
projects to improve radar technology, the political turmoil of the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution had made implementation of these R&D 
projects very diffi  cult, if not impossible, in 1967–1970. Th e new models of 
search radar and AAA guns did not emerge until 1971.13
Figuring we’d have to adapt to Shrike missiles and increasing U.S. bomb-
ing, our battalion and regiment headquarters relied on our own resources, 
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or the people’s war approach and the low-tech tactics. Most of our com-
manding offi  cers at battalion and above levels were the Korean War veter-
ans, who had experience in fi ghting against American warplanes.
In the morning of July 20, nearly one hundred American warplanes 
approached the Yen Bai area. When the enemy airplanes reached thirty to 
forty miles from our positions, our search radars detected the targets and 
sent in the data to the gun-laying radars. Th en the search radars used on-
and-off  switch and low volt wave to deal with the Shrike. Th e search radar 
was turned off  before the F-105s reached their Shrike missile fi re range [fi f-
teen miles]. In the meantime, our gun-laying radar spotted the targets and 
passed the information to my battalion command center. My staff  mem-
bers calculated the data and sent out the artillery fi x. Th en the gun-laying 
radar shut down their long wave, while the operators shook radar antenna 
left  and right, up and down, to make it hard for Shrike missiles to fol-
low their radar wave. Waiting until the airplanes entered the air-defense 
fi re area, the operators turned the long wave back on to direct the fi re on 
the airplanes. Even though the American airplanes fi red thirty-one Shrike 
Chinese AAA troops in Yen Bai in 1966.
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missiles at all of our radars, including our battalion radars, there was no 
major damage by the Shrikes.
Th en we issued fi re orders to all 100 mm, 85 mm, and 37 mm guns. 
From the north side of the bridge, the Fourth Company opened fi re on the 
fi ghters and bombers. Th e American airplanes tried to pull out and escape 
from the well-organized Chinese fi re.
“We got it! We got it!” yelled the Fourth commander so loudly that I 
could hear him from the radio over the heavy bombing and intense artil-
lery shelling. I looked up. One of the bombers was fl ying away with black 
smoke trailing, the plane swinging like a drunkard. “Second Squad,” I called 
in no time. “Look for a crashed plane and American pilots.”
A dozen soldiers picked up their rifl es and rushed into the jungle. 
We were instructed by the division and regiment commands to check on 
crashed planes and to capture any surviving pilots in order to evaluate the 
air defense and improve our performance. Th e Second Squad had to rush 
to the crash site fi rst and guard the “operating area,” so the Vietnamese or 
the Soviets could not enter, according to the agreements. If the Soviets got 
there fi rst, the Chinese could not interfere in their “operations.” We had to 
compete against the Soviets, as we always said that we fought against the 
American imperialists in the sky and against the Soviet revisionists on the 
ground.
In fact, we needed to know American aviation technology. Aft er the 
Sino-Soviet split in 1960, we lost the only source for the air force mod-
ernization. Our participation in the Vietnam War opened up a new win-
dow of opportunity to learn from the U.S. Air Force, the most advanced 
in the world. Our high command instructed our troops to search for pilot 
logbooks, codes, records, and training manuals; also instrument panels, 
communication devices, radar equipment, and electronic systems, weapon 
controls, missiles, launchers, and cameras.
During my fi eld training in 1966, I saw several groups of Chinese 
defense engineers, technology experts, and weapon designers from Bei-
jing traveling to the crash sites for their research and to the POW camps to 
interrogate American pilots.
Nevertheless, the Chinese-Vietnamese as well as Russian-Vietnamese 
agreements requested that all captured pilots be turned over to the NVA 
within two hours, and all the weapons and equipment be turned over to the 
NVA within twenty-four hours. Th e Vietnamese command, however, knew 
that the Chinese and Russians were researching and pirating the American 
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high-tech equipment and hardware, and shipping them back to their coun-
tries. Th e Vietnamese were neither allowed to stop the Chinese nor Soviet 
military vehicles, nor to search Chinese or Russian military personnel.14 
Two days later, our search squad returned without fi nding the crash site. 
We did not change our combat report that the Fourth Company had shot 
down one American airplane on July 20.15
Th e NVA command was not satisfi ed with our low-tech war-fi ght-
ing, or guerrilla, tactics. Th ey requested our commands to submit to the 
NVA command within twenty-four hours aft er each engagement.16 Aft er 
each battle, we had routine paperwork, counting ammunition, assessing 
[or rather, guessing] the results, and reporting to the offi  cers. Th e NVA 
needed the number, if any, of American planes shot down, American pilots 
captured, Chinese casualties, bridge and road damage, civilian casualties, 
ammunition used, technical problems, communication failures, or any 
other problems.
In the early winter, our division command did not satisfy its combat 
objectives since we didn’t shoot down as many American airplanes as other 
divisions. Th e command launched an “active defense,” moving out of our 
defense perimeter and looking for an engagement, instead of waiting for 
one.
Our regiment command planned to ambush the American airplanes 
at their rendezvous points aft er their raids and on their way back to base. 
With the planes off  guard, with no bombs, low on fuel, and at slow speed, 
the Chinese guns might have a better chance. One company from my bat-
talion participated in the fi rst ambush battle with other two companies. 
Th e ambush point was very crucial. Th e fi rst location was chosen about 
thirty miles south of the defense area, near Bac Ninh, sixty miles north of 
Hanoi, North Vietnam’s capital city.
I led my company to our position, which was in the middle of the 
impenetrable jungle. We had to cut through the trees and bushes in order 
to move the big guns into the positions. Movement through fi ft een-foot-
high elephant grass and knee-deep mud not only slowed our position con-
struction, but produced considerable fatigue as well. To better conceal 
our movement and deployment, no cooking, hot water, or hot food was 
allowed. We ate powdered rice crackers and canned meat for weeks. And, 
most frustrating, the American airplanes didn’t meet there.
We had a small force with small guns and without medium-range 
search radar. We had to change our positions three miles eastward during 
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the second week. Early in the third week, on December 16, eight Ameri-
can airplanes came, fl ying south, at slow speed, low altitude, and in a non-
combat formation. Our commander waited until all the planes fl ew into 
our ambush zone, and ordered to fi re. My company aimed at the targets 
and fi red several rounds. One plane was hit by the intense explosions of 
our fi rst-round shells. Before the American pilots fi gured out they were 
ambushed, another was hit and on fi re. Th e rest of the airplanes pulled up 
to a high altitude, but did not leave. Th ey made a big U-turn, regrouped, 
and attacked our positions. Th ey made two passes, fi ring upon our posi-
tions. And, then, all of a sudden, they’d gone. Our company was lucky 
having only fi ve wounded, but the other two companies suff ered heavy 
casualties. It was reported that we shot down one warplane and damaged 
two. Our ambush was a big success, and I believed that Mao’s guerrilla tac-
tics still worked in today’s high-tech warfare.
In January 1968, our division, the Sixty-fourth Division, rotated back to 
China aft er nine months in Vietnam. It was reported that the division shot 
down 109 American airplanes and damaged 85, while 40 soldiers and offi  -
cers were killed and 246 wounded.17 Aft er our return, our regiment moved 
to Tangshan, Hebei Province, in 1969. In 1970–1975, our antiaircraft  weap-
onry and equipment were improved drastically due to our problems in the 
Vietnam War. For instance, the PLA designed and manufactured its own 
85 mm all-weather, automatic antiaircraft  artillery gun in 1972. It pro-
duced its own command and communication equipment in the same year. 
Its AAA forces had a total of 10,000 antiaircraft  artillery guns by 1972. Th e 
PLA also began to produce an improved model of 37 mm double-barreled 
guns in 1974. By the mid-1970s, we had new radar systems, such as Models 
572 and 589 low altitude search radar, Model 586 fi re-guiding radar, and 
Model 405 off shore search radar. I took part in these technology improve-
ments. I was promoted to major, serving as a battalion commander, regi-
mental chief of staff , and regimental commander.
However, since the late 1960s, the missile technology began to play a 
more important role in China’s air defense. By 1972, the PLA Air Force had 
four surface-to-air missile divisions, including fi ft y-fi ve SAM missile bat-
talions. While producing more missiles and upgrading missile technology, 
from 1976 to 1980, the air force started to downsize its conventional AAA 
forces by disbanding six antiaircraft  artillery divisions. I retired from the 
active PLA duty in 1981. While enjoying my retirement, among my favor-
ite things is to tell my combat experience in the Vietnam War.
Chapter 10
Russian Spies in Hanoi
I got the name and contact information of “Mr. B.” from a former KGB agent 
at an international conference on Intelligence in the Vietnam War.1 Th en we 
communicated via telephone and e-mail before our meetings and interviews 
a year later. Serious and phlegmatic, Mr. B. always chose his words carefully 
and tried to provide short answers to my questions.2 Having worked with 
Chinese sources and recruited the Chinese Vietnamese informants in Hanoi, 
he spoke fl uent Chinese and knew the Chinese intelligence community very 
well. Mr. B. told me in the interviews that the former Soviet Union had helped 
the Chinese to establish an intelligence system during Stalin’s regime in the 
early 1950s. Th us, the Chinese intelligence service was a mirror image of the 
KGB. Th at is why not only their methods, tactics, and organizations, but also 
their mind-sets were similar. Even the titles, numbers, and positions in both 
secret services and security ministries were identical. It made their rivalry 
a “war of twins,” as the former KGB agent called it, aft er the Russo-Chinese 
split in the 1960s. From 1965 to 1970, North Vietnam was an arena for Rus-
sia’s spying on China.
Th e Soviet Union increased its intelligence activities drastically in Viet-
nam aft er Moscow shift ed from its policy of “staying away” in 1960–1964 to 
a new policy of “lending a hand” to North Vietnam in 1965. Mr. B.’s story 
of his life as a KGB agent in Hanoi gives some details of the Russian intelli-
gence training, organization, missions, and recruitment in North Vietnam in 
1966–1968.3 It is interesting to see how the Communist intelligence services 
spied on each other. In the following story, he also indicates the internal prob-
lems of the KGB, such as the lack of institutional security and job protection, 
distrust and peer confl icts, lack of retirement and social welfare, bureaucratic 
ignorance and carelessness of appointment, and politics in intelligence. All of 
94 Hanoi’s Comrades
these undermined the KGB from within and reduced the eff ectiveness and 
integrity of the Russian intelligence system. Mr. B. wishes to remain anony-
mous in the publication of his personal story. He has joined the “Glasnost 
Foundation,” an international anti-KGB organization headed by Sergei Grig-
oryantz, a human rights activist.
Mr. B.
Russian Agent, KGB (Soviet Security and Intelligence Service),
Russian Embassy in Hanoi, North Vietnam
During my college years, I was recruited by the National Security Commit-
tee, popularly known as the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti). 
Aft er my college graduation in 1964, the KGB sent me to the counterintelli-
gence school in Minsk [the current capital city of the Republic of Belarus]. I 
received formal intelligence training for two years. During my school years 
at Minsk, I met some Vietnamese intelligence offi  cers who were trained by 
the KGB intelligence and counterintelligence. I also met some of the expe-
rienced KGB offi  cers in their forties. Th ey came to the school for a short 
training of new tactics and technology. Some of them made new Vietnam-
ese friends in the school. Th en, in 1965, the Vietnam War there became the 
KGB’s fi rst priority.
Aft er my school years at Minsk, I was assigned to the KGB’s Sixth 
Department at the KGB headquarters.4 Th e Sixth Department conducted 
the interception and inspection of correspondence. My job was to exam-
ine the interceptions and reports on the correspondence both in Vietnam 
and China. I enjoyed working in the offi  ce while I continued my studies of 
Vietnamese language, history, and politics in Moscow.
In 1966, I received my fi rst overseas assignment, as I expected, to 
Vietnam. At that moment, the KGB needed to build quickly its own intel-
ligence sources in Vietnam because of the rapid increase of the Soviet 
involvement in the Vietnam War aft er February 1965.5 Before 1965, the 
KGB station in Hanoi consisted of only fi ve undercover agents, since the 
Soviet embassy had not yet established a military mission. Yepher Ivanovo 
was one of the early KGB agents working in the embassy, with a cover-
ing position as a third secretary. Fluent in Vietnamese, he reported the 
war situation to Moscow and provided the assessment of U.S. air bombing 
of North Vietnam. Th e KGB also collected information on the U.S. mili-
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tary technology, equipment and weaponry quality, troop morale, and war 
preparation.
Later, the high command of the Soviet armed forces established the 
military mission in the Soviet embassy at Hanoi. Th e head offi  cer of the 
KGB served as a military missionary at the embassy in Hanoi. His deputy 
served as vice consul general. Another offi  cer was a consul (middle level 
diplomat), Agent Georgiy Pechernikov. At that time he was the only agent 
who could speak some Vietnamese. His lingual capacity kept him very 
busy. He had to attend all the diplomatic events, read all the information 
and reports in Vietnamese, and meet all of our Vietnamese agents at least 
once a week. Th at exhausted him and caused him some health problems. 
Soon aft er his return to the Soviet Union, he retired from the KGB because 
of his poor health. He died in 1996. Two other undercover agents served as 
a cipher clerk and a driver at the embassy.
In 1966, the KGB doubled the number of its agents from fi ve to ten at 
the embassy; and by 1970 the number increased to fi ft een. When I arrived, 
I found out that many of the agents could speak some Vietnamese or at 
least could read Vietnamese. Th ey worked intensively and eff ectively. For 
example, their accurate reports and timely assessment helped to improve 
the Russian missile technology in combat. Aft er the Soviet Union provided 
Hanoi with SAM-75M missiles, the air defense in North Vietnam reduced 
the eff ectiveness of the U.S. Rolling Th under air campaign in 1966–1967. 
Th e U.S. air forces, however, soon developed new technologies and tac-
tics to deal with the Russian missiles in 1968. Th e Vietnamese missile 
troops could then only shoot down one American airplane with an aver-
age of fi ring ten to fourteen SAM-75M missiles. Th e KGB agents in Hanoi 
focused their eff orts on collecting the air-defense information and mak-
ing accurate assessments. Based on the information, the Russian missile 
experts improved the combat eff ectiveness of the SAM missiles by develop-
ing new SAM-125 missiles, which enabled the Vietnamese to shoot down 
one American plane by fi ring an average of three to four SAM missiles in 
1971–1972.
Having been well trained, the KGB agents adapted to the working 
environment, weather, and people quickly. All Russian agents in Vietnam 
liked its traditional cuisine. We cunningly used it for making our Viet-
namese agents relaxed during the meeting or recruitment. Some of the 
Vietnamese spies had received some of their training in the Soviet Union. 
Th eir familiarity with the KGB system made our work much easier. But I 
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knew that they never trusted us. When we were in Hanoi, the North Viet-
namese counterintelligence shadowed us. Well, it seemed natural, even 
though we were all Communist agents and fi ghting the same war against 
the Americans.
Even the KGB didn’t trust its own people. All of the Russian agents in 
the embassy kept an eye on each other and reported any suspicion of any 
possible collaboration with foreign intelligence. Th e KGB headquarters 
had internal control to protect itself as an institution at home and abroad. 
It aimed to discover traitors and potential defectors. Th e distrust and peer 
spying, of course, hurt many honest agents and offi  cers. Unfortunately, it 
had been part of KGB culture or tradition. It was a professional disease 
inside the KGB. Sometimes it just drove you crazy. In the meantime, how-
ever, the KGB didn’t try everything to protect its own agents. For example, 
one Russian agent lost her cover in Hanoi. Aft er calling her back, Moscow 
headquarters appointed a new female agent as a replacement to the same 
position and in the same offi  ce of her unmasked predecessor. Th at made 
it clear for everybody that the newcomer was a KGB spy, too. Th e cover 
became transparent. Th is bureaucratic ignorance and carelessness had vic-
timized many KGB agents.
Th e Soviet military intelligence in Hanoi was in worse shape. It 
remained inadequate when I got there in 1966. Although the GRU 
[Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye, or the Foreign Military Intelli-
gence Directorate of the Red Army General Staff  of the Soviet Union], just 
like the Defense Intelligence Agency in the U.S. Defense Department, set 
up a station in the embassy, they didn’t have a single Vietnamese speaker. 
I knew that their job was to obtain American military technology and 
weapon samples from the Vietnamese. Th ey also provided the training 
for the NVA special force, which conducted sabotage, assassinations, and 
other secret missions. I heard that the Russian military intelligence agents 
also interrogated American POWs, especially the American pilots who 
were shot down during the Operation Rolling Th under air bombing cam-
paign against North Vietnam. Since the KGB and GRU had their separate 
systems, we didn’t have much communication or exchange except seeing 
each other at the embassy’s weekly business meetings.
My cover at the embassy was a press consul in the News and Media Sec-
tion. I worked with journalists, reporters, and the News and Press Bureau 
in the DRV’s State Council. My assignment was to collect political and mil-
itary information on China and Beijing-Hanoi relations. At that time, the 
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KGB worked hard against China, an immediate threat to Soviet security 
and international relations. To fulfi ll my assignments, I attended many of 
the press conferences, talked to the news corps in the city, recruited Viet-
namese and Chinese reporters as informants, translated useful informa-
tion from Vietnamese to Russian, and wrote reports. I spent a lot of time 
writing reports. I was supposed to write ten pages of my spy reports every 
day. Th en, these reports were coded into telegrams and sent to Moscow. 
Each of us was so busy and stressed that we really didn’t know what other 
agents were doing. We were not sharing any information with each other. 
It was prohibited on the ground of security.
At that time, China was in the middle of its “Cultural Revolution.” 
Although Beijing remained closed to the West, it had many channels to 
inform Hanoi of its “great achievements” in the mass radical movements. 
From my sources in Hanoi, I received news every day on Chinese leaders’ 
speeches, power struggles in Beijing, collapses of the local governments, 
military involvements, armed confl icts, and casualties. I selected the impor-
tant information and translated them from Vietnamese to Russian. It was 
very time consuming, and I worked until midnight almost every day.
I didn’t have much time to recruit the Chinese informants or agents. 
Anyway, the Chinese or Vietnamese-Chinese civilians were unreliable 
human sources. If you talked to a Chinese citizen or a Chinese reporter in 
public, he or she would turn around and walk away aft er they found out 
you were a Russian. Some agreed to work and accept our off er and money, 
but they would give you virtually worthless information. According to my 
experience, they were so tricky. Aft er they received our money, these Chi-
nese agents always double-crossed by eagerly confessing to the Chinese 
counterintelligence in North Vietnam.
Another factor that had made the KGB spying on China the most 
diffi  cult operation was the similarity of the two Communist intelligence 
systems. It has been a replica of the KGB, which had created the Chinese 
intelligence in the early 1950s and trained the Chinese offi  cers and agents 
until the early 1960s.6 In other words, both intelligence agencies grew from 
the same root. Up to the early 1960s, the leading posts in China’s intelli-
gence were held by Soviet KGB intelligence offi  cers from Lubyanka. Aft er 
the Soviet-Chinese split, the Soviets returned home. Nevertheless, most of 
the top Chinese offi  cers and agents from the 1960s to 1980s had received 
some training in the Soviet Union during their early career in the 1950s.
Th e life at the embassy was comfortable, even though the Vietnamese 
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government didn’t treat us very well. Th ey tried to play a political game of 
balance or neutrality between the Soviet Union and China. Th ey wanted to 
show the Chinese that the Vietnamese government was not one of Moscow’s 
puppets. Sometimes their unfriendliness just went too far. For example, the 
Soviet embassy was always the last one among the diplomatic community 
in Hanoi to get their invitations to a reception or a party. To improve the 
relations, our embassy tried so hard to please the North Vietnamese gov-
ernment. Th e relationship between Hanoi and Moscow got better aft er Ho 
Chi Minh’s death in 1969.
To avoid any unpleasant incident, the Soviet embassy had so many 
rules. We couldn’t do a lot of things we needed. Th ey didn’t give any spe-
cial consideration to the agents. I met Col. Nikita Karatsupa at the Soviet 
embassy in North Vietnam. As senior KGB offi  cer, his mission was to train 
Vietnamese colleagues [agents] in Hanoi.7 Although he was well-known 
in the KGB as a hero, Colonel Karatsupa didn’t have a good apartment 
in the embassy because he was aging and retiring, without much future 
in the Soviet politics. He complained to Maj. Gen. George Preobrazhen-
sky, deputy chief of the KGB in charge of the rear regions and neighbor-
ing countries. General Preobrazhensky talked to the Soviet embassy about 
the colonel’s poor health condition. Th e embassy reluctantly moved Kar-
atsupa into a bigger apartment. He retired from the KGB aft er his Hanoi 
assignment.
I left  Hanoi in 1968 for another assignment in Japan. I believe that 
our hard work and valuable information made a signifi cant contribution 
to Moscow’s decision-making toward Vietnam, which had resulted in the 
defeat of the Americans and the victory of the Vietnam people and gov-
ernment. I heard that the Soviet-North Vietnamese relationship was dras-
tically improved in 1969–1971. Th ereaft er, Hanoi divorced Beijing and 
established a complete and strong cooperation with Moscow. I never had 
a chance to revisit Hanoi, where I served our country during the Vietnam 
War.
Part Th ree
Saigon’s Allies
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Chapter 11
Long Days and Endless Nights
An Artillery Story
Funny and optimistic, Sgt. David McCray always made our interviews very 
enjoyable meetings. No wonder he was popular in his Non-Commissioned 
Offi  cer Candidate School class that went to Vietnam, or that he organized 
their fi rst reunion in Washington, D.C., many years aft er the war. Sergeant 
McCray was draft ed when he was a student at the University of Oklahoma 
and was sent to Vietnam in 1970.1 Going to war for most meant tearful good-
byes at home, followed by days or even weeks of homesickness and loneli-
ness while in training, and shocking experiences in their early engagements in 
South Vietnam. Indeed, many of them were unprepared for what they would 
experience in combat against Communist forces in an unfamiliar land. 
Uneasy and nervous aft er his induction date, David did not fully understand 
what was going on in Vietnam.
Th e environment provided the fi rst obstacle for a newly arrived soldier. 
Memories abounded about the oppressive heat, with the average monthly 
temperature of 90 degrees oft en soaring into triple digits. In the winter 
months, Vietnam’s dry season, troops oft en operated in temperatures between 
100 and 110 degrees. During the summer and fall the endless monsoon rains 
arrived, ensuring the soldiers stayed constantly wet. Exposure to the jungles 
proved as harsh and deadly as the Viet Cong. Infested with snakes, mosqui-
toes, ants, and leeches, soldiers dealt with discomfort, pain, and even death 
from the environment. Common affl  ictions included bacterial and fun-
gal infections (referred to as jungle rot), malaria, and hepatitis. Pride and 
a sense of belonging are key components of eff ective army units.2 Sergeant 
McCray’s story shows how a newcomer could survive ’Nam during his fi rst 
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three months and become an eff ective soldier in Battery E, Forty-fi rst Artil-
lery, the “Whispering Death.”
Sgt. David E. McCray
Battery E, Forty-fi rst Artillery, Fourth Division, U.S. Army
I served in the U.S. Army from February 1970 through December 1971. I 
was draft ed and put under orders in December 1969. Since I was in school, 
I was allowed to fi nish the current semester, which ended in the middle 
of January 1970. Th e county in Oklahoma I lived in, McClain County, 
for some reason put me under orders that prevented me from going into 
the lottery the following month. I was the only fi ft h-year senior that was 
treated this way. When I was draft ed, I was a student at the University of 
Oklahoma carrying fi ft een hours and working at a service station in Nor-
man, Oklahoma. I would work twelve hours a day for thirteen straight days 
with one day off  because it was necessary to pay for my education. I was in 
some ways relieved to be draft ed.
I took basic training in Fort Polk, Louisiana. I was in [Charlie Com-
pany, Fourth Platoon, Second Squad] for eight weeks. I took both my 
Advanced Individual Training [AIT] and Non-Commissioned Offi  cer 
Candidate School [NCOCS] training at Fort Bliss, Texas. Th ey were both 
in the fi rst AIT brigade, and in the AIT, I was in C battery for eight weeks. 
In the NCOCS I was part of the training battalion for twenty-three weeks.
I was trained to be a squad leader, 16F40 MOS (Military Occupational 
Specialty).3 My duty was to operate air-defense artillery equipment for 
dusters and quad fi ft ies.4 Th e squad leader, usually a sergeant E-5, and sec-
tion chief, usually either a sergeant E-5 or staff  sergeant E-6, were remotely 
attached to other fi rebases or landing zones to pull perimeter defense at 
night and run convoys during the day to supply the bases with ammunition 
or other supplies. Th e squad leader was in charge of one unit and the sec-
tion chief was in charge of two units. Th e section usually had two sergeants, 
E-5, and the section chief, E-6, would serve as liaison to the attached unit’s 
commanding offi  cer. In my case it was usually the 173rd Airborne.
I went straight from NCOCS to Vietnam and traveled to many places 
in the country. I reported to the Oakland Army Base outside San Fran-
cisco, California, on December 31, 1970, just prior to noon. I spent three 
days there and was transferred to Travis Air Force Base for deployment to 
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Vietnam. We left  Travis and fl ew to Anchorage, Alaska, and had a short 
layover for refueling. From there we fl ew to Tokyo, Japan, with another 
short layover for refueling. We left  Tokyo and fl ew directly into Bien Hoa 
Air Base just outside Saigon, South Vietnam.
Aft er spending the night at the Bien Hoa Air Base, I was transferred 
to Nha Trang for assignment with the First Field Forces. Next I was sent to 
Tuy Hoa for deployment in the Sixtieth Artillery in Charlie Battery, dust-
ers, Fourth Division.5 From Tuy Hoa I went to Two Bits Firebase for four 
or fi ve weeks, next to Landing Zone [LZ] English for fi ve to six weeks and 
fi nally to LZ Uplift  for about three months at the end of May 1971.6 Charlie 
Battery went into “stand down” and I was transferred back to Tuy Hoa for 
reassignment to E-Forty-fi rst artillery in Pleiku in the Central Highlands.
I spent four to six weeks at Artillery Hill in Pleiku and four to fi ve 
weeks at Firebase Tin Can on the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and 
South Vietnam along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Next I was transferred back 
to Artillery Hill in Pleiku for four to six weeks, and in late August or early 
September I was transferred to Cha Rang Valley. Th is would prove to be 
my last base in Vietnam. I stayed there from September to December pull-
ing perimeter defense at night and running convoys during the day. Dur-
Sgt. David E. McCray (fi rst from right) and Battery E in 1971.
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ing this time we ran many convoys from Quin Nhon ammunition depot 
to remote fi rebases along QL-19.7 However, this was the best duty I had in 
Vietnam.
Th e biggest memory about my service was when we were driving into 
Cam Rahn Bay. We hit several traffi  c lights with the normal red, yellow, 
and green lights. It fi nally hit me that I had not seen any other colored 
lights since I had been in Vietnam. It was a special signal to me because I 
knew that I was going home aft er all. For my entire period in Vietnam I 
tried to take one day at a time, although I had kept what we called a “short 
timers” calendar. Several times I had close calls at moments when I did 
not expect it. Because of this, I had tried to keep myself from getting too 
excited about coming home. I was afraid of making a big mistake. I was not 
due to leave Vietnam until January 5 and had expected to spend Christmas 
and New Year’s Day in Vietnam. Now I knew for sure I would be home 
before Christmas.
I elected to leave the battery headquarters in Tuy Hoa a few days ear-
lier and trusted a clerk in battery headquarters to complete the medals for 
everyone. When I left , the medals were in process, but it was never com-
pleted. To my knowledge, no one in my section, including myself, received 
his or her ARCOM [the army commendation medal given to almost all 
soldiers serving in a combat zone]. Th is bothers me to this day because 
I spent my entire tour in the fi eld. Th e clerk I entrusted to complete the 
paperwork had put himself in for a Bronze Star and ARCOM. To my aston-
ishment, since I have been back I have discovered this was the norm for 
most of the clerks in Vietnam. Th ey had the company offi  cers sign hun-
dreds of papers on a daily basis and it was easy for them to push through. 
Even when it was passed to battalion headquarters their buddies would get 
them signed in the same manner.
Another searing memory was when my mother, my dad’s two broth-
ers, my brother, and my sister dropped me off  at the Oakland Army Base 
to report for my Vietnam tour. It was all I could do to keep from breaking 
down in front of them. Th ey were not taking it very well and I was trying 
to be positive and in control. If one of my buddies had not come up to us 
when we exited the car, I am not sure I would have been able to maintain 
control. A guy named Tom Mahoney made things a lot easier for me when 
we ended up being stationed in the same section in Vietnam for a short 
period, which made the transition a lot easier. Th e fi rst night in Vietnam, at 
the Bien Hoa Air Base, there was a sapper attack and we were warehoused 
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in a barracks without any weapons during the attack. Th at would be the 
fi rst of many scares.
Something funny that happened to me was while we were on bivouac 
at Fort Bliss [in Texas]. We were staying in bunkers similar what we had 
in Vietnam. Th ese bunkers were large enough for fi ve of us to sleep in and 
keep our guard status for the night. During one night, when one of the 
squad members came in to wake his replacement for his shift  on guard 
duty, a loud rattle was heard in the bunker. All of a sudden fi ve guys were 
frozen. Not knowing where to go or what to do, they all started shouting 
for help. Several of us came running to see what was happening. Upon 
discovering there was a rattlesnake in the bunker with them, we went to 
get fl ashlights to fi nd out where the snake was. It turns out the snake had 
crawled under one of the guys’ sleeping bags near his feet and the guard 
disturbed the snake when he walked in. Th ey managed to get the snake 
out and those fi ve guys did not want to stay in the bunker for the rest of 
the bivouac period. However, they had no choice because the weather had 
turned cold because the three-week period was during late September and 
early October.
I had many, many scary experiences during my service. One that sticks 
in my mind happened so quickly that I didn’t have enough time to get 
scared until it was over. It happened on my last night in Charlie Battery 
before we went into “stand down” the last of May. We had been getting 
rocketed and mortared from such an angle that our dusters did not have a 
fi eld of fi re. Th e commanding offi  cer of the 173rd Airborne told us at about 
fi ve o’clock that evening that they were going to deploy one of our dust-
ers to high ground at LZ Uplift . LZ Uplift  straddles QL-1 highway. East of 
the highway was a hill where the communication center was located. We 
moved aft er dark to prevent anyone outside the base to know where we 
were going to be located, or so we thought. We had a bulldozer push up a 
parapet for the duster. We laid a landline to the nearest bunker and I made 
radio contact with Fire Direction Center [FDC], where all authorizations 
are issued for fi re missions, for our fi ring coordinates. Th ese were normal 
procedures, to have two-way contact to the FDC if needed.
During my establishment of radio contact, the last thing I remember 
was seeing a blue fl ash. A rocket had hit near the base of the parapet the 
bulldozer had already fi nished. Aft er the blast I found myself twenty to 
thirty feet behind the duster with the breath knocked out of me. Luckily 
the soft  dirt, parapet, and duster protected me and I was only disoriented. 
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I got up and ran smack into the bulldozer, bruising my hip and leg. Once I 
managed to regain my senses, I ran back to the duster. We were not given 
permission to return fi re that night. We received no fi ring coordinates for 
over another hour. It was a very unusual night, and it seemed as though the 
Viet Cong knew we would be moving before we did. It was not unusual for 
things like this to happen. Th e “all clear” had to be given by the local ARVN 
before we were given coordinates.
Another scary incident was a convoy escort to LZ Moon. We were to 
arrive at a fi rebase south of LZ Uplift  by 0900 hours and escort an ammuni-
tion convoy to LZ Moon, which had been under attack for several nights. 
We arrived on time at the fi rebase, but to our amazement the convoy was 
not ready to go. Th is was highly unusual, although we were not concerned 
about the delay. As the day wore on, we began to get concerned because of 
the time it took to get to LZ Moon. It was not a great distance, but the road 
was a dirt road and went through the jungle with elephant grass growing 
very close to sides of the road. It was very slow travel. About 1600 hours 
the convoy was ready, and I was very nervous by then. I knew that in order 
to get to LZ Moon before dark we would need some luck. Of course, we 
were not lucky. Less than a mile off  the QL-1, the engineers discovered the 
road was mined. Procedures for a mined dirt road called for the engineers 
to sweep the roads. I think the engineers only found a couple mines, but it 
really slowed us down and made the engineers very cautious. When dark 
fell we were only halfway to our destination and we could see LZ Moon 
getting hit. Th e captain that was in charge had us pull into a circle in the 
elephant grass and make camp for the night. Th e four dusters were the only 
fi repower we had, with a few infantry types. Th at was the longest night of 
my life and probably the scariest. We were never attacked and extremely 
lucky. Due to our vulnerability, a couple of experienced squads could have 
taken it to us in that elephant grass. Th e next day a helicopter arrived and 
picked up the captain and we were sent back to our LZ. To this day, I do not 
know what happened at LZ Moon.
A third scary episode I will discuss included an incident that happened 
at Firebase Tin Can on the tri-border area of South Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Laos. Th e fi rebase was only two to three miles from the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail and was the size of a football fi eld. On this base were two eight-inch 
guns, two 175 mm guns, two 155 mm guns, two dusters, and two quad fi f-
ties. My guess was that there were only about fi ft y personnel on this base. 
Th e quads protected the north and west side of the base, on the east side 
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was a MACV compound with an ARVN base, and the west and south side 
of the base were covered by the dusters. Th e west side faced the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail.
I usually took the fi rst watch on guard duty at night until 0100 hours 
and left  the other four for two separate shift s from 0100 hours until day-
light. Ever since my Vietnam days I have become a very light sleeper and 
any strange noise will wake me. I am sure this night contributed to this 
trait. Sometime during the early morning hours I awoke feeling as if pins 
and needles were sticking me. I immediately rose and began counting 
the guys. I was startled to discover that no one was on guard duty. I woke 
everyone and we ran to our assigned positions. I was in my boxer shorts, 
fl ack jacket, and helmet with my M-16. As I began walking along the razor 
wire, a fi gure jumped up from the wire and began running back through 
the claymore mines. Th e next morning we discovered that many of our 
mines had been disconnected without our knowing it. We all learned a 
very good lesson and I changed our procedures. Th e guard on duty was not 
allowed to come into the bunker until properly relieved of his guard duty. 
In addition, if the individual did not come out on fi rst call, I was to be noti-
fi ed immediately. To this day, I do not know what or why I woke up. I guess 
God was watching over us.
My favorite memory in the service was aft er we graduated from NCOCS 
in October 1970. We then had to serve six weeks of on-the-job-training in 
the AIT units. Some of us trained the trainees at motor pool, classroom, 
physical training, marched them to classes, rifl e range, etc. I was chosen 
as the physical training drill instructor, among other duties. I really liked 
this duty. I was in tremendous shape and could outrun all but a couple of 
the trainees. I really worked them hard, and when my time was up they 
all were in really good shape. I was running about fi ve-minute miles in 
combat boots, fatigues, and tee shirt at that time. We did physical training 
every morning and every evening. During the day I marched them to their 
classes. It was a cup of tea to me. I was glad I did not get the motor pool 
duty because it was too boring for me. In addition, for the fi rst time since 
I had been in the army, my fellow graduates and I had our evenings free. 
When we were off  duty we were free to go to town, play tennis, or go to the 
NCO’s club. It made the army more like a job for the fi rst time.
Th e worst thing that happened to me was fi nding out my AIT buddy 
Darrell L. Ponder was killed in Vietnam. I do not know the details except 
that he was killed during a sapper attack on the base. I heard one of his 
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peers panicked and ran over him in a quad fi ft y truck. I still do not know 
for sure if this is true.
Th e biggest lesson I learned from my military service is that life is not 
guaranteed. Live one day at a time. You can save for the future, but try to 
enjoy each day. We in America have been blessed. Th ose who have not 
served in the military under a time of duress or served in an impoverished 
country have no idea how blessed we are. I think either the Job Corps, mil-
itary, or similar service should be required for everyone aft er either high 
school or college. We owe this to our country. Maybe then our citizens 
would understand more about how veterans have made life better in the 
United States.
Th ere were a couple of people that I met in the military that infl uenced 
or impressed me extremely. Th eir names were 1st Lt. Stephen Muse and 1st 
Lt. Dominick Crea. Th ey were both West Point cadets that were assigned 
to our unit for a while in Pleiku. Both were obviously very bright and could 
do things without listening to the NCO’s opinion. However, both were pro-
active listeners and would take into account our opinions as well as our 
ideas to approaching diff erent problems. I really had a good relationship 
with both individuals. Lieutenant Crea served as the company commander 
at the end of my tour.
My entire tour of duty in Vietnam lasted from January 6, 1971, until 
arrival at Fort Lewis, Washington, on December 12, 1971, for ETS [Esti-
mated Time of Separation] on December 13, 1971. I remained in the Inac-
tive Reserve until February 10, 1976.8
My homecoming is still hard for me to talk about. I need to go back to 
my departure fi rst. My mother, sister, and brother had driven me to Cali-
fornia to visit my dad’s mother and his siblings’ families. I had a good time 
and all of my relatives paid attention to me and made me feel special. We left  
southern California for the Bay Area to report to the Oakland Army Base. 
My dad’s two brothers drove up there and we visited my mother’s relatives.
Th e night before reporting for my Vietnam assignment, at that rela-
tive’s home, I overheard a reference to me as a baby killer by one of those 
relatives, who refused to leave their room to talk to me. If this wasn’t bad 
enough, when I was transported by bus from the Oakland Army Base to 
Travis Air Force Base we were met with protesters at the gate with a barrage 
of tomatoes. Th is had quite a negative impression on me.
Upon my estimated time of separation from the army [or ETS, used in 
conjunction from separation from active military service] from active duty 
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in Seattle, I was spat upon in both the Seattle airport and the Denver air-
port. I did not have that experience in the Dallas Love Field Airport or the 
Oklahoma City Airport, but the damage had already been done. I found 
myself embarrassed and ashamed of my uniform. Th e fi rst thing I did was 
to borrow a pair of jeans from my brother and a shirt before I made the 
trip to Pawnee, Oklahoma, to see my mother. To this day these memories 
haunt me, especially the cruel comment by the relative. Th e joy of seeing 
my immediate family was overshadowed by what had happened before my 
deployment and return from my service responsibilities. In addition, I had 
brought back gift s to my family and tried to give a handmade hat to my 
two-year-old nephew. My brother told me it was unacceptable for a child to 
wear a hat from a war. Last year, I fi nally gave that hat to my nephew.
Aft er I got out of the military I returned to college, while working full 
time. I graduated with a bachelor’s degree in biology and a minor in math-
ematics and physical education in 1974, and an accounting degree in 1978. 
I was promoted into the accounting department for the company I had 
been working for and began my career in accounting. In 1998, I started 
searching the Internet to fi nd the forty members of my NCOCS class that 
went to Vietnam. I located thirty-six of them and organized a reunion in 
Washington, D.C., which tied to the Dusters, Quads, and Searchlights Vet-
eran Organization. Eleven members of the class and some of their wives 
attended. It was quite an emotional reunion.
Sgt. David E. McCray in 2004.
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Chapter 12
And Th en Th ey’re Gone . . .
Just Like Th at
Maj. Curt Munson has few regrets about having volunteered for the marines 
and Vietnam. As a young man, he was willing to face challenges and take 
risks. It is still true these days when he sits in his big offi  ce as the invest-
ment representative for one of the largest national fi nancial corporations.1 
Major Munson was one of the U.S. Marines sent to Vietnam aft er 1968 as 
the war became unpopular at home. In early 1968, the NVA and PLAF forces 
launched a general off ensive campaign against the American and ARVN 
forces during the Lunar New Year (Tet). Aft er the Tet Off ensive, Gen. William 
C. Westmoreland asked for 206,000 additional troops for South Vietnam. 
Pres. Lyndon Johnson turned him down and shortly thereaft er announced his 
decision not to run for reelection. Nevertheless, 25,000 American troops were 
sent to South Vietnam as replacements.2
Major Munson joined the marines in the spring of 1969 when he was 
eighteen. Th e American soldiers who fought in Vietnam had the youngest 
average age of any American war. Th ey were younger than those who had 
served in World War II (1941–1945) and the Korean War (1950–1953). In 
February 1970, Curt was sent to Vietnam. He came back home a year later. 
It has been forty years since Munson returned from Vietnam, but even aft er 
that long, he’s clear and decisive about his most important memories. Aft er 
his tour in Vietnam, he went on to spend twenty years on active duty in the 
marines, plus four years on reserve status. He retired in 1993 as a major, aft er 
serving in such exotic locations as Somalia, Israel, Syria, and Egypt. Munson 
served as a UN Truce Supervision Offi  cer, commanded the marine detach-
ment on the aircraft  carrier John F. Kennedy, served in Desert Storm, and 
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taught at the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and the Marine Corps Com-
mand and Staff  College.
Maj. Curt Munson
H&S Company, Th ird Battalion, First Marine Division,
U.S. Marine Corps
In 1969, the Vietnam War was raging and I was a freshman at the Univer-
sity of Arkansas. I knew that I wanted to participate in the most signifi cant 
event of my generation, and didn’t want to spend the rest of my life on the 
outside looking in. Ironically, that is just where Vietnam veterans wound 
up.
I chose to join the marines in the spring semester of 1969 once I 
decided to drop out aft er the term. Because I was eighteen, healthy, and out 
of college, I was pretty resigned to serving somehow. Th e son of a highly 
decorated World War II veteran and career soldier, and having always 
lived on army bases, my decision to join the marines broke with tradition. 
Joining the Marine Corp was essentially a minor act of rebellion, but was 
infl uenced by Leon Uris’s book Battle Cry, which depicted them as men of 
honor and greatness. I knew I had committed myself to a tour in Vietnam, 
although at that point, if someone had asked me, I would not have known 
much about the issues involved. Most of my exposure to the war came 
from the John Wayne fi lm Th e Green Berets, with its one dimensional and 
jingoistic view of the war, and Walter Cronkite. Going to school in Arkan-
sas, I wasn’t really aware of the antiwar factions. My thinking about going 
to war was that it was something I wanted to do, as part of my generation, 
as part of history, and as a part of growing up. As I say that, it seems amaz-
ingly naive to me, but there it is.
In late July 1969, I reported for boot camp at the Marine Corps Recruit 
Depot, San Diego, California. Th e objective of boot camp was to prepare 
basically trained marines, so we drilled, learned fi rst-aid, Marine Corps 
traditions and history, physical fi tness, and the care and shooting of our 
weapons. Aft er I fi nished with boot camp in October, I went to Infan-
try Regiment Training [IRT] and then to Basic Infantry Training School 
[BITS]. I was a little smarter by then, and was ambivalent, both relieved 
and concerned to be designated an infantryman. I had to keep reminding 
myself that infantry was what I wanted, but it gave me pause as well. Aft er 
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twenty days’ leave, I went back for a week of .50 caliber machine gun train-
ing and then reported to Staging Battalion for fi nal training and prepara-
tion for deployment as a replacement. Acclimating us to the idea that we 
were going to go kill people was a big part of the training in boot camp. 
Even more than John Wayne, it tended to dehumanize the enemy, to por-
tray them as fodder, just somebody we needed to go and kill. You must 
get people’s minds right about that, and it is one area in which the Marine 
Corps did a pretty good job.
By the time I boarded the Boeing 707 that took me to Vietnam on 
February 16, 1970, I felt like I was well trained, but more importantly, we 
were fi t enough for the challenges of being infantry in a tropical climate. 
I thought I was ready, but it wasn’t until I’d been in Vietnam for several 
months that I realized no training would do as much for me as simply serv-
ing in an operational company for awhile. Th at was where the real learning 
took place.
Upon arrival, I reported for duty with the Th ird Battalion, Fift h 
Marines, First Marine Division. Th e unit was then located in what was 
known as I Corps, the northernmost allied military sector in South Viet-
nam, just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the South 
from North Vietnam.
I was assigned to H&S [Headquarters and Support] Company’s mor-
tar platoon, but I actually served with Mike and Kilo companies of Th ird 
Battalion. I was initially assigned to the An Hoa fi re support base in the 
rugged terrain known as “Arizona Territory,”3 about thirty-fi ve miles west-
southwest of Da Nang.
In March 1970 I joined my battalion at the marine fi rebase on Hill 65.4 
Aft er I joined Mike Company we rotated through several smaller fi rebases. 
Finally, in August 1970, my battalion relocated to Fire Support Base Ross, 
in the Khe Sanh Mountains.
I served almost my entire one-year tour in Vietnam as a forward 
observer [FO] with Mike and Kilo companies and as a section leader in the 
Th ird Battalion’s mortar platoon. As an FO, I was responsible for the fi re-
support planning and execution for an entire company of infantrymen, to 
include mortars, artillery, and close air support. Sometimes I shared those 
duties with an artillery observer, and once with a forward air controller, but 
much of the time I was by myself. Imagine a nineteen-year-old being given 
that job. It just fl oors me to think about that now.
My scariest experience in Vietnam occurred while Mike Company was 
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conducting operations from Hill 270 South, in the Khe Sanh Mountains, 
near An Hoa. It began with what was supposed to be a normal medevac 
mission off  our hilltop by a Marine CH-46 helicopter. It should have been 
the most routine thing in the world. Unfortunately, the landing zone [LZ] 
on Hill 270 was smaller than my dining room. Because the LZ was so tiny, 
the chopper had to hover with its front end off  the forward slope in order 
to load casualties over the rear-end ramp. As the ship maneuvered into 
position its tail rotor struck the ground.
Th e torque, along with the sudden stop of the tail rotor, brought the 
Maj. Curt Munson at the Khe Sanh Mountains in 1970.
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whole bird down, shattering the rotor blades and sending pieces fl ying 
through the air. In seconds, the helicopter rolled off  the hilltop and down 
the side of the mountain. I had been standing next to the LZ ready to help 
load Greg Cluff , our artillery observer, down with malaria, onto the heli-
copter. I could scarcely believe what I was seeing. Th at chopper was fi lled 
with guys from my company. Th e chopper fi nally got hung up in our con-
certina wire, more or less upright, and immediately began to burn. I had 
been literally as close as I could be. It would have been almost churlish for 
me not to participate in the rescue. Without thinking, I actually dropped 
Greg on his ass and ran down the side of the mountain to where the heli-
copter was and just happened to reach it fi rst. Th ere were quite a few casu-
alties already aboard, and those that could were climbing out of the bird. 
Th ey were a little banged up, but when you are nineteen years old (as almost 
everybody was) you can survive all kinds of things.
Th e copilot had jumped out already. He left  his fl ying partner [the pilot] 
in the right seat. He looked at me when I ran up and said, “He’s dead. Don’t 
worry about him.” I was already at the pilot’s door, so I reached up and 
grabbed him. Apparently he’d heard the copilot, because he made enough 
movement to prove to me that he was alive. I couldn’t lift  him out of the 
seat from below, so I ran underneath the helicopter to the copilot’s door 
and climbed on board. Th e helicopter was in fl ames at this point. When I 
got into the cockpit I realized that one of the reasons I couldn’t move the 
pilot was because the instrument panel had broken free and fallen into his 
lap. I used my leg to lift  the panel up and out of the way. Aft er that I lift ed 
this full-grown man up over the armored seat and handed him out to our 
company gunnery sergeant like the pilot was a little baby. I was scared out 
of my gourd. I’ve heard stories all my life about little old ladies carrying 
their refrigerators out of the house during a fi re, but that was my fi rst expe-
rience with being that adrenalized.
A couple weeks later I was notifi ed that I’d been recommended for the 
Navy-Marine Corps Medal. I fi nally got it when I was back in college. For 
twenty years I wore a medal that I received for thirty seconds of commit-
ment. I received several other decorations during my career, but that was 
still my senior award when I retired.
In an infantry company, casualties are the cost of waging war. I became 
more blasé as my tour progressed, even fatalistic, but I never got used to 
it. I saw so many guys lose their legs to booby traps that I was convinced 
my number was coming up. A rifl e company is a pretty tight-knit group. 
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I had friends that were killed or wounded. Th at is the worst thing that hap-
pened to me. Each event was sad, but one of the worst was when Don Tucker 
got killed. We’d been together since before arriving in Vietnam and by then 
he was a really good friend of mine. Another pal named Bob Morris got the 
wound I kept expecting for myself when he lost both of his legs. I still think 
about them. Donny Tucker was killed in an ambush. Morris tripped a booby 
trap while on patrol. I was there for Morris’s wound, but not Tucker’s death.
When I visited the Wall when it came here [the traveling Vietnam 
Memorial exhibit] I made a rubbing of Donny’s name. When I got home 
that night, I wrote him a letter to kind of bring him up to date on what had 
happened to me in the years since I’d seen him last, as an act of closure, I 
suppose. I was in tears when I fi nished. He was just barely nineteen when 
he died. Way too young. He is always going to be nineteen. He was in my 
squad at Staging Battalion, just this shy kid from North Carolina.
Tucker’s death is probably the sad thing that stayed with me the lon-
gest, longer than others who were wounded, even though sometimes their 
wounds were terrible; longer than anybody else that was killed. Whenever 
someone died, the enormity of it was almost bone crushing. You’d see a guy 
horsing around just before a patrol, laughing and full of life. Th ey would be 
at a 100 percent of their capabilities. Th eir parents spent seventeen, eigh-
teen, or nineteen years raising them up straight and tall. Men have to be 
physically fi t to even qualify to join the marines. Th ey were alive and com-
pletely potent and capable one minute and dead as a hammer the next. 
When it happens, you think, “Th is is like you are being screwed with, the 
worst nightmare that’s possible.” It just happened! He was standing there 
a couple of seconds ago. If we can just turn the clock back ten seconds, we 
can make it not happen. How tough could that be? Sometimes, you’d actu-
ally look around like you’re going to fi nd some key or clue that will let you 
turn back the clock. Surely you could undo something that happened that 
recently. But you can’t. You can’t bring anything back that’s already hap-
pened. It was terrible. How awful it is to take somebody who’s at the height 
of his physical prowess, and then he’s gone [snapping his fi ngers] just like 
that.
Another sad story that has stuck with me occurred when one of our 
guys shot himself accidentally through his knee (passing his weapon to 
another marine while climbing up a ravine), and died of shock in a couple 
of minutes. He died before the helicopter could even get there. We had 
other guys who suff ered the most grievous wounds . . . losing legs or an 
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arm and they’d be alive and wisecracking about sending you a bottle of 
bourbon from the States when the helicopter got there. Th is guy took one 
look at his leg and it killed him. He went into shock—just freaked out. I 
will never forget that.
Another very vivid memory of my tour was the weaponry available 
to fi ght the war. We had the ability to bring an enormous amount of fi re-
power to bear on a target. I remember standing on a hilltop and watching 
a B-52 strike that was within my range of vision and observing the shock 
waves blast through the jungle. At the company level, we had no ability to 
request a B-52 strike. Because of the lead time, it’s just as well. As I stood 
there watching the bombs explode, it occurred to me that if there actually 
was any enemy in the target area they were just unlucky.
At my level, though, as an FO I could call in close air strikes, artillery 
missions, and my own mortars. I had a wide variety of weapons at my dis-
posal. For a nineteen-year-old that was a pretty heady experience.
One of my favorite memories from Vietnam was mail. Th e support I 
got from my family and Janis (then my girlfriend, now my wife) and from 
Janis’s family was vital to me. For others in my unit, however, the mail 
sometimes brought bad news.
I lost track of the number of “Dear John” letters guys in my company 
received. Whether the letters came from wives or girlfriends, too few of the 
relationships survived a year of being apart. Aft er the initial shock and sad-
ness, guys frequently became pretty sanguine about their own breakups, 
and the letters themselves tended to make their way around the company. 
If you weren’t emotional about them, some were actually pretty funny. Oth-
ers gave you pause to think how vicious a girl who’d actually said she loved 
a guy could be aft er she’d found somebody new.
When you are young, a year stretches out like an eternity. Before 
I’d been in country nine months even, it seemed like my whole life had 
occurred right there [in Vietnam]. I can’t even imagine what the guys in 
World War II went through, leaving the States in 1942 and coming back 
in 1945 or 1946. Vietnam was a total immersion for me. Th e work was 
all-consuming and at times everything else was just a distraction. I recall 
thinking it would be a miracle if my family and friends remembered me at 
all. Sometimes I could hardly envision them. I remember thinking, “What 
if I don’t recognize anybody when I get home? What if they don’t recognize 
me?” Th ese were irrational fears and I knew it, but it was one way to recog-
nize how much I had changed during my time away.
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I learned a good many human or cultural values, the best and the 
worst, from my time in Vietnam. First, that selfl essness was pretty darned 
common. In an infantry company I think it crossed a lot of barriers—a lot 
of cultural and racial lines. When we were “outside the wire” [outside the 
perimeter fence], whatever our ethnicity or life experiences, our mutual 
interests meshed perfectly. We all wanted to come back. I remember at 
times being with guys of totally diff erent backgrounds and thinking how 
much we had in common. And then once we were back inside the wire, we 
didn’t have a thing in common. An idea frequently enforced by the various 
peer groups.
Vietnam was the most racially charged experience of my lifetime. It 
wasn’t when we were in the bush. It was when we were on base camps. I 
worked with guys in the bush, blacks and so forth, that I thought, man, 
we’re really friends. And then they wouldn’t speak to me when we were 
behind the wire because they couldn’t handle the social pressure of the 
ostracism from their running buddies. Th at made me sad.
When I left  Vietnam I was convinced that the South Vietnamese army 
was ineff ective and of poor quality. In retrospect, I have come to realize 
that my experience was limited to poorly trained militia units that oper-
ated on or near our fi rebases. We couldn’t depend on them for even the 
most basic things, like staying awake on watch or maintaining the integrity 
of their equipment. I blamed that on their training. In combat, confusion 
and fear are really easy to mistake for one another (and one usually leads 
to the other). If they weren’t good soldiers, maybe it’s because the ones I 
worked with didn’t know what they were doing. I never had any experience 
with their Rangers, Marines, or other good units.
Still, I think that for a Vietnamese not to be a good soldier is ironic as 
hell. Th e militia men I saw were guys who would seem to me to have the 
greatest level of commitment because they were fi ghting right next to their 
homes. Yet they showed it the least. Finally, a lot of people forget that we 
had other allies in Vietnam, such as Australia and the Republic of Korea 
(ROK). I never worked with Aussies, but we did operate with the ROK 
Marines and they were terrifi c.
I respected the enemy, even though I didn’t think that they were great 
soldiers as a rule. I had two completely diff erent segments in my tour. Th e 
fi rst several months, I was in an area where our enemy was predominantly 
Viet Cong. Th e VCs were similar to the militia units (sometimes actually 
the same guys) that I was talking about a minute ago. Th ey weren’t very 
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well trained. If a VC unit ambushed us, for example, they would initiate the 
ambush by fi ring an AK-47 on full automatic. You’d get a couple rounds up 
head high, then recoil would cause everything else to go over our heads. 
If you attacked into one of their ambushes, they would disperse. Th ey 
wouldn’t stay their ground. Th ey didn’t fi ght it out. Although they could be 
ingenious in the construction of booby traps, they didn’t have the soldier 
skills that were required to fi ght us one on one.
Th e last several months of my tour were in the Khe Sanh Mountains, 
where we had NVA. And that was a completely diff erent experience. Th ey 
were much tougher soldiers; very competent. Th ey were equipped properly 
and they had weapons in suffi  cient numbers and so forth to do a good job. 
It was scary to meet those guys. I had a lot of respect for them. But I don’t 
want to take anything away from the Viet Cong because they lacked soldier 
skills. Th ey were doing a job that was incredibly diffi  cult, and under very 
tough circumstances.
My tour in Vietnam ended with my fl ight home on February 15, 1971. 
I fl ew out of Da Nang Air Base. I passed through Los Angeles Airport very 
early in the morning, so I didn’t see any of the war protesters that marred 
homecoming for a lot of Vietnam veterans. I was disappointed to have my 
camera stolen in LA. I hadn’t developed any pictures yet, and all the fi lm 
I took while there was with it. Without photographs I was afraid I would 
forget—I have not.
On the positive side, while I was sitting in the airport with my buddy 
Ed Spry, the actor Dale Robertson rode by in one of those little golf carts 
they use to ferry people around. He had the driver stop, hopped off , and 
came over to shake our hands. Th at really meant a lot to me.
I had a better homecoming than many Vietnam veterans. I was met at 
the airport by my mother, then-girlfriend now wife, Janis, one of my three 
brothers, and my grandmother. I think my mother was most prepared to 
see the changes in me. She had seen my father when he got back from 
World War II. Having my parents available to talk to was extremely impor-
tant because I did not know what to expect. I had terrible dreams for a year 
or so, and all the other things that veterans typically experience. At no time 
did I ever receive any sort of offi  cial warning about the resocialization pro-
cess, and of course, nothing about PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder]. 
Talking with my parents and learning that my dad had similar experiences 
aft er World War II let me know I wasn’t losing my mind, and that my feel-
ings and dreams were a fairly common experience that would recede over 
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time. Fundamentally, my family was sound, and my upbringing was sound, 
so I was pretty sound. I think most combat soldiers experience some level 
of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression aft er the scary part is over. 
Having a family like mine made it easier to bear.
When I returned to college at the University of Arkansas in the fall 
of 1971, I was never interested in any of the antiwar protests or move-
ments. I was cordial to the Vietnam Veterans Against the War [VVAW] 
guys I knew, but I never went to any of their meetings. Th e whole business 
seemed inappropriate to me somehow. I wore my fi eld jacket on campus 
with the Marine Corps emblem on it, and I was proud of it, but everybody 
wore one. I would never have defaced mine with a peace sign or magic 
marker messages.
I didn’t want to talk about my experiences when I came home from 
Vietnam because I discovered right away that while people would ask you 
what it was like, they didn’t really want to hear the answers. You could see 
that as soon as you didn’t have a two-second quip that explained every-
thing, their eyes would glaze over. I was happy not to talk about it. Even 
[later on] in the Marine Corps, I never really talked about Vietnam that 
much because nobody was all that interested. It was irrelevant to the kind 
of training we were doing, for a more mechanized, European-type sce-
nario. It was easy to avoid the topic.
I think it was inevitable that the war ended the way it did. I think there 
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were a couple of dynamics that came into play there. One of them was the 
idea of individual replacements, a terrible mistake. It was a way to make 
the eff ort sort of a commoditized event. Not the best way to fi ght a war, but 
a perfect refl ection of Robert McNamara’s management—we were all just 
spare parts.
Th e other was war exhaustion. At the time, I wanted the war to end. 
I wanted it to end very much. I can remember how frustrated I was when 
Henry Kissinger and the North Vietnamese delegates to peace talks in Paris 
spent so much time worrying about the size or shape of the table, and how 
frustrated we all were. I just wanted it to be over before my little brother 
wound up over there. I wanted it to be over for a variety of reasons, but the 
main reason was because I thought, at the time, we had lost.
My opinion has changed. By now enough time has passed for a bet-
ter historical and political perspective to have been achieved. Like most 
Americans, I failed to understand the full implications and what we did 
as a nation in Vietnam until 1991—the year the Soviet Union collapsed.5 
In the next decade or so, a lot of the academics, reporters, and others who 
were protesters in the Vietnam War will have retired or passed from the 
scene. What I’d like to see is for some young rabble-rousing historian with 
no personal stake in the war to come forward and say, “Communism was 
a real threat—the Soviets were a real threat! And these guys [the Vietnam 
vets] did something really valuable.”
Th e other thing I have come to realize in the years since 1989 is how 
great the impact was on the people of Vietnam. If you watch TV programs 
where Vietnam veterans go back and meet with NVA veterans or VC, I’m 
amazed at how many of them are missing limbs. How many of them have 
been seriously injured. How many lost children and spouses and parents 
and others that we would not normally have considered to be combatants 
as a result of the incredibly intensive combat and the weapons we brought 
to bear. Almost as bad as the dead and maimed is the impact that still 
exists, from unexploded ordnance, poverty, and other problems linked to 
the war. Th ose things are heartbreaking to me. I’m much more empathetic 
now than I was. I have a more balanced perspective on all of that. I can feel 
strongly about the wars I’ve been in without being a war proponent. I wish 
our country would talk more and fi ght less. Nearly fourteen years aft er my 
retirement from the Marine Corps, I still have strong feelings about my 
time in the military. It’s called service for a reason.6
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Chapter 13
No John Wayne Movie
Real Bullets, Real Blood
Lt. Gary Doss fl ew one of the UH-34D helicopters, known as the “Ugly 
Angels,” and landed it at the university parking lot. Th e retired military heli-
copter and Lieutenant Doss’s presentation were well received by the students 
from the Vietnam War history class. In his story, Lieutenant Doss describes 
how a nineteen-year-old Oklahoman joined the U.S. Marine Corps, received 
his training in California, and engaged in bloody combat in the same year.1 
Over 794,000 U.S. Marines served in Vietnam, more than the total in World 
War II. Th e Corps suff ered 101,574 casualties, including 14,821 dead.2 Th e 
marines began combat operations in spring 1962. Th en its helicopter task 
force moved to the I Corps Tactical Zone (the fi ve northern provinces of South 
Vietnam). More marines were sent to northern South Vietnam in 1965, when 
the First Marine Aircraft  Wing began its off ensive mission. Lieutenant Doss 
served in the First Marine Aircraft  Wing.
When Lieutenant Doss got to Vietnam in 1966, the war situation had 
deteriorated. Gen. Wallace M. Green Jr., commander of the U.S. Marine 
Corps, and Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, commander of Fleet Marine Force 
Pacifi c, employed more helicopters in ground combat operations in 1966–
1968, leading Vietnam to be described as “the helicopter war.” As a door gun-
ner and mechanic in one of the Seahorse helicopters, Lieutenant Doss became 
part of the “Ugly Angel” squadron. Th eir Sikorsky choppers ferried marines in 
and out of battle. His story is typical of the experiences endured by a major-
ity of the young marines.
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Lt. Gary Doss
Squadron HMM-362, First Marine Air Wing, Ky Ha,
U.S. Marine Corps
As a kid growing up in Oklahoma, the only times I ever really heard about 
war were in John Wayne movies and the TV news. Aft er I got out of high 
school, I went to work construction for my dad’s company. I didn’t really 
know what I wanted to do, and by 1965, when the draft  started to become 
a big issue, I started getting cards and visitors from the military. Aft er I 
took a basic qualifi cations, skills, and interest test, I got more mail from 
the services and realized I had more qualifi cations than I thought. One 
evening, an offi  cer from the Marine Corps visited my house and told me 
I qualifi ed for what they called an aviation guarantee program. Although 
this sounded interesting, I still didn’t want to join, not right before the holi-
days. I fi nally enlisted right aft er the New Year in 1966.
I went to boot camp in February, and fl ew to San Diego with seven 
others from Oklahoma City. Th e ones I remember are Rusty Kirk, George 
Smith, James Harris, and Richard Allen. Kirk was killed in Vietnam and 
awarded the Silver Star. All the horror stories fell short of the reality of 
camp. Th e Marine Corps wanted to tear you down, mold you, and create 
you into the marine poster child. Th ey did a pretty good job by marching, 
drilling, and restricting you, not even letting you call home. Due to the war 
situation in Vietnam, boot camp was reduced to eight weeks from the nor-
mal twelve weeks, but even though it had been compressed, everyone still 
wanted to be done with it.
I eventually graduated from boot camp and went into Infantry Regiment 
Training [IRT], where I was immediately assigned to Uniform Company as 
a machine operator. Th e training took up to four weeks for me and several 
other guys who were assigned to the motor pool or air wingers. Th e noto-
rious “wing wipers” [air wingers] were not a “part” of the Marine Corps, as 
some would say, so we got our own special training. We got only the basics 
of training, learning how to shoot all sorts of weapons and basic camou-
fl age training. I graduated from IRT and was assigned to NATTC [National 
Aviation Technology Training Center–Memphis] in Millington, Tennessee 
[just north of Memphis]. Th ere I went through reciprocating engine train-
ing, including how to operate diff erent machinery, and repair, pull apart, and 
troubleshoot the reciprocating engine. I enjoyed that part, but we were still 
pretty restricted on time and what we could do, like in boot camp.
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In Millington, I met Phillip Jackson from North Carolina. We devel-
oped a lasting friendship and oddly found ourselves together for most of 
our time in Vietnam. Shortly aft er we met, we discovered that we had a lot 
of things in common. Th is common ground surfaced quickly and allowed 
Jackson and me to remain together at the camp. Th e day of graduation as 
class 636, we all got a message while marching back in formation during 
a graduation exercise. Th e runner had fi ery information in hand: all of us 
were going to Okinawa to await further transport. We were allowed a short 
leave before our fl ying halfway across the world. We fi rst arrived at Trea-
sure Island, and I thought that would be the last I’d see of Jackson.
But we both were shipped to Honolulu, then to Guam, and still together 
to Okinawa in December 1966. We stayed in the transit barracks there, and 
every day we would get into formation, fall out, and listen to loud speakers 
for information about who was going where. A good number of us were 
called to go “FFT-RVN,” which sounded like some recreational vehicle to 
me. I realized quickly that “RVN” stood for “Republic of Vietnam” [South 
Vietnam], which meant you were going somewhere pretty serious. In a few 
days, Jackson was called to “FFT-RVN,” which was hard for me because by 
this time we were pretty close. My name was called the next day, and I was 
off  to Fatima Marine Corps station to catch a C-130 to Da Nang in South 
Vietnam.3
Th is continues to be one of my most vivid memories because of the 
enormous activity when I arrived in Vietnam. A few hours aft er landing, I 
oddly met up with Jackson again. In the transit shack, we discovered we’d 
be following each other again, going to an air base called Chu Lai.4 “You 
two guys are going to Ky Ha, that’s a helicopter base up the road that gets 
mortared every night,” a guy informed us in the barracks. I didn’t want to 
believe it. Jackson and I found out that Ky Ha would be our home, and I got 
stationed in Hams 36, part of Marine Air Group [MAG] 36, which was part 
of the First Marine Air Wing [USMC 1st MAW] in South Vietnam.5
I found out at Ky Ha that the guy down at Chu Lai was only half right. 
It’s true that it was a helicopter base, but we didn’t get mortared every night. 
Jackson and I always watched the helicopters fl y away and wondered what 
it was like on the outside, on the other side of the wire. Th e choppers we 
had were UH-34D Sikorsky helicopters, or known as the “Ugly Angels.”6 
We heard stories from the men about how they were fl ying all the time, day 
and night, running back troop insertions, refugees, mail runs, test hops, 
reconnaissance missions, and all sorts of things. I thought that they really 
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knew how to stretch a good table because they got so many things done in 
a short time period. Th ese guys would come back and work on their birds 
all night so they’d be ready to fl y the next day. Ky Ha wasn’t a bad deal. It 
had hot showers, a little chapel overlooking the valley, and a great beach. It 
would have been an excellent resort area because of the beautiful breaking 
water and the sunset on the South China Sea.
I never forget one night, a guy went out to fl y and the next day some-
body we didn’t know came by to pick up his gear and inventory his stuff . 
He never came back again. At that point, I just accepted that as the way it 
was. Jackson went to the helicopter squadron before me, and I wondered if 
someday I wouldn’t see him again. In a few days I got my orders.
I was to go on to the front line with the squadron and Jackson. Th is was 
something new for me because I hadn’t been out of our base too far. My 
farthest trip had been from shore to the base. I was astonished at the fact 
that those stories at the base were real. It didn’t take long to go from hop 
to hop to hop in the helicopter in a small time frame along the front line. 
We would be in a number of diff erent places in just a few hours. One thing 
we could execute was taking the wounded from battlefi eld to the hospital 
in forty-fi ve minutes, an incredibly short time period. Th is was remark-
able compared to the Korean War because the wounded had to be trans-
ferred back in a vehicle, whenever and wherever it was going.7 Th e speed 
Lt. Gary Doss and the “Ugly Angel” at Ky Ha in 1967.
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we could get things done meant many more lives being saved and being 
able to extract soldiers just at the nick of time.
One of my fi rst missions was with this kid named Poindexter from 
Georgia on a resupply operation. We would drop off  food, water, muni-
tions, or take on somebody needing relief for heatstroke or whatever and 
replace them with somebody else. Th e skill of carrying out these missions 
was very precise. We would fl y in at a high rate of speed and fl are the old 
bird up on its axis to cut down air speed. By the time we touched the wheel, 
we’d be unloading our stuff . Usually if we were just off -loading, we’d just tilt 
up on the bird’s axis and be in and out of the zone in a matter of seconds. 
Sometimes seconds is all you had. We would, of course, on-load as well, 
but this was much more diffi  cult because it meant we would spend more 
time on the ground. Th e name of the game was to be in and out of the zone 
as quickly as possible. Th e less time we were in the zone, the less time in the 
target area, and the less time we had to take casualties.
One day, we took off  looking for a medevac bird. Medevac missions 
were to transport injured from the fi eld by helicopters to a hospital where 
they can receive medical or surgical care. I was in the gunner seat during 
this mission. Th e wind streamed into the cabin and the rain started just 
aft er we took off . Th e weather fell on us and made it extremely hard to see 
and maneuver. Suddenly, the huge explosions were going off  all around us, 
jerking the helicopter. I didn’t know if we were in an artillery zone or some-
where else we shouldn’t be. Th ose helicopters were built for all weather con-
ditions, but it didn’t matter if you couldn’t see.8 Th ankfully, as we lowered 
in the sky the weather settled down a little. I tried to orient myself as we 
dropped down out of the clouds because there was still a lot of rain coming 
in, and that’s when I saw streaks. Th ey were coming up from the tree line to 
my left  and under the helicopter while we were fl ying over this little village. 
It fi nally occurred to me what was happening, when the crew chief hollered, 
“Men, we’re taking fi re!” Th at resistance was plenty incentive for the chief 
to open up with an M-60 and start blasting away. I saw a man in the village 
positioned and shooting his automatic at us along with a little kid running 
out of a little hooch pointing a huge gun at us. I tried to get my weapon out 
and over the pivot point to fi re, but it wouldn’t quite get out that far, so I had 
to watch him fi re at us. Immediately I could hear the bullets hit our bird. We 
were able to fl y a little bit and set down in safety, and it amazed me how one 
second you were being fi red at, and the other moment you were safe. We 
landed where there was a group of marines in an outpost. We sucked down 
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our ration cigarettes because we were all nervous and keyed up about the 
experience. Poindexter talked about the men he hit in the village. When I 
surveyed the damage to the helicopter, I found bullet holes a couple of feet 
from my position. Th e pilot fi red the bird back up and I checked the gauges 
to make sure everything was okay. We left  that zone and fl ew from 1,500 to 
1,800 feet altitude to get out of range of small arms.
In the daytime, our bird would usually be accompanied by another 
gunship helicopter and a Huey, or a chase bird with one jet engine and two 
side by side pilots, an open canopy cargo area with two gunners, two exter-
nal M-60s on each side, and 2.75-inch rocket pods on each side.
One day, a Huey fl ew in our close air support while we were down into 
the zone for the extraction. My pilot called to the ground about the situ-
ation. Th ey answered that they were surrounded, and taking fi re from all 
sides. Th e Huey pilot radioed that he’s coming down to make his pass. He 
fl ew low to detect the suspected targets, proceeding to unload on the tar-
gets to keep them quiet long enough for our bird to get in the zone. It was 
our turn. My pilot laid our bird over and corkscrewed that thing down out 
of the sky, shoving me way back into the seat. Th e power of the reciprocat-
ing engine was amazing. He cut off  the power to fall in a sort of controlled 
crash, and as we circled in I could hear, “You’re taking fi re, you’re taking 
fi re!” My pilot said, “Ain’t that a bitch,” and drops her down out of the sky. 
We landed right in the middle of a dry rice paddy in a little terraced area. I 
could see one guy was dragging one of the medics by the helmet. Th at guy 
wasn’t getting up. I noticed all these dirt clods kicking up from enemy fi re, 
but I jumped out and helped this guy on board. We took off  again. My pilot 
asked the Huey about the air support aft er we got out of the zone. He said 
his guns locked up on his fi rst pass and all he could do was make a pass or 
two to make it look like he was doing something. Th at was just one of those 
days. All’s well that ends well, and I was blessed.
Another day involved Jackson. We drew some reconnaissance inser-
tions so they could do silent surveillance for a while. We dropped three 
diff erent sets that day. Jackson was in the other helicopter, and I was in the 
lead bird with the commanding offi  cer fl ying pilot. Th e senior pilot was 
always the fi rst in the zone. We ended up doing a little basic maneuver and 
made the drop. You were always keyed up in a free-fi re zone, but the inser-
tions remained mostly uneventful. With recons, you didn’t want to give 
away your position and wanted to get in and out without too much delay, 
and I lived to fi ght another day.
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Another time, a reconnaissance team was doing surveillance for a few 
days and was spotted by the enemy. Our job was to extract them. Th e recon 
team was running around and updating us about where they were, and 
we’d try to locate their position by some of the terrain and landmarks they 
described. We eventually arrived at the location, and saw them on a side of 
a hill taking some intense fi re with KIAs everywhere and several wounded. 
A guy on the ground told the pilot via radio that there were people listen-
ing to the radio that wasn’t on their team. Our pilot asked the soldier if he 
“popped” smoke, [to] tell [him] what color it [was]. Th e soldier returned, 
“We’re poppin’ yellow smoke.” We pinpointed their location. Th e lead bird, 
my bird, fl ew into the zone and performed a rescue for the most seriously 
injured fi rst. Our method of rescue came down to hovering over the zone 
to perform the extraction using a hoist. Th e guy on the ground needed 
assistance or a basket, and we didn’t have a basket. So the next best thing 
was that I was lowered down on the hoist. I could smell the gunpowder and 
see and hear the crackles and radios—the war was going on here.
I had such an inner battle going on inside because I had yet to see my 
twenty-fi rst birthday and I was lowered into what seemed like a death trap. 
During a normal hoist extraction, we would reel off  the amount of cable 
Lt. Gary Doss (center) and one of the graduate research assistants in 2003.
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needed prior, beforehand, then drop it into a zone to save time. But since 
I was riding this thing, it had to be lowered slowly, inch by inch. I decided 
that it would save precious time if I could roll off  the hoist and drop a dis-
tance to the ground. My heart was in my throat, and I checked the .38 cali-
ber on my hip. I suddenly hit a phase that I didn’t know what to do, and I 
stopped for a second and said, “Lord be with me,” and this perfect peace 
came upon me. I thought later that I should have prayed, “Lord get me out 
of here,” since that prayer went so well. As I was standing in the doorway 
of the helicopter about to go down, everything went into slow motion. At 
this moment I realized that we weren’t even in the zone. Th e crew chief said 
he lost contact with the ground at the last second and the soldier couldn’t 
direct us the last few hundred feet to their position, but we’d be coming 
around for our fi nal approach.
It turns out that I would have to sit ringside and watch my best friend’s 
bird fl y into the zone. I could hear the helicopter Jackson was in and could 
see the dust kicking off  their bird from the fi re they were taking. Th en I 
heard words from the pilot that just cut through my soul, “Both my crew-
men are hit,” but they continued the rescue with the hoist on the ground. 
Th e good thing I saw was someone in their bird taking the hoist into the 
helicopter aft er I watched it being raised up, so at least one crewman must 
be left  alive. My crew went back and picked up some more crew and a 
spare Sparrow Hawk team because we underestimated how vicious that 
zone would be. Close air support was also called. We would go back and 
forth to complete the mission all day bringing back both alive and KIAs.
Later that day, I walked over to Jackson’s bird and was astonished by 
all the blood staining the belly of the helicopter and the bullet holes every-
where. I was heading back and a shadow crossed my path in the fl ight line. 
It may seem impossible to recognize a man by his shadow, but I knew it 
was Jackson, and it was. I looked up at his smiling face and said, “You’re a 
dead man, aren’t you?” He said, “No, buddy, I’m sure not.” He told me that 
they couldn’t fi re on the zone because of friendlies in the area, and by the 
time they got in the zone the bullets were hitting them like hail on a tin 
roof. Jackson said that the bullets were hitting everywhere and he got one 
in the back. He said, “I knew I was dead and just reached around just to feel 
how big the hole was, except then I got hit right here in the chest.” Jackson 
escaped death that time and so did I. We would both live to fi ght on.9
Chapter 14
More T han Meets the Eye
Supporting the Intelligence Eff ort
I have known Lt. Col. Terry Lynn May since 1993 as a colleague and a good 
friend. Th e retired army offi  cer had a great sense of humor, wisdom beyond 
his age, and a sincere passion for sharing and honoring the military experi-
ences of the Vietnam War veterans. I attended his funeral service in 2003 
aft er he lost his battle to leukemia. Among the family, friends, and prominent 
people in attendance were the city mayor, ROTC offi  cers, and local veterans. 
I oft en sit in the middle of the park that was dedicated to his memory in 2005, 
watching the kids playing around and thinking about how to remember Lieu-
tenant Colonel May in a meaningful way.
Lt. Col. Terry May served as the commander of the Forty-fi ft h Mili-
tary Intelligence Company, U.S. Army, from 1969 to 1970 in Vietnam. His 
specialty, aerial reconnaissance and imagery interpretation, and his expe-
rience as an army intelligence offi  cer refl ect military intelligence at the com-
pany level. He describes his Vietnam tour as bizarre, unpredictable, intense, 
exhausting, and daunting.1 At the national level, generally speaking, the U.S. 
intelligence community believed that its eff orts had worked during the Viet-
nam War.2 A conference on Intelligence in the Vietnam War, however, pro-
vided a mixed picture of U.S. intelligence, including electronic information 
collection, signals and imagery intelligence, counterintelligence, infi ltration 
operations into the North, psychological operations, the Phoenix program, 
provincial reconnaissance units, analytical resources, politics of intelligence, 
and interagency cooperation and confl icts between the CIA, DIA, and other 
intelligence organizations. While many presentations came up with a posi-
tive conclusion, others insisted that the U.S. intelligence’s judgments proved 
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prescient much of the time but found little receptivity. At other times during 
1965–1968, the intelligence community found favor with policymakers but 
turned out to be wrong.3 Th e CIA also believed that they provided intelligence 
on Vietnam that was better than that of other offi  cial contributors.4
Lt. Col. Terry Lynn May
Commander, Forty-fi ft h Company, 525th Military Intelligence Group, 
U.S. Army
My Vietnam adventure actually began in the early summer of 1969, when I 
got my written orders for Vietnam. I had just left  Fort Bragg, North Caro-
lina, to attend an army intelligence school in Baltimore, Maryland. I went 
there to become an aerial reconnaissance planner and photo interpretation 
offi  cer with a specialty of aerial reconnaissance and imagery interpretation. 
I was a brand new captain, had been married for not quite three years, and 
had two infant children: sixteen months and two months.
I had voluntarily become part of the U.S. military establishment and 
was prepared to go to Vietnam. As a professional soldier, the right or 
wrong of U.S. involvement was not a hot political or personal issue for me, 
at least at the time. I was prepared and proud to do what I had been trained 
for, and I thought I had a good understanding of the enemy. But I never 
thought that what I would do in Vietnam was something so entirely unex-
pected and diff erent from what I had been trained for.
Th e Vietnam confl ict had been going strong for almost four years, and 
I had known since my sophomore year as an ROTC cadet at Central Michi-
gan University that service in Vietnam was almost inevitable, and equally 
essential, for any offi  cer considering the army as a career.
I fl ew out of Lambert Field, St. Louis, on December 22, 1969. A few 
hours later, I was at Travis Air Force Base, north of San Francisco, chang-
ing into a short-sleeved khaki uniform. I was in a crowded room with 
hundreds of other soldiers of all ranks. We tried to mask our real emo-
tions with wisecracks and joking around. I noticed from the ribbons on 
their uniforms—their military awards and decorations—that many were 
headed back for another tour. I felt like a rookie suiting up for his fi rst game 
in the major leagues. Aft er what seemed like an interminable fl ight, with 
stops in Hawaii and Guam, I remember how my pulse quickened when we 
made our fi nal, and very steep, approach to Bien Hoa airfi eld, some twenty 
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miles east of Saigon. Bien Hoa was a principal port of aerial arrival for U.S. 
forces.
It was about 0200 hours there, and a real time warp. We left  the plane 
quickly, its engines still running in case a mortar attack demanded quick 
departure. We walked into a wall of heat and humidity. As we moved 
toward the terminal, on the right side of a roped pathway, servicemen on 
their way home walked on the other side of the rope to the plane we just 
left . You could not possibly fi nd a sharper contrast of emotion. We were 
virtually silent, but the guys going home sure had a lot to say to and about 
us, most of which was triple-R rated.
At that time, offi  cers could indicate an assignment preference during 
in-processing. I remember being quite embarrassed when an amused per-
sonnel sergeant chided me for the preference I had indicated, “PACEX.” 
He enjoyed telling me the acronym stood for the Pacifi c Exchange Sys-
tem, responsible for operating the post exchange, or PXs, in country. Alas, 
PACEX was not the high-level intelligence-exploitation center I thought 
that acronym might stand for and where I had hoped to fi nd air condition-
ing, fl uorescent lights, and comfortable offi  cers’ quarters.
On Christmas Day, 1969, I found myself assigned to the 525th Military 
Intelligence Group, headquartered in Saigon. Th e unit adjutant, or person-
nel offi  cer, who processed me in was Ephram Zimbalist III, son of Ephram 
Zimbalist Jr., the famous movie and TV star. Just one of my many bizarre 
Vietnam experiences. Th e next day, I received my pinpoint assignment and 
was transported by jeep to the Forty-fi ft h Support Company, located at 
Parker Compound on the banks of the Saigon River. I was one person in 
the huge support infrastructure seldom heard about. Military analysts call 
it the “tooth-to-tail” ratio. As part of the supporting “tail,” I was one of the 
fi ft een or eighteen people supporting, in some capacity, each combat infan-
tryman doing the fi ghting. My war, as an Army Military Intelligence Com-
pany Commander, would be one of responsibility for a very large group 
of soldiers, over fi ve hundred men. My duties included their mandatory 
training, supplies, transportation, military justice, personal counseling and 
career development needs, and personal security. I also had to keep track 
of and maintain over two hundred widely scattered vehicles.
During that initial drive through Saigon, I couldn’t believe the sights, 
sounds, smells, and congestion. Blaring horns, heavy diesel exhaust fumes, 
wall-to-wall people speaking a sing-songy language of which I knew not 
one word. I wondered if the North Vietnamese Army or the Viet Cong 
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would ever even get a chance to kill me. I was glad to break out of down-
town Saigon and roll through the gate of Parker Compound. I spent my 
entire tour there, serving fi rst, for four months, as executive offi  cer for the 
company, and then the balance of my tour as commanding offi  cer. I had 
anticipated neither of those assignments nor anything of their kind.
Th e small installation measured no more than about thirty by fi ft y 
yards. Th e old, two-story original villa, which housed our orderly room, 
a couple of other administrative offi  ces, the mess hall, and offi  cer quar-
ters, sat in the middle of the property. Around the perimeter was a ram-
shackle assortment of old, stucco-walled, tin-roofed buildings and guard 
towers behind layers of military barbed wire. Th ese outbuildings housed 
the enlisted personnel, our arms room, supply room, a small club, a one-
chair barbershop, and a tiny PX. Th e latter two each measured about eight 
by ten feet. On the extreme northeast corner of the greater Saigon area, 
Parker Compound had originally been a French equestrian academy and 
stables, probably built in the early 1900s during the heyday of France’s cen-
tury-long colonial administration of then-Indochina.
We were called a “support” company as an operational security measure. 
Th e cover name was supposed to conceal our true identity and purpose: 
a military intelligence organization, the Forty-fi ft h Military Intelligence 
Company, part of its parent organization, the 519th Military Intelligence 
Battalion. Th at unit was headquartered at Ton Son Nhut Air Force Base, 
on the north side of Saigon. Th e cover eff ort included our wearing infan-
try, rather than military intelligence, insignia on our uniforms. I quickly 
learned, however, that this ruse probably only fooled other U.S. units, and 
certainly not the Vietnamese, either the Southern or Viet Cong variety.
Parker Compound was immediately across the Saigon River from 
“Indian Country,” as it was called: an area unsecured by U.S. forces. Aft er 
dark, there could be no movement from the compound unless by armed 
convoy. Organized relief forces were at least thirty minutes away.
Most nights we could see artillery fl ashes and helicopter gunships work-
ing on the near horizon. While we had a barbed wire perimeter and armed 
MPs in guard towers twenty-four hours a day, we knew we were dead meat 
if the Viet Cong really wanted to own Parker Compound. Rumor had it 
that the Vietnamese owner of our little installation was making large, regu-
lar payments to the VC to ensure his property was protected. I’m not sure 
he cared that much about us, though.
Th e bulk of the soldiers in the Forty-fi ft h Company were intelligence 
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specialists working in a wide variety of analytical and reporting functions 
in many diff erent locations throughout the greater Saigon area. Th e mili-
tary intelligence eff ort for the war was headquartered there. Most worked 
twelve-hour shift s, six or seven days a week. I had every rank assigned to 
the company, from private to colonel. Only the lower-rank enlisted troops 
lived at Parker Compound, a couple hundred total. I was also billeted there 
for most of my tour, along with several lieutenants on my staff .
Th e men of the Forty-fi ft h Military Intelligence Company (there were 
no women assigned) were the young soldiers, both offi  cers and enlisted, 
who as intelligence specialists and managers were responsible for analyz-
ing enemy ground strength, disposition, location and intentions—“order 
of battle,” as it was called. Th ey were also responsible for such functions 
as identifying infi ltration routes and rates, and analyzing captured docu-
ments, materiel, weapons, and prisoner-of-war interrogation reports. Th ey 
interpreted aerial photography and operated the computer systems housing 
the in-country intelligence database for the war eff ort. Th eir contribution 
understandably never got much publicity or credit, but it was absolutely 
critical to the planning and conduct of the war.
As a whole, they were a great bunch of troops: bright, mature, and 
responsible. Fortunately, and thankfully, they weren’t exposed to the rig-
ors and risks of combat fi eld duty. I’m also proud to say they also had very, 
very few problems with drugs and alcohol. Th is was the time of the draft , 
and many of the young enlisted soldiers had college degrees. My company 
clerk had a master’s degree, and everyone working on my administrative 
staff  had some college. Virtually all had been draft ed.
I never thought I’d be given so much responsibility, so quickly, with so 
little time, training, and experience in the U.S. Army. I was usually worried 
if I could get the job done. My gut was in a knot for most of that year. In 
many ways, however, I was lucky to have such a challenging job. My hours 
were very long, however, and I seldom had any free time. Th e only true 
privacy I had was when sleeping. I routinely worked seven days a week, at 
least twelve hours a day; frequently much more. Between the work and the 
heat, my weight eventually dropped from about 170 to 147.
My tour in Vietnam frequently featured bizarre vignettes and observa-
tions that have stayed with me all these years. Running into an army friend 
and learning that he had the responsibility of using then a new and dramatic 
bit of technology called a facsimile device, to send to the White House daily 
copies of aerial reconnaissance photos. We later learned that the president 
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and secretary of defense were personally involved in selecting tactical air 
strike targets. I soon began to realize that with so many South Vietnam-
ese political and societal infrastructure problems and corruption, and with 
such high-level U.S. political involvement regarding small-scale tactical 
decisions, something was terribly wrong and out of whack about this war.
While I have some good memories from my time in the war, many are 
serious, poignant, and sobering. I became fast friends with a Vietnamese 
Army engineer offi  cer who was a devout Christian and strong proponent 
of democracy for his country. Just a few years ago I learned he had spent 
twelve years in a North Vietnamese jungle “reeducation” camp before 
being able to fl ee to the United States with his family. Traveling to my Bat-
talion Headquarters, located adjacent to the U.S. Army Mortuary at Ton 
Son Nhut AFB, and seeing one large cargo helicopter aft er another land 
to unload body bags of U.S. dead. My executive offi  cer’s best friend was 
killed elsewhere in the country, and on the day the army casualty notifi -
cation team arrived to inform his wife, it was their wedding anniversary. 
Also, the fl owers he had ordered weeks ahead of time through the Sai-
gon PX wound up being delivered while the notifi cation team was doing 
their grim business. Having to go toe-to-toe with a drunk fi rst sergeant. A 
legend in his own mind and old enough to be my father, he had become 
insubordinate and disrespectful, not to mention losing sight of his roles 
and responsibilities.
I also stood the toughest inspection of my entire army career, at a time 
when the soldiers in the company were working double shift s provid-
ing intelligence support for the invasion of Cambodia. Several busloads 
of inspectors spent a part of three days with us checking our compliance 
with about a million diff erent army regulations. Th is was a time of drug 
problems for some units in Vietnam. Th ey not only physically checked the 
troops’ foot and wall lockers, but also my desk and lockers; even my laun-
dry bag. Th is was certainly one time when being an offi  cer and commander 
meant nothing. Th ey even climbed into our water tower looking for drugs 
or other contraband. None was found. Needless to say, we felt these tactics 
and policies were personally and professionally insulting and humiliating.
My low point came aft er four months in the country, when I had 
already been there for what seemed like forever, and realized I still had 
twice as long to go. Wondering, the longer I was there, what eventually 
would happen to the country aft er we left , I saw very black clouds on the 
horizon.
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Even for a “Saigon Commando” like myself, there were some scary 
times and moments, especially knowing that our compound was unde-
fendable and extremely vulnerable, particularly aft er dark. Standing on the 
porch of our building and having a spent rifl e round from several thousand 
yards away plink to the fl oor about ten feet away. Driving my jeep to bat-
talion headquarters and seeing, in my left  peripheral vision, a Vietnamese 
child about ten or twelve years old lob an object at me and run like hell. 
Fortunately it was a light bulb, which broke on the street in front of me, 
and not a grenade. Sitting in our little club one night at Parker Compound 
during a severe storm only to suddenly realize that those weren’t lightning 
strikes up the river about half a mile, but rather incoming rocket fi re near 
a bridge. Th ey sound a lot alike. Army regulations also required me to con-
duct quarterly reenlistment briefi ngs. Imagine trying to deliver an inspir-
ing, motivating address to a theater full of young soldiers, virtually all of 
whom were draft ed and who never had a single thought about reenlisting.
Eventually it was almost time to go home. Th e last week seemed like 
it would never end. I remember being too excited to sleep well. Of course 
the ultimate emotion was actually making it to my DEROS, or “rotation” 
date; the day to go home. Normally, the night before was cause for a terrifi c 
“good-bye” party. Aft er working so hard and so closely with my fellow sol-
diers in such an intense setting, the good-byes were also somewhat bitter-
sweet. Despite the excitement of leaving the war behind, it was also tough 
to say good-bye to the men with whom I had gone through so much. Nev-
ertheless, this was what I had been waiting for, the opportunity to drive out 
of Parker Compound for the last time.
On that “wake-up” day, as it was called, it seemed like the minutes 
stood still. Th e ride to the airport was a blur of memories and anticipa-
tion. Th en came long, slow lines for U.S. military and South Vietnamese 
customs inspections. We were all probably pretty paranoid by that point, 
just knowing that we’d either get shelled, or that somebody had screwed up 
the paperwork to go home, or that the plane would be delayed. My pulse 
was racing.
Finally seeing the “freedom bird” sitting there on the tarmac with its 
inviting open door was a hugely emotional experience. I was really leaving. 
I would actually be back in the “land of the big PX” within about twenty-
four hours. I would actually soon be reunited with my wife and kids.
Frankly, I can’t remember much about the fl ight back, except the utter 
sense of anticipation, knowing that in just a matter of hours, not months 
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or weeks, I’d be restored to the long awaited role of husband and father; of 
fi nally being present and accounted for, and not represented by letters, pic-
tures, and an occasional phone call.
Aft er an intermediate stop in Hawaii, we fi nally landed at Travis Air 
Force Base, north of San Francisco. It was late November, aft er dark, rain-
ing, and a cold 49 degrees. We were all in short-sleeved tropical uniforms 
and about to freeze. We were then bused to San Francisco International 
Airport for connecting fl ights. Arrival there accounted for one of the most 
bizarre memories I have.
Because of antiwar protesters and picket lines at the airport, we were 
instructed to dismount the buses, proceed immediately to the men’s 
rooms, and change out of our uniforms into civilian clothes. Th en we were 
to make our way, by ones and twos, to our connecting fl ights. Th is was so 
we wouldn’t be hassled or spat upon. What a homecoming. Th at stood in 
absolute stark contrast, of course, to the homecomings of our service per-
sonnel aft er the Korean War and World War II.
Th e next part of my homecoming was equally memorable, and at the 
extreme opposite end of the emotional spectrum. My wife had fl own to San 
Francisco with the kids and was waiting at a hotel for me. Th e kids were 
already sound asleep when I got to the room.5
 Lt. Col. Terry Lynn May in 2003.
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In Vietnam we used to kid about how putting down our duffl  e bag 
would be the second thing we’d do aft er fi nally reuniting with our spouse. 
I simply say that no romance novelist could do justice to that tenderest of 
moments when we realized, in each other’s arms, that at long last the war 
was fi nally over for us.
I learned a lot from my experience in Vietnam. Some of my major les-
sons learned were that: I had been properly prepared and trained to get 
the job done; learned to have confi dence in myself and was pretty damned 
good at leading, organizing, and problem solving; learned that I could 
do lots more than I thought possible; had loved taking care of the troops, 
and learned so much from the sergeants; was proud of what I had accom-
plished and my service to country; gained a much greater appreciation for 
our nation, our way of life and values, and how lucky we are to be citizens 
of this country; gained a greater appreciation for life itself, for how fragile 
it is, and how much family really means; and realized that some of the real 
heroes of that war were the devoted and loving military wives who kept 
things going at home and provided so much support and comfort from a 
distance.6
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Part Four
Doctors and Nurses
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Chapter 15
Medevac and Medcap Missions 
and More
I fi rst read Th ird Class Seaman Ron Peterson’s story in the newspaper. Th en 
Lt. Col. Terry May introduced me to the local Vietnam veteran group that 
Ron Peterson joined.1 Peterson had joined the U.S. Navy Reserves when he 
was only seventeen as a junior in high school, and was sent to Vietnam in 
1965 when he was twenty-one. During his one-year tour, Peterson served 
as a navy corpsman in the First Marine Air Wing at Da Nang. Within the 
U.S. military establishment, the Marine Corps and navy had a unique rela-
tionship when it came to medical support during the Vietnam War. While 
the army and the air force have their own service-specifi c medical system at 
all tactical echelons, the navy provides the medical support for the marines.2 
According to Peterson, in any battlefi eld, training exercise, or garrison envi-
ronment, navy corpsmen (medical technicians) were the combat medics and 
clinical personnel supporting the marines. His experience in Vietnam came 
during the earlier part of that war and, as such, is quite unique.
Considering his own time in the navy and his having a son who is a ten-
year veteran of the Navy SEALs, Ron Peterson has strong views and advice 
regarding military service. He had the unique perspective of having worked 
with Vietnamese citizens while in Vietnam, as well as with Vietnamese émi-
grés during his follow-on civilian medical career in the VA system. Aft er his 
Vietnam tour, Peterson returned to higher education at Southwest Texas State 
University and then enrolled in the Physician’s Assistant program at Duke 
University. Following his graduation, Peterson began a distinguished thirty-
year career working at a number of prestigious hospitals, primarily in inter-
nal medicine and urgent care. Along the way, he helped establish Physician’s 
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Assistant programs at Alderson-Broaddus College in West Virginia (where he 
earned a B.S. degree) and at Baylor University. He served at VA medical cen-
ters in Texas for some thirty years, retiring in 2000. Now in his sixties, Peter-
son works part-time for a physician at a metropolitan health center.
Th ird Class Seaman Ron Peterson
Medevac Corpsman, First MAW Base, Da Nang, U.S. Navy
I had joined the navy reserves while still in high school, attending boot 
camp in San Diego between my junior and senior years. I had some friends 
in high school, and we talked about it [enlisting], and thought it would 
really be a neat thing to do. We kind of joined together. It was part of the 
delayed-entry program. My mother was just about to kill me because we 
signed up. But I was sure this way I’d be able to go to college and then go 
on wherever I wanted to. Our goals were to be able to be in the reserves, 
yet go on to college.
Part of my plan worked. I had been in the navy reserve for almost 
two years and had just fi nished my freshman year in pre-med at South-
west Texas State, where I fi rst met Judy (later my wife), when gathering 
war clouds on the other side of the world changed my life forever. I didn’t 
expect the call for active duty. It was May 1964, a time when most Ameri-
cans weren’t yet thinking about a place called South Vietnam.
I began my training for a qualifi ed corpsman and combat medic, which 
was quite extensive, about six months long. I did my ‘A-School’ [advanced 
individual training] as I went on active duty. It was Hospital Corps School 
in San Diego. Th at’s about a four-month program. As you fi nish your 
“A School,” you’re assigned where you’re going to go next. At that time, 
because of the Vietnam War, a large number of people were assigned to 
the Fleet Marine Force. Aft er the “A School,” I attended what was called 
the Field Medical Service School. Th at’s where you got indoctrinated into 
the marines; kind of a little marine boot camp. It was also fi eld medicine, 
where you learn how to do fi eld bandages and things like that. It was about 
two months long at Camp Pendleton.
From Field Medical School, I was attached to Headquarters Squad-
ron 1 of the First Marine Air Wing in Iwakuni, Japan. It was about forty 
miles from Hiroshima. That was supposed to be my thirteen-month 
overseas tour. I was there five months and then the whole First Marine 
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Air Wing moved to Da Nang, South Vietnam. I was in Da Nang for 
eight months.
From everything I heard about the Viet Cong and NVA troops, they 
were very capable in the sense of guerrilla tactics. Th ey were exceedingly 
good. Th ey were diffi  cult to get a handle on, in the sense that you had them 
and you didn’t. Th ey had ways of hiding and going underground and not 
being able to be found. Th e other thing, of course, was that it was so diffi  cult 
to tell the good people from the bad people. Some of the things we heard 
played out and continued to prove that they were a very wily enemy.
I believed what most Americans believed: that it [Communism] was a 
bad thing, and that if left  unchecked could lead to other countries falling 
under that same type of regime. Th ere were all these theories about what 
Communism and these dictatorial types of governments could do. It was 
a very bad thing and I believed that if we didn’t take a stand there, then we 
may have that on our back doorstep. I have much stronger feelings now 
than I did at that time. As a young person you believe that your leaders are 
making the right decisions. I thought what we were doing was an important 
thing, a positive thing. I did not see it in the light of the war protesters.
I knew when I fi rst went in that there was a great chance that I would 
end up going there. Early on I was kind of caught up in the fact that it was 
an important thing, especially the closer I got, when I was in Japan. Every-
one left  in stages, to go to Da Nang, but I didn’t get to go in the fi rst couple 
of groups. At that point I wanted to go. I was very happy that I was going to 
be part of something I thought was important, not only for other people, 
but a big impact on my life. It would be a big factor in the perspectives I 
have and in how I carried out the remainder of my life.
I was just twenty-one, and being exposed to wartime events in a for-
eign country certainly was a shock to my system. And yet it was something 
I really wanted to do. As you get involved with a group like the marines and 
where I was, you get caught up in that and feel like that’s where you ought 
to be. But to step off  the plane in Vietnam and know you’re going to be 
involved in that type of a confl ict was certainly a very vivid memory.
Th ere were many times it was scary, when we’d take mortar rounds 
during the nighttime. Th e mortaring was pretty oft en. Th ere were always 
rounds going off , even during the daytime. It became so common you 
almost didn’t think about it. When there was a real threat we’d be alerted 
that we’d be having incoming. Th at would oft entimes be once or twice 
weekly, and then we’d go for a period of time and not have any. And of 
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course you never knew exactly where those were going to hit. During the 
monsoon season it would be raining very hard, and in addition to that 
there would be incoming mortar rounds, and getting up in the middle of 
the night when it was dark and trying to make your way to a bunker.3 Hav-
ing it happen at night always made things more interesting. I can certainly 
remember being frightened on more than one occasion.
Luckily, I and the people I was with never had any injury. But all around 
us there would be serious medical problems that we’d be involved in treat-
ing and transporting out to the larger hospital, the triage hospital, called 
Charlie Med, or C-Med, where most of the more defi nitive treatment, sur-
gery and so forth, would be handled.
Another security concern was an adjacent Vietnamese village, nick-
named “Dog Patch.” Villagers worked in the marine unit’s area during 
the day, yet mortar rounds frequently came from the village at night. And 
being there early on [in the war], nothing was very well controlled at that 
point. We lived where you could look from our tents right into the “Dog 
Patch.” So we were always uneasy in the sense of feeling secure.
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I was involved in several areas in the dispensary. Treating patients in 
sick call, working in the lab and in the pharmacy were all part of my duties. 
Th ere were many occasions of having to suture marines due to daily work 
injuries and minor combat wounds. Some of their injuries occurred when 
the guys partied a little too much and had lacerations from falls or con-
frontations with fellow soldiers.
One day as I was looking for a medical record at the dispensary check-in 
desk, I was aware that someone had walked in and was standing at the desk. 
I continued to look for the record as the individual stood patiently for me to 
help him. Finally, he said politely, “Is there anyone here who could fi x my bro-
ken sunglasses?” As I looked up, I realized “Moses” was standing in front of 
me! It was Charlton Heston that I had so rudely ignored. He continued to be 
such a polite and appreciative person while we all fell over each other trying 
to fi x his glasses. He then agreed to go outside and have a photo shoot with us. 
He was on a USO visit to Vietnam. It was indeed a fun and memorable day.4
I volunteered many times to fi ll in for other corpsmen and fl y on heli-
copter medevac [medical-evacuation missions]. We went wherever the 
action was, marine or army, within fi ft y to one hundred miles of Da Nang. 
Our routine duties were not to fl y medevac, but I did get to fl y medevacs 
on occasion. Basically, we’d fi ll in for other corpsmen that were at another 
unit, called MAG-16, or Marine Air Group 16.5 I think they were at Marble 
Mountain, right on the ocean front.6 It was real close to Da Nang, maybe 
ten miles. We’d fl y and pick up wounded American soldiers and bring them 
back. On many occasions they would already be deceased, so we’d be bring-
ing back the body bags at that point.
Sometimes we’d go into zones that were clear and other times there 
would still be hostile fi re. I can remember a few times at night, fl ying in, 
and seeing the tracer rounds come up, actually taking some hits that were 
not detrimental to the helicopter. I certainly remember being very fright-
ened at that time. But I made it fi ne, and never had any serious accidents 
while I was aboard. Th ose were very vivid memories. Luckily, I didn’t do 
that full time. I was with the headquarters squadron, and usually worked 
in the dispensary there. I provided medical care.
We’d fl y into any number of places around that whole Da Nang area, 
wherever there was action going on. It was to wherever there were hostili-
ties going on and our soldiers were receiving injuries. It could be army or 
marines, and it was in a fairly tight radius, probably fi ft y to one hundred 
miles around Da Nang.
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Th e fi rst really signifi cant and indeed fatal injuries I treated were when 
I fl ew a medevac mission for the fi rst time. Th e soldier had what proved to 
be a fatal wound of the chest and abdomen, and all we could really do was to 
attempt to stop the bleeding, apply battle dressings, and get IV fl uids going. 
He really was past our ability to do much for him by the time we arrived 
at the site. Unfortunately, there were many times when this was the sce-
nario. On other occasions, however, we were able to stabilize wounds and 
get them back for more defi nitive treatment. Th e fi rst time I was involved 
[in treating combat injuries] I was very frightened, not so much about the 
danger of the mission itself, but more about whether or not I would be up 
to the task of helping someone who may be critically injured. What I found 
out was that in the heat of the situation our training took over, and I was 
able to function better than I had anticipated I would.
I got the opportunity to do what was called a Medcap [medical civic 
action program] mission. Th at’s where we would go out and treat some of 
the indigenous people for their illnesses and injuries and insect bites and 
what have you. Of course they had extensive disease. Th ey were very sup-
portive and happy to have us. We believed we were really being helpful. 
Th ere was one negative side to that, however. And that is this: there were 
occasions where we would put dressings on some of those people for vari-
ous problems and then these very people would be found later, killed, aft er 
attacking Americans. Th ey’d still have those dressings on them. It was still 
very hard at that point to tell who was on your side and who wasn’t. Th at 
was a continuing problem; somewhat of a universal problem there, not just 
with us. We had numerous Vietnamese that worked in our dispensary, and 
on a daily basis we had to trust that they were the good people. Some of 
them were, some of them were not, as we found out.
Our living conditions were pretty sparse, yet certainly better than the 
marines who were out in the fi eld, because at least we had either dirt-fl oor 
tents or, later on, hard-fl oor tents to sleep in. When I fi rst arrived in Da 
Nang we slept in large, dirt-fl oor tents. I recall there were eight to ten men 
per tent at that time. Later on, my condition improved, maybe because I 
passed my E-5 exam. In any event, I was moved to a ‘hard-back’ tent that 
had wooden framing and fl oors. Th ose tents were like the Taj Mahal by 
comparison. We had much more room, with our own desk, chair, bed, and 
private storage area. And only four men per tent. It’s amazing what this 
could do for morale. It also made me feel guilty at times knowing how the 
ground troops were living out in the fi eld.
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One of the funny things I remember was during the monsoon sea-
son, when it rains tremendously there. Around our tents we would have 
trenches built that we could get into in case we sustained mortar attack, 
which occurred frequently on that compound. We’d have a place to get into 
very quickly. One time in the middle of the night when it had been rain-
ing very, very hard, and we were all very soundly asleep, all of a sudden we 
heard this big splash and a big scream. Th e chief [chief petty offi  cer] in our 
tent, his whole cot and everything, had fallen off  into the trench, because 
the dirt had given away from the water washing it out. He came out look-
ing very distraught.
Usually before we’d go to bed we’d sweep out the tent and clean it up. 
And then we’d get up in the morning and there would be thousands of lit-
tle prints all over, in the dirt. Th ere were very large rats that were all over 
our area, and of course the prints were from the rats. At the medical tent, 
in the dispensary, we treated many marines who had their toes chewed by 
rats at night. Many times the marines weren’t aware that a rat had been in 
their bed. Th e rats were large and looked as big as squirrels. And they had 
shrews over there, a very aggressive smaller animal. I remember that as a 
very bad problem there. Actually, one of our sanitation jobs was to collect 
them and to test them for various diseases, particularly rabies, in case we 
had to treat the troops. But rabies never was a problem.
Our leisure time was somewhat limited, but like most GIs when we 
had time, we would write home. Or we’d read old letters and trade books 
with our friends. Once or twice a week there would be a movie, and that 
was always a fun time. I have been a runner for years, but I really started 
running in Vietnam. Th e Da Nang Air Base was large, and at certain times 
it was safe to get out and run on the dirt roads around the base. On one 
occasion, I was running with a friend when mortar rounds started com-
ing in. I’m not positive, but I think I may have run the fastest mile that I 
have ever run, either before or since. Luckily, we made it back to our area 
without injury or further incident. I got to take one week of R&R to Oki-
nawa. Some of the guys got to go as far as Australia, but lucky me, I drew 
Okinawa. It really wasn’t bad at all, especially considering our usual living 
conditions.
I experienced losing good friends in combat and know what that feels 
like. I had a couple of close friends who were killed, and those are cer-
tainly vivid memories; corpsmen that were there, that were actually killed 
either on their helicopter missions or waiting to go. I actually had one who 
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was killed at night, sleeping on his helicopter. Th e VC came in during the 
night and blew up the helicopter and he was killed. Interestingly enough, 
he was the brother of Tab Hunter, the movie star. He was the chief hospital 
corpsman and was killed just sleeping on that helicopter. Usually the chiefs 
didn’t even go on those missions. He was just one of those kinds of guys 
who wanted to be involved. One or two friends were killed aft er I left  Da 
Nang. Th at was kind of tough to hear about. It’s still a very negative feel-
ing for me.
So, there was not at that time a lot of dissent, either at home or amongst 
the troops. I had lived around lots of diff erent types of people, including 
Mexican Americans and blacks, so I worked with them again, and that was 
not anything new for me. I felt for the most part that we were a unit. We 
worked together. Th ere were not a lot of people, from my perspective, mad 
or upset about how they were treated. I understand that later a lot of that 
changed and that the troops even began to question why they were there. I 
think a lot of this, why I didn’t see that, had to do with the time I was there. 
People were dedicated to their jobs and seemed to be excited about doing 
it, about serving, about getting it done and getting home.
My tour in Vietnam ended in April 1966. As opposed to the many 
Vietnam veterans who had a bad homecoming experience, or none at all 
worth remembering, I never felt any negativity. I was not even aware of 
that for so long. Although, aft er I was back for awhile was when a lot of 
that [protests] really got worse. I had a very, very supportive family who 
always kept in touch with me. I had quite a huge number of people there in 
Austin when I fl ew in. I remember it to this day. Th ey couldn’t have been 
more loving, more caring, more excited to see me. Th ey certainly treated 
me as a hero, although I didn’t feel I deserved that. Th ey continue to sup-
port me to this day.
Th e whole experience is to feel that you were benefi tting a good cause. 
I believe that was an important thing that we did. I’ve never experienced 
any negativity in my life as a Vietnam veteran. Th at probably had to do 
with the positive, great support I had. I was certainly treated as a hero when 
I came home. I was disappointed since many lives were lost. It took a lot of 
time, a lot of humanity, a lot of death and destruction on both sides. It was 
really very disappointing and anticlimactic; and ending the way it did was 
certainly not the way most Americans would have wanted.
Aft er my Vietnam tour, I spent my last few months of active duty 
aboard a navy destroyer-tender at Charleston, South Carolina. In the fall of 
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1966, I returned to Southwest Texas State University to complete my edu-
cation. But not for long.
I happened to see an article in Look magazine about the new Physi-
cian’s Assistant program at Duke University. Th ey were accepting many 
former military medics and corpsmen. I applied and was accepted into 
the third class in 1967. I went from central Texas to Duke University. Th at 
was a very liberal place. I saw many antiwar demonstrations. Th at was 
extremely interesting to me as a Vietnam veteran. Aft er I had been there 
awhile, it started to make me contemplate more and more why we had 
been there and why all these people were so upset about it. I began to have 
new thoughts at that point in time, still feeling that what we did was the 
right thing. Th ere were people who think we should have gone on and tried 
to fi nish that war.
Aft er two continuous years of intense study, I graduated in 1969. I 
began to work at the VA [Veterans Administration] hospitals. I know from 
working with Vietnam veterans and taking care of them that a lot of them 
have had terrible problems as a result of the war. It got to the point where a 
lot of them could not get on with their lives. I really had trouble with that 
because I thought, okay, we did the best we could, now we needed to pick 
up and carry on. But I saw how the war impacted people and how they 
couldn’t get over it. I think it had a lot to do with their family background 
and structure. I’ve seen many veterans [in the hospital] who have not done 
well because of their background.
During the war, you’re fi red up to go and make a diff erence. You 
feel like you can be of great benefi t. Of course, aft er getting there, being 
afraid at times was certainly a part of it. Saddened by the death of not only 
friends, but also innocents, the civilians. Being disappointed and angered 
that some of the people you think are friends are not friends and are killing 
your friends and your soldiers’ friends. And as the time drew near to leave, 
thinking, “Boy, am I happy to get out of here!” Happy that you’re gone, 
happy that you’ve participated, saddened by what’s going on, and disap-
pointed by the way it ended. But, overall, I would still consider it a positive 
experience in my life.
Nevertheless, it had a defi nite impact, dramatically, on my life. To come 
from a very blessed land, blessed family background, and to be exposed to 
what is going on in the world that is not good, and to know that although we 
were not as successful as we wanted to be, that we still had a good impact.
I have very positive feelings about the Vietnamese people I’ve known 
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and worked with since the war. Th e ones that I worked with that proved to 
be true comrades when I was there, I had great respect for. Because of the 
things I saw, I was not very trusting for a long period of time because you 
could never be certain who was and was not the enemy. I think the Viet-
namese people were very, very smart as a general population. I think they 
are very dedicated to whatever their goal is, to attain that goal. Th ey’re will-
ing to stick it out, no matter what, whether it was to get out [of Vietnam], 
or if it’s the enemy or if it’s not the enemy; whatever that goal is, they will 
stick with it. Th ey’re very tenacious. Th ey’re a very strongly family oriented 
people. I really have a lot of respect for them as a general rule.
I still think we had a very positive, signifi cant impact on an area of 
the world that needed help. And then, to come back and to feel even more 
blessed because of the freedom that we have in our country, and all of the 
wonderful things that we have in our country as opposed to many, many 
places in the world that still, to this day, don’t know our freedom. Th ose 
are probably the most important things I learned from that [my tour in 
Vietnam].
Chapter 16
Drowning Tears with Laughter
Students were enchanted by 2nd Lt. Judy Crausbay Hamilton’s enthusiastic 
attitude and unique war experience when she talked to my history classes 
about Vietnam.1 Women were not draft ed into the military in the 1960s, but 
Judy signed up and served as both an air force and an army nurse during the 
Vietnam War.2 She worked in the air medical evacuation squadron in the 
U.S. Air National Guard from 1965 to 1967. Th en she asked the air force to 
put her in-country as a fl ight nurse. Aft er they told her that only male nurses 
were sent “in-country,” she left  the air force for the army. She went to Vietnam 
from 1967 to 1968, serving as an army nurse at the Ninety-fi rst Evacuation 
Hospital, III Corp, and other fi eld medical facilities.3
Aft er the Vietnam War, many veterans combated their emotions with 
anger, others turned to alcohol or drugs, and many withdrew from soci-
ety. Second Lt. Hamilton learned to channel her horrifying experiences into 
memories, some of which bring laughter. Serving as an army nurse, she saved 
the lives of American, South Vietnamese, and North Vietnamese soldiers. She 
cared for soldiers during times of great danger. Th ere is no doubt that she 
endured stressful times. However, she has learned to cope with the stressors of 
war in a most unique way.4
Th e following chapter covers Judy’s story of courage and patriotism in 
1965–1969. Her vast experiences off er a unique perspective to the war. One 
of the wounded soldiers wrote to her many years aft er the war: “Last night I 
must have woke up a dozen times, each time enjoying the excitement of hav-
ing established contact with you again, and remembering just how much you 
were a very bright light during a very dark tour of duty. Before my twenti-
eth birthday I had been wounded in action three times, the worst time being 
the multiple GSW’s that brought me to the Ninety-fi rst Evac in November of 
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1968.” He expressed his gratitude for her caring in a time of dire need. “For 
over twenty-fi ve years I have simply wanted to say ‘Th ank You’ for your care, 
concern, and kind words spoken daily during that six week period. You were 
truly an angel existing in a living hell. . . . Certainly you came in contact with 
hundreds of wounded soldiers, and there was nothing particularly unique or 
outstanding that would cause you to remember me. But for me you were not 
only the fi rst American woman I had seen in seven months, but a great source 
of inspiration in an otherwise totally depressing environment.”5
2nd Lt. Judy Crausbay Hamilton
Flight Nurse, Air National Guard, U.S. Air Force, and Ninety-First Evac 
and Can Th o Hospitals, South Vietnam, U.S. Army
I joined the military aft er completing nursing school at Baptist Memorial 
Hospital in 1965. I served in the U.S. Air National Guard from 1965 to 
1967 and served with the U.S. Army from 1967 to 1969. Women were not 
draft ed into the military. Some women went to nursing school through the 
army, and they were indentured to them for three years. I went into the 
military to travel. My brother was in the navy on the USS Enterprise, and 
he also served in Vietnam. I have always been a nurse. I worked as a pedi-
atric staff  nurse at Children’s Memorial Hospital.
Aft er I joined the Air National Guard in 1965, I attended fl ight nurse 
school for about eight weeks at the School of Aerospace Medicine, Brooks 
Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas. I attended army boot camp at Fort Sam 
Houston, Texas. As fl ight nurses, we went to fl ight nurse school and came into 
the air force as offi  cers. So we did not go through air force basic training.
Air force nursing was totally diff erent from civilian nursing. We per-
formed everything inside an aircraft . All of our nursing was done during 
fl ight. Th e great diff erence between air force fl ight nursing and civilian 
nursing was that you did not have someone to answer your questions. Most 
of the time fl ight nurses did not have anyone to help with medical pro-
cedures that might be needed in fl ight. Occasionally we would fl y with 
one fl ight surgeon on board. A fl ight surgeon would fl y with us only if we 
had an extremely critical patient. So we fl ew many times without fl ight 
surgeons. Th at was a big diff erence between civilian and fl ight nursing. 
During this time, the military nursing was completely diff erent because we 
were dealing totally with casualties from Vietnam.
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Th en I received air evacuation training with an active duty air force 
aero-med unit located at Yakota, Japan. Next, we fl ew into Clark Air Force 
Base [Sapangbato, the Philippines]. During this time, the military fl ew 
patients back from Vietnam to Clark Air Force Base. We loaded the injured 
soldiers, marines, and seamen into C-141 transport aircraft  at Clark and 
then fl ew them to Japan. From Japan we fl ew these men back to the United 
States.
One of my most vivid memories took place during a routine mission, 
while I was assigned to the 137th Air Medical Evacuation Squadron, which 
was on their way to Vietnam. During this mission, my air force rank was 
second lieutenant. Th ere was a rapid decompression on a C-141 aircraft  
2nd Lt. Judy Crausbay Hamilton and her aero-medical evac team in 1966.
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that landed before we arrived at Wake Island. Th e rapid decompression 
occurred at 35,000 feet with approximately one hundred GI soldiers going 
to Vietnam. We took those soldiers and placed them on our C-141. One of 
these soldiers was severely injured with a case of cerebral bends.6
We fl ew the injured soldier back to Hickam Air Force Base and placed 
him in a navy decompression chamber. Aft erwards, I fl ew with these sol-
diers to Vietnam. I took care of that patient in the back of the aircraft , with 
the assistance of my two corpsmen [medical technicians]. We had a really 
scary fl ight because the patient almost died on me several times in fl ight. I 
had no medications for an emergency situation. Th ere were very few things 
available that I needed to work on this patient. However, we did get him 
back to the decompression chamber. An article in Th e Oklahoma Journal 
recaptured this extraordinary event:
Th e patient needed oxygen, but the troop system could not be used; 
the technicians used a low-pressure bottle, which had to be fi lled 
every 15 minutes from the forward part of the cabin. Th e crew fl ew 
abnormally low and, at Lt. Crausbay’s suggestion, over pressurized 
the cabin to a simulated altitude 1,000 feet below sea level. At one 
point, the patient’s pulse rated to 200—far above normal. Drugs, 
which would have countered the condition, weren’t available. 
Remembering a technique from training, the Air Guard Nurse 
applied arterial pressure which reduced the pulse to normal.7
Fortunately, I had two medical technicians with me from our guard unit 
with experience in air evacuation. Th ey were really tremendous and did a 
great job. Th e story also ran in a 1967 issue of Th e National Guardsman, 
and included a humorous compliment. “Th e guardsmen had been on 31 
sleepless hours of duty. But it was Lt. Crausbay’s fi rst visit to Hawaii and 
she wanted to make the most of it. She washed her hair and went out on a 
date.”8 Major General Weber wrote me a letter, “Congratulations on a job 
well done and we are most appreciative of the fi ne publicity you brought to 
Air-Evacuation.”9
Whenever we did our air evac missions over to Southeast Asia, the GI 
patients were so receptive and grateful. You could not do enough for them. 
Th e soldiers were so mortally wounded and damaged. I remember one sol-
dier whose torso was in the middle of the litter. I asked him: “Don’t you 
need to move up in the litter?” Th e litter was fl at and not tilted up. I tried 
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to move him and found that he did not have any legs. He fi t perfectly in 
the center of the litter. I felt so terrible. One soldier had a tracheotomy [a 
breathing tube in his neck]. He would not go to sleep for fear that it would 
plug up and he would die in his sleep. I told him that “If you just close your 
eyes and go to sleep, I will sit here by you and watch you for a couple of 
hours. . . . I will just sit right here by you.”
I said to myself: “When I get back to the States, I want to get around 
those patients more. I want to go where they are fi rst injured. I don’t want 
to just take care of them forty-eight hours later, or a week or so aft er their 
injury.”
So I asked the air force if they would put me in-country Vietnam as a 
fl ight nurse. An offi  cer said: “No, we are only sending male fl ight nurses 
in-country Vietnam.” Th en, the guys in the Air Guard told me that “You 
know Judy, if you were in the army, I bet you that they would send you to 
Vietnam in a New York minute.”
So I contacted the army and asked them if they would actually send me 
in-country Vietnam. Th e army offi  cers told me; “Yes, we will guarantee you 
an assignment to Vietnam.” Th erefore, I left  the comforts and camaraderie 
of the air force for the army in 1967.
I did this aft er I realized that many of the Guards did not serve in-
country Vietnam. Th is is really what instigated my transfer to the Army 
Nurse Corps. I would have stayed with the air force had they assigned me 
in-country Vietnam.
I served in the U.S. Army from 1967 to 1969. While in the army, I 
served four months at Fort Ord, Monterey, California, on an orthopedic 
ward. Th e hospital ward received casualties returning from Vietnam. Th ere 
was an AIT and basic training program [boot camp] located at Fort Ord. 
Th erefore, we received AIT and basic training casualties as well.
One of the things that I found so special before getting stationed in 
Vietnam was working with the casualties returning from Vietnam. Th ese 
soldiers were fresh from Japan and pretty fresh from Vietnam. Th ey were 
obviously wounded to the extent that they were not going back to the ser-
vice, so they sent them back to the U.S. and tried to place them in a mili-
tary hospital close to their homes. Many of them at Fort Ord were from 
Redondo Beach, Los Angeles, and other close locations. Th e soldiers would 
usually arrive at Travis Air Force Base and then would be transported to 
Fort Ord Army Hospital. Th ey came in massive infl uxes. When a patient 
arrived, his family was notifi ed where the ward would be. If the patient was 
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well enough, the family could take him out on leave. Nevertheless, they 
needed to stay there at the hospital for reconstructive or follow-up surgery. 
Th e patients were allowed to go out on passes with their family.
I remember this one patient who came to the ward. He was an old man, 
twenty-fi ve years old! I say this with tongue in cheek, because everybody 
was between eighteen and nineteen. He was an older guy without any legs. 
He had lost both legs in Vietnam. We did not have a lot of amputees at this 
ward. Th e patient arrived about noon and his wife was coming to the ward 
from Los Angeles that evening.
Before her visit, I asked him, “Does she know what happened to you?” 
“Yes, she knows.” We were waiting eagerly for her to come. I mean “we,” 
the whole ward, about fi ft y GIs and a half dozen nurses, was waiting on 
her arrival. No one knew if she would reject him or accept him. When she 
arrived on the ward, she looked at her husband. Th e only thing she said was 
“Get your things together. I’ve got a motel room for us.”
You know, this lady was our queen! We could not have done enough 
for her! Th at is all he needed to hear. Th at one incident really gave me 
another picture of Vietnam that I will never forget. I had not seen the other 
side of Vietnam [in-country] yet. For the fi rst time I was seeing the family’s 
responses and how they coped with these morbid injuries. Th is experience 
was an introduction to the reality of the brutality of war.
Th en I arrived in South Vietnam as an army nurse.
I stayed a year in-country Vietnam and spent more than half of my 
time at the Ninety-fi rst Evacuation Hospital, III Corp.10 Th e Ninety-fi rst 
Evacuation Hospital was located close to a fi shing village near Tuy Hoa Air 
Force Base.11
My fi rst duty was as an “in-country” air evacuation crew member. 
I would jump on a C-130 and fl y with the crew when they transported 
patients. At Tuy Hoa, there were three squadrons of F-100 fi ghters and also 
several squadrons of C-130 Hercules. Th e C-130 crew would take off  at Tuy 
Hoa Air Force Base, and then we would go to Da Nang to pick up a medi-
cal team. From there we would start hopping all over the place picking up 
patients at Camp Evans, Hue, Quang Tri, and Hue Phu Bai. Th en we would 
bring them back to Da Nang and unload the patients and the medical team 
there. Finally, by the end of the day, we would fl y back to Tuy Hoa, and I 
could be back to my hospital.
When I fi rst began making these air evacuation fl ights, they were very 
fast. Th e crew had to load patients very quickly, as the C-130 was a favor-
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ite target of the VC and NVA’s mortars. Th ey wanted to stop the U.S. air 
evacuation and destroy cargo capabilities. We could only load the patients 
who were physically at the end of the runway before we touched down. We 
could not wait for them to be brought out. Th e aircraft  commander briefed 
us, saying, “We are just going to load on the ones that are on the fl ight line 
and then close the cargo doors.” Th at is the way it was many times. Even 
though the fi rst mortar rounds were close, the VC or NVA had to adjust 
their target. Th e second set would be more accurate, but with the third set 
we would be gone. Needless to say, every crew member worked quickly.
Aft er each pick-up, we lift ed the patients and secured the litters in the 
stanchions. Th ese fl ights were low and fast. Th ere was a lot of up and down. 
Th ere was not enough time for the aircraft  to reach a fl ight altitude where 
the air was cooler. Th e C-130 Hercules aircraft  was a literal oven. Th e fuse-
lage was extremely hot. Th e air crew even fl ew the plane with the large 
manhole on the fl ight deck open. So the crew in the back would take off  
their wringing wet shirts and continue with their duties. I had many really 
neat experiences doing that in-county air evacuation.
Th e person who impressed me the most was my commanding offi  cer, 
Lt. Col. Annie Ruth Graham, at the Ninety-fi rst Evacuation Hospital at Tuy 
Hoa. As an army nurse in both World War II and Korea, she was a totally 
fascinating person. Speaking with a true Southern drawl, she thought we 
were all her little chickens. We needed her mothering, and she provided 
that for us. Unfortunately, she had a stroke while stationed at the Ninety-
fi rst. I fl ew with her to Japan as her fl ight nurse. We made an emergency 
fl ight in a C-135 tanker out of Tuy Hoa and fl ew straight to Japan. She died 
four days later in Japan. She never regained consciousness. I must interject 
here that the United States is the only country I know that would and did 
use one huge super jet aircraft  to transport one patient to a hospital half-
way around the world. Th ere were many times that a C-135 would trans-
port one burned soldier from Vietnam directly to San Antonio to receive 
specialized treatment at the Fort Sam Houston Army Hospital burn unit.
I spent some time at a surgical army hospital in I Corps and in the 
Mekong Delta serving the Ninth Infantry Division and the navy.12 Th is 
army hospital was located on the Mekong River at Can Th o.
I spent a little time at Hue. Th e 101st Airborne Division was treated at 
this surgical hospital. It was located at Camp Evans. Th is was as far north 
as we could get, just eighteen miles from North Vietnam.
While in-country, one of my most humorous experiences involved the 
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theft  of my brassieres. We would hang our clothes outside to dry while in 
Vietnam. One particular day, I had washed and hung my clothes out to dry. 
I really don’t know if it was the marines or the 101st Airborne Division, as 
they were both in the area. Anyway, all of my underwear disappeared! Th at 
placed me in a bad fi x, because there were no places to shop to get more 
bras. Sometime later as I boarded a C-130 aircraft  there she was! One of my 
long lost bras proudly draped across the fuselage with a big sign that said, 
“Lest We Forget!” I confess that I needed the brassieres really bad, but I did 
not claim it. I said to myself that I would just pass this one up.
Well, the story didn’t end there. I went on R&R to Japan. While visiting 
Japan, my friend and I were in a beauty shop getting our hair fi xed. We had 
already gone to the base store looking for some underwear, but the Japa-
nese girls are really small. Th erefore, there was not a whole lot of off ering 
for me. Th e sales lady said, “Well, we had two in your size, but someone 
just came and bought them.” Shortly aft er I went back to the hotel some-
one knocked on the door. I opened the door to an American woman. She 
said that “I’m the one who bought those brassieres. I overheard you in the 
beauty shop. I want you to have these.” I wanted to pay her. But she refused 
to take my money. Th is woman was some general’s wife and she was very 
gracious. Actually, I have never known a general that is not very gracious. 
He usually has a good woman behind him. So I wound up with a couple of 
brassieres from some general’s wife.
While in Vietnam, I had to prepare my medical corpsman with what 
he was supposed to do if we had a rocket or mortar attack at night. Th e pos-
tulated reports were kind of like a weather forecast: “You may have incom-
ing [rockets] tonight.” Many times we were alerted of impending attacks. 
I told my corpsman to place a blanket over this patient as he was in trac-
tion. Th is one was going on the fl oor and to place his mattress on top of 
him. All of their IVs were placed down by their side. I went through every 
single patient and told him exactly what we were going to do. I briefed him 
about these procedures, because it was only the two of us working together. 
When an incoming attack occurred, we needed to be on the same page.
Aft er running him through the procedures, he looked me squarely in 
the eye and replied to me in a slow Southern drawl: “Ma’am, I sure hope 
you can do all that by yourself, because I am going to be over here behind 
this refrigerator.” He was very serious! I thought back on that incident and 
said to him, “Well, okay!”
Another funny story involved one of our nurses who was pregnant, 
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and her husband was back in the States. She was delighted to be pregnant, 
as she thought this would be her ticket home. She went to the military 
radio station, which had acronyms like MARS. Th e radio station would 
shoot up a beam when the satellite was going over and catch the satellite, 
which would bounce back and be picked up in the States. A ham radio 
operator in the States would pick up the signal and then call that person’s 
home. Once communications were established, the two parties would talk. 
Th is method was the only way you could communicate home back then.
Our pregnant nurse was calling to tell her husband the good news. Th e 
operator told her: “Alright, you’re ready to go ma’am . . . go ahead and tell 
him.” Th e nurse said: “Honey, I’m pregnant!” Th e message didn’t go over 
and therefore they could not understand her on the other end of the line. 
Finally, the operator told her that “there is a problem with the tone level in 
your voice. Here, let me give it a go.”
So now the male operator was saying: “Honey, I’m pregnant!” He 
was literally screaming this message over the airwaves. Suddenly the line 
became quiet. Th en another operator’s voice came over the radio, saying: 
“You guys will just do anything to get out of Vietnam, won’t you?”
2nd Lt. Judy Crausbay Hamilton 
receives her medal in 1967.
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Th e male operator at our MARS sounded like one of our soldiers saying 
he was pregnant! Th is happened way before the television series M*A*S*H. 
I have refl ected back on that story and thought it would have made a great 
scene for Corporal Klinger.
I spent one memorable day and night at a Special Forces camp. I 
wanted to see some of the Central Highlands and how the Montangnards, 
the tribal mountain people, lived. I had a friend who was an air force FAC 
[forward air controller]. He dropped me off  at this Special Forces camp. 
Th is was a Green Beret “A” Camp. Th e captain in charge took me to a vil-
lage, which looked like something from a National Geographic documen-
tary. Th e huts were all on stilts with bamboo thatch roofs. Th e women were 
topless with a baby hanging off  of their breasts. Th ey all chewed beetle nut, 
as their smiles showed black teeth. At fi rst, they were all very frightened of 
me as I looked so diff erent to them. Th ey would not come out of their huts 
or even stick their heads out. It seemed like nobody was home.
Aft er passing by one hut, a young girl came running out of a hut 
screaming at me in Vietnamese, “Lieutenant!” Th en she started talking in 
English to me. I found out that she was one of many children wounded 
and sent to our hospital during the Tet Off ensive. Around thirteen years 
old at that time, the girl was crippled with rickets and could not walk very 
well. Th erefore, I traded my boots for her “Jesus shoes,” which were sandals 
made of tires. Th e young girl was able to hobble around in my sturdy boots. 
With her as my guide, the villagers began to let down their guard and even 
welcomed me inside of their tiny huts. Most of the villagers warmed up 
to me, while some still shied away from me. I think it was because of my 
blonde hair.
I also wanted to go further into the village. Th e captain told me that we 
were not allowed in the village because the Viet Cong troops were sleep-
ing during the daytime. Th ey did not bother the Special Forces at night. In 
return, the Special Forces did not bother them during the day. I was told 
not to pass this post.
At night, I found out that these Green Berets were in a quandary as 
there was actually not a place for me to sleep. All of their quarters and 
operations were under the ground in well-fortifi ed bunkers. However, 
there had to be one guy on the radio at all times. Th is radio was located 
in a commons area where they ate and showered. Th e captain agreed to 
take the radio, so I could use his private quarters. While trying to sleep in 
the underground quarters, I felt something drop on the covers. I turned 
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on the fl ashlight and saw several giant bugs scurry out into the darkness. 
I wrapped my sheet around myself and sat outside. It was really peaceful 
and quite lovely. Th en I realized that sitting out in the open in the middle of 
the Central Highlands, wrapped in a very white sheet under the very bright 
moonlight, was not a good idea. So I went back to the captain. He told me 
to sleep on the sofa out on the veranda on a screened-in porch. When I 
tried to sleep, the rats started coming out from the sandbags surrounding 
the terrace. Th ose rats were doing a tight rope act on the electrical wires 
above me. Th ese rats were as large as kittens. I kept turning my fl ashlight 
on and chasing away the rats.
Th e best thing that happened to me in Vietnam was giving nursing 
care to the American soldiers, marines, and seamen. To be their mother, 
sister, girlfriend, or whatever they needed to see when they woke up. Many 
of them did not realize they were not talking to their girlfriend, sister, or 
their mother. Th e next best thing would be the camaraderie that I had with 
my peers. Th ere were no false pretenses. We all bonded quickly. We would 
sit up at all-night parties waiting for somebody’s baby to be born in the 
States. Th e other people would be just as drunk and rejoicing as the daddy 
was. I remember guys coming back from R&R, and meeting with their 
wives and family. Everybody got excited about everybody else’s excitement. 
We shared each other’s joy. I remember people reading their letters out 
loud to everyone and everyone sharing their care packages.
Th e best lesson I learned from the military service was that you must 
agree with the mission before you commit yourself to the service. I did not 
even know what the mission was. I would have still gone as a nurse, even 
though I do not now, and did not then, agree with President Johnson’s for-
eign political policies. I had not an intimate knowledge of how his policies 
would much later have an eff ect on my life. I lost all faith in the political 
system of my country. I did not agree with how President Johnson and 
other politicians handled the war in Vietnam. Th e generals did not direct 
the battles, the politicians did. If the politicians had allowed the generals to 
lead, we would have won the war. Our men were very restrained. Th eir very 
lives were compromised in one battle aft er another. Th ey were restricted to 
“taking one hill aft er another.” Th ey were rightfully angry.
So I would say to the soldier, “Agree with the mission.” Learn what the 
mission is before joining the armed forces. If you cannot deal with com-
bat and everything combat entails, then do not join. During the Vietnam 
War, even the cooks had to use their weapons on diff erent occasions. If an 
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individual cannot agree with the mission, then they do not need to sign up. 
Once a person has joined the armed service, they should be prepared to 
give it 100 percent every day.
I have no regrets when reminiscing over the time I served in the mili-
tary. It was some of the worst times and the best times of my life. Some-
times in the night hours I am wakened with latent grieving for the many, 
too many American sons and daughters sent to war in the jungles and rice 
paddies halfway around the world. Th ey sang that hit song of the 1960s: 
“We Gotta Get Out of Th is Place.” Sadly, it was the last thing they ever 
did.
Chapter 17
Life and Death of an
ARVN Doctor
Dr. Nguyen Canh Minh didn’t have much choice during the French Indo-
china War of 1946–1954 and the Vietnam War of 1960–1975.1 His coun-
try became a battleground where two political ideologies competed in order 
to show their superiority. Th e Vietnamese people were only chessmen on a 
board, who unfortunately transformed the struggle between two superpow-
ers into their own bloody civil wars. All the Vietnamese youth approaching 
military service age were draft ed in both South and North Vietnam. Th e war 
between two peoples in one nation, brother against brother, friend against 
friend, and sometimes even father against son, was very destructive for fam-
ily bonds and the nation as a whole.
As a fi eld doctor, Minh risked his own life several times to rescue others 
in South Vietnam. As a medical group commander, he worked with diff er-
ent U.S. advisers in the army hospital and had quite diff erent experiences. 
Dr. Minh’s view on the ARVN offi  cer corps was also diff erent from the war-
time stereotype. Aft er the Communist takeover of the South, he was sent to a 
“reeducation camp,” or a prison camp, in the North for more than four years.2 
In these POW camps, all of the prisoners had to do manual labor work to 
produce enough food for themselves and to send a surplus to the Communist 
government. Th ey had to accept the Communist ideology by studying the 
propaganda materials and confessing their own “crime” against the Commu-
nists in the war. Th ey were punished if they failed to work hard or to criticize 
themselves. Many of the POWs died in these camps. Dr. Minh witnessed some 
life-or-death situations in his prison camp. While in camp he made up his 
mind to leave Vietnam and come to America.
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Aft er his release from the prison camp, he took three of his children 
with him, traveling by foot for a week to fl ee Vietnam. Aft er crossing the 
Vietnamese-Cambodian border, they continued their long march for another 
three weeks, traveling by foot for fi ve hundred miles and crossing the “killing 
fi elds” of Cambodia, which was also under Communist control at that time. 
Aft er their long march of four weeks, they fi nally entered Th ailand. Two years 
later, the broken family reunited in America.
Dr. Nguyen Canh Minh
Medical Group Commander, Army Hospital at Can Th o,
Fourth Tactical Zone, ARVN (South Vietnam)
I was born in 1930 in Hue, the capital city of South Vietnam from 1945 to 
1955. I had three brothers and three sisters. When I was in high school in 
Hue, the First Indochina War, or the French Indochina War, broke out in 
1946. To fi ght against the Vietnamese Communist forces [Viet Minhs] in 
the North, the French government and our Emperor Bao Dai signed an 
agreement to establish a Vietnamese National Army [VNA] in 1949. I went 
to a college in 1947 and fi nished my B.S. degree in biochemistry and phys-
ics within four years.
When I graduated from college in 1951, the Vietnamese government 
had enforced a compulsory service for all South Vietnamese youth.3 Th e 
army was mostly equipped, trained, and commanded by French military. 
Th e French had established a training system for the VNA offi  cer corps. 
Youths who had a high school diploma could sign up for military training 
at the national military academies as offi  cers.
Since I joined the army with a college degree, I was sent to the VNA 
Medical School at the Hanoi Medical University in 1951. Many of the 
medical instructors were French military surgeons and doctors who had 
fi eld experience in World War II. During the four years [1951–1954] of my 
medical school, I studied a French medical curriculum at the Medical Uni-
versity in Hanoi, which had been under the French occupation from 1946 
to 1954. Th e French professors and doctors emphasized basic knowledge, 
systematic training, and professionalism. Patient and skillful, they helped 
us learn a lot of foundation and general education subjects.
In 1952, I met my future wife, Nhon, at the university, where she stud-
ied medical education for her teaching degree. She was also from Hue. 
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We had so much in common. Aft er two years of dating, with our families’ 
permission, we got married at Hue in 1954. Aft er the French army lost 
their battle at Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954, the French govern-
ment decided to negotiate for a settlement in Indochina. Th e Geneva Peace 
Agreement was signed in July 1954. While the French troops evacuated 
from Vietnam, the Viet Minh troops withdrew to north of the 17th paral-
lel, and the VNA troops regrouped in the South.
In 1955, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was founded with Saigon as 
its capital city. Th e VNA was renamed the ARVN in the same year as South 
Vietnam’s national army. Having replaced the French in South Vietnam to 
fi ght against the Communist expansion, the United States began to help 
the ARVN with its reorganization and improvement. Th e army received 
military advisers, fi nancial aid, and weapons and equipment from Amer-
ica to defend South Vietnam against a perceived Northern invasion by the 
NVA from the North.
Aft er 1954, my family was separated between the North and the South. 
My oldest brother stayed behind in the North and served as a post offi  ce 
cadre for the Communist government. Two brothers moved down to the 
South with the ARVN. My second eldest brother served as an instructor 
in the ARVN National Police Academy. My youngest brother worked as 
an airplane electrical engineer in the ARVN Air Force at Da Nang. If you 
entered the service, you lost your freedom. You had to relocate with your 
service and unit. Military rule was very tough, and you had to endure mili-
tary discipline.
Th e army moved its medical school from Hanoi to Saigon and renamed 
it the Medical University of Saigon. I moved with my newly wed wife to 
Saigon so that I could continue my medical studies for three more years 
[1954–1957]. At the Medical University of Saigon, we now had American 
doctors in our classroom with their medical expertise and fi eld experience 
in the Korean War. Th eir teaching style and training approach were dif-
ferent from the French. Th e American instructors introduced the cutting-
edge technology and showed us how to use new medical equipment. We 
had a lot of hands-on opportunities, which really helped me later in the 
hospitals. I was trained as a general practitioner at the Medical University 
of Saigon. Aft er my graduation from the university in 1957, I received an 
additional six months’ training for fi eld surgery by the ARVN.
I began my medical service in the ARVN in 1958 and continued my 
service for seventeen years, until 1975. For the fi rst three years, from 1958 
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to 1961, I headed a small medical team as medical captain performing 
physicals for an ARVN recruiting offi  ce. We traveled to every district of the 
Mekong Delta to draft  Vietnamese youth approaching military service age. 
At the beginning, the service age was twenty years of age. Later, this age 
was reduced to eighteen. During wartime, I believe that everyone should 
serve his country through the compulsory service system.
Aft er my promotion to medical chief as a major, I became chief of a 
medical group for medical and sanitary inspection of the ARVN troops 
from 1962 to 1965. I had an American adviser for our group. We usually 
fl ew in a helicopter from base to base for the routine inspection of infan-
trymen’s physical and living conditions. Our job was to prevent an epi-
demic breakout, food poisoning, and any potential health problem which 
may cause noncombat casualties or lower our troops’ combat eff ectiveness 
and morale.
My fi rst scary life-and-death experience occurred at this time. One day, 
I and my U.S. adviser fl ew a helicopter to an army camp for a routine sani-
tary inspection. During this fl ight, our chopper had a mechanical failure 
and went down with heavy smoke. We crashed in an unsafe zone, but we 
were all okay. Only two things could happen to us: either the ARVN or the 
U.S. chopper would rescue us, or the Viet Cong would kill us. It depended 
on who would arrive fi rst. Th e crash site was at the bottom of a hill and 
near a forest. I suggested hiding in the forest. But the American adviser 
refused, saying that we should wait at the crash site so rescuers could fi nd 
us. We should give them one hour. Aft er that, we could move into the forest. 
Everybody checked their weapons and was ready to defend our position. 
Fortunately, a U.S. Marine chopper showed up only twenty-fi ve minutes 
aft er our crash and before the Viet Cong could reach us. I appreciated the 
American adviser’s experience and advice, which saved our lives.
Aft er 1965, the battles became more intense between the ARVN-U.S. 
forces and PLAF-NVA forces in the South. My inspection team was reas-
signed as a medical evacuation group which fl ew wounded ARVN soldiers 
from the front line in the Fourth Tactical Zone to a nearby hospital in the 
Mekong Delta. We had several helicopters, and we fl ew almost every day 
to transport the wounded soldiers. During these years, I received a Cou-
rageous Combatant Medal from the ARVN high command for risking my 
life to serve wounded soldiers.4
During these years, I worked with diff erent U.S. advisers who were very 
professional and helpful. Nevertheless, I didn’t like some of them. Ignorant 
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and self-centered, they didn’t want to talk to you, because they believed 
they already knew everything about you and your problems. One of them 
caused the worst thing to happen to me during my service.
Aft er another promotion, I became a residential doctor at a big hospi-
tal of the army in the city of Can Th o. My wife was happy about my trans-
fer and liked this big city.5 I worked in the Can Th o General Hospital and 
treated wounded soldiers, including gunshot, mine explosion, and other 
injuries. As a large regional hospital, the Can Th o General Hospital served 
both military and civilian patients at that time. We had two separate sys-
tems in the hospital: one side of the hospital served the civilians; and the 
ARVN Fourth Tactical Zone and the Mekong Delta, 1964–1975
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other side was the army hospital. We had two separate clinic buildings, two 
in-patient facilities, and two supply/storage buildings.
In the army hospital, we were very busy. We received many wounded 
soldiers every day. Th e residential doctors had to work two shift s, day and 
night. Even when I was not on duty, I was still on call. Th e army hospital 
was so big that we had more than one thousand beds in the military in-
patient facilities. Th is two-in-one hospital really caused confusion. People 
always looked for places, and many times they walked into wrong build-
ings. Th e Army Hospital administration always asked about why a civilian 
was in a military clinic building, or why a military surgical doctor was in 
a civilian supply/storage building. Th at was exactly what would happen to 
me. As an army residential doctor, I also knew several civilian doctors, so 
I visited them from time to time and had lunch with them when I was off  
duty. I walked in and out of the civilian clinic and supply/storage buildings 
quite oft en.
One day in 1967, a newly arrived American adviser to the hospital civil-
ian administration accused me of stealing medical supplies from the civil-
ian supply/storage building and selling them to Viet Cong. It was totally 
false, but a serious accusation. I was in a very dangerous situation in which 
I could be arrested as a traitor and even executed as a Viet Cong sympa-
thizer. I defended myself by writing many letters to prove my innocence. 
Th e U.S. adviser ignored the facts and used the stereotype measurement to 
judge me as another corrupt ARVN medic and to cover up a large number 
of their missing medicines and supplies.
My supervisor, as an American adviser to the military administration 
at the hospital, came to my defense and explained everything to the hospi-
tal heads. He also wrote a report to the U.S. Medical Service and Advisory 
Headquarters in Saigon. Later, they cleared my case and transferred the 
U.S. adviser who had falsely accused me to another hospital in early 1968. 
I remember the date because it happened just before the Viet Cong’s Tet 
attacks. On Mau Th an, New Year’s Eve, or Tet in 1968, the city of Can Th o 
was unexpectedly attacked by the PLAF and PAVN as part of their nation-
wide off ensive campaign.
I know a typical American viewed the ARVN offi  cer corps as incom-
petent, corrupted, and bureaucratic. However, as far as I know, there were 
many good, honest, and well-trained Vietnamese offi  cers in our command. 
Among these were Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the Fourth 
Army Corps in 1966–1969, and Gen. Nguyen Khoa Nam, the last com-
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mander of the Fourth Tactical Zone until 1975.6 Both of them were honest, 
hard-working, and effi  cient commanders. Th ey made good fi ghting plans 
for the Fourth Corps. Th ey never allowed their families to take advantage 
of their high-ranking positions for personal interests.
In 1969–1972, I was promoted to the commander of the ARVN Sev-
enty-fourth Medical Group in the Fourth Tactical Zone. I oversaw most of 
the medical activities in the zone and worked with U.S. advisers closely on 
plans, joint activities, and problems.
Every three months, accompanied by a couple of American medical 
advisers, we went to inspect our Viet Cong POW camps. Th ere were two 
major camps on the islands off  the coast. One of them was on Con Dao, 
or Poulo Condore Island, located about eighty kilometers east of Saigon, 
under the command of the Second Tactical Zone. Th e other camp was 
on Phu Quoc Island, about 120 kilometers from Can Th o, off shore under 
the Fourth Tactical Zone command.7 Th e Phu Quoc was the largest POW 
camp, holding about 30,000 Communist prisoners. Th e contrast between 
the way the ARVN treated the POWs with the way the Communists were 
dealing with prisoners was stark. As the zone medical chief, I inspected the 
POWs’ health conditions and camp sanitary situations on a regular basis. 
Aft er each visit, I reported to the zone command about the problems and 
made improvement suggestions. As we know, the Viet Cong and PLAF did 
not have any medical routine inspection or treatment. Th ey didn’t even 
have any facilities for ARVN and American POWs. Th ey just placed cap-
tives anywhere in a village, a cave, or even holes in the ground, anywhere 
that was convenient for them to conceal the POW camps.
In 1972, I retired from the service. I received the National Honor Medal 
for serving the nation during a time of war. Aft er my retirement, I still 
worked in the same hospital, the Can Th o General Hospital, as a physician 
in the civilian clinic. I also trained some doctors and nurses in the hospital. 
In 1974, the war situation was getting worse every day. Many people wor-
ried about the future of South Vietnam. I talked to my wife and we decided 
to send two of our nine children to America to attend college.
In April 1975, the Communist forces took over the South. In the sum-
mer, the Communist government sent soldiers to my house and arrested 
me because I had served in the ARVN during the war. Th ey sent me all the 
way from the South to a “reeducation camp” in the far North, close to the 
Vietnamese-Chinese border. I spent more than four years in the camp.
My “reeducation center” was in a mountainous region northwest of 
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Hanoi, known as Son La Prison Camp. It contained about six thousand 
ARVN offi  cers imprisoned, including sixty physicians, pharmacists, den-
tists, and medical service corpsmen. Th e Son La Prison Camp was in a big 
forest and far away from any village or town. It was guarded by the NVA 
soldiers and there was no way to escape. You couldn’t survive in the wild 
forest.
We had to work hard as manual laborers in the prison camp to sup-
port ourselves. Aft er we arrived in 1975, the camp offi  cials told us that they 
would supply 75 percent of our food and other basic needs for the fi rst six 
months. We should produce the rest of our daily needs. Th en, aft er the fi rst 
six months, they would reduce their supply and give us only 50 percent of 
our basic needs for the second six months. By the fi rst anniversary, a year 
later, they would supply nothing, and we had to provide 100 percent of our 
food, cloth, tools, housing, and other needs.
Aft er my arrival in 1975, I worked in the rice fi eld with many others 
to feed this large prison population. Some of the prisoners worked in the 
vegetable gardens or chicken farms to produce various vegetables and meat 
for the camp security troops and offi  cials. We were lucky to have some 
chicken meat in our meals several times a year during the holidays. We got 
a haircut twice a year. And we were not allowed to write to our family for 
the fi rst year.
In 1976, I worked with a construction team to build more shelters for 
the growing prisoner population and repaired the only dirt road through 
the forest, along with several bridges. We walked into the forest every day, 
cutting down the big trees and dragging them back to the camp. We didn’t 
have any truck or machine. All we had were small hand tools like those in 
your garage [in America]. It was hard and dangerous to cut down the big 
trees and to cut them into useable timbers. We had no hard hats, no gloves, 
no working shoes, nor any protection. Prisoners got injured every day. Sev-
eral teammates were killed by falling trees in the forest and by accidents 
during construction in the camp.
Later, about 1977, the camp offi  cials chose twelve of the sixty med-
ical professionals to set up a dispensary to treat their fellow inmates in 
case these POWs were injured or hurt. I was one of the twelve people. We 
got some rudimentary surgical instruments and outdated medicine. We 
never had enough medicine to treat injured prisoners. And we could not 
send any seriously injured prisoner to a hospital for further treatment. One 
time, a prisoner’s arm was cut by a rice reaping hook. We didn’t have any 
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medicine or instruments to stop his bleeding. He suff ered serious pain. We 
just watched him bleed to death later that evening. Th e camp offi  cials and 
guards were there, too. I knew they had a good supply of medicine and an 
army nurse in their quarters. But he was taking care of the Communist 
offi  cers and soldiers, not any of the prisoners. By that time, I had made 
up mind that I had to leave Vietnam. I couldn’t live under the Communist 
authorities. Th ere was no freedom for the people, no respect of human 
life, and no safety under the Communist control. If possible, I would leave 
this country to look for a better place to live for my children, my wife, and 
myself.
In late 1978, the security troops increased. Th ey were armed with 
Dr. Nguyen Canh Minh (front center) and other physicians at the prisoner camp in 
1976.
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machine guns and mortars. Th ere were some rumors that China and 
Vietnam had problems along their border, and that there would be a war 
between the two Communist countries. In early 1979, for several weeks, we 
could not go outside the camp to work in the rice fi eld or in the forest. We 
could only stay inside the camp. We could hear some heavy artillery gun-
shots, but it seemed far away.
In the summer, the camp headquarters began to release the prisoners. I 
was released in October 1979. Many of the prisoners didn’t make it, includ-
ing several of my friends in the medical team. Aft er being released from 
the prison camp, I didn’t go back to Can Th o. I knew that the local Com-
munist authorities were waiting for me and would give the released pris-
oners a hard time. I stopped at Saigon, now renamed as Ho Chi Minh City. 
In November, I met my wife and children in Saigon. We made the impor-
tant decision to leave Vietnam and to go to America. We had two children 
studying in American colleges at that time.
How would we go to America? Our plan was to walk out of Vietnam 
by foot. We would cross the border and enter Cambodia fi rst. Th en we 
would cross Communist-controlled Cambodia and enter Th ailand, which 
was still a free country in Southeast Asia. In Th ailand, we could contact our 
children in America. Hopefully we would come to America from there.
In December 1979, my family split again. I took three of seven chil-
dren with me, said good-bye to my wife, and began our long journey to 
America. We walked west toward Cambodia. We traveled through three 
provinces [states] along the Mekong River. We pretended to be local people 
by not carrying any luggage. We walked for one week and reached the Viet-
namese-Cambodian border. At night, we passed the NVA guards, crossed 
the border, and fi nally entered Cambodia.
In Cambodia, we continued our long march by foot. We had to cross 
the country to reach Th ailand. We were still very careful traveling through 
Cambodia because the Vietnamese Communist troops occupied that coun-
try at the time. And Cambodia was under a radical Communist govern-
ment which had turned the country into the “killing fi elds” at that time.8 
We saw the dead bodies everywhere; and we also saw a lot of Vietnamese 
refugees in Cambodia. If the soldiers and local authorities found out you 
were Vietnamese, they would send you back to Vietnam. We tried not to 
say any Vietnamese word when there were people around us. Two of my 
three kids were sick in Cambodia. I found some herbs in the mountains 
to treat their fever and sickness. We walked fi ve hundred miles for three 
Life and Death of an ARVN Doctor 175
weeks to cross Cambodia. In that year, my wife sent two of the four chil-
dren she had out of Vietnam among the “boat people.”
Finally, on December 26, 1979, aft er the long march of four weeks, 
we crossed the Cambodian-Th ai border. In Th ailand, we found the Inter-
national Red Cross and settled in one of the Red Cross refugee camps. I 
contacted my wife, asking her to leave Vietnam by following my route to 
Th ailand. In 1980, my wife arrived in Th ailand with our other two chil-
dren. We also contacted our son and daughter in America.
On January 1, 1981, we arrived in the United States. It took us more 
than a year to come to America. In 1986, aft er passing a medical exam, I 
got a job in medical research at the Wisconsin Medical Center, Milwau-
kee, Wisconsin. I worked there for the next thirteen years. Aft er moving 
to Chicago, I worked in orthopedic research at Rush Hospital until my 
retirement.
Dr. Nguyen Canh Minh in 2007.
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Chapter 18
A Korean Captain 
and His Hospital
We met for the fi rst time at an international symposium on the Asian-Pacifi c 
Rim in 1991. As the conference organizer, Dr. Walter Byong I. Jung brought in 
American governors, Asian ambassadors and consuls, university presidents, 
and many scholars from Asia. With a widely recognized reputation in aca-
demic exchanges and a Ph.D. in urban development, Dr. Jung taught at state 
universities in the United States for more than twenty years and published 
many books in America and Korea. His favorite topic, however, was Viet-
nam. When I was invited to his home for dinner, I found out that he and his 
wife, Young, met in the Vietnam War. Capt. Walter Jung served in the Ninth 
Infantry Division of the South Korean Army, or the Army of the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), from 1966–1967, while his wife was an ROK Army nurse.1
Captain Jung told me that the South Korean government began to send 
its troops to Vietnam in March 1965. As the “ROK Military Assistant Group, 
Vietnam,” the early arrivals consisted of medical support, engineers, and secu-
rity troops. In November, the ROK Army sent its Capital Infantry Division 
and a marine brigade to South Vietnam to join the American operations. In 
1966, the ROK doubled its troops in Vietnam by sending its Ninth Infantry 
Division and more marines.2
According to Captain Jung, many Korean soldiers, tough and well 
trained, were no-nonsense fi ghters. Th ey were the bulwark in keeping the piv-
otal Highway 1 in central Vietnam reasonably free of the Viet Cong menace. 
Th at does not mean the enemy fi ghters were soft  or inferior; on the contrary, 
they were tremendously motivated and remarkably resourceful, though they 
were poorly armed and supplied. For every rice fi eld and mountain ridge in 
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central Vietnam, two armies contested bitterly. Neither the ROK Army nor 
the Viet Cong won every battle and encounter. As part of the Ninth M.A.S.H. 
command of the Ninth Division, Captain Jung managed the hospital security, 
medical supply, logistics, and transportation. His stories about how to deal 
with a Viet Cong POW major’s psychological tactics and hospital escape, a 
hostage situation, and local nurse recruitments are very interesting.3
Capt. Walter Byong I. Jung
Ninth Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (M.A.S.H.), Ninth Infantry 
Division, Army of the Republic of Korea (South Korea)
I was born in South Korea in 1942. When I was eight years old, North 
Korea invaded the South, and the Korean War broke out in 1950. It was the 
fi rst time that I had ever seen American soldiers. I remember that, friendly 
and funny, they were handing out candies and gums to the Korean kids. 
I really liked these soldiers who had come all the way from America to 
Korea to help our people fi ght the war against the Communist invasion. I 
never thought that I would fi ght side by side with American troops in the 
Vietnam War fi ft een years later.
When I was in college, I enrolled in the ROTC program. In 1964, I 
was commissioned a second lieutenant of the South Korean Army (ROK 
Army). Th ereaft er, I was posted for the 1103rd Field Engineering Group, 
serving as a specialist in river crossing operations. In 1966, I transferred 
to command the First Combined Motor Pool of the Second Army Corps. 
Later that year, I received the order that our motor pool unit would be reas-
signed to the White Horse Infantry Division headquarters, which was leav-
ing for South Vietnam in August.4
On August 11, 1967, we were aboard a large transport ship for Viet-
nam. We arrived in Nha Trang, a provincial capital in central South Viet-
nam. As a member of the new replacement group, I spent two more days 
for the paperwork at the Logistics Command headquarters. I received the 
new orders.
According to my new orders, I and two medical offi  cers headed to the 
Ninth Mobile Army Surgical Hospital [M.A.S.H.], located in the vicinity 
of Tuy Hoa, the capital city of Phu Yen Province. Th e Ninth M.A.S.H. sup-
plied medical services for all the Korean soldiers in the region. Our hospi-
tal facilities were along the coast, facing the ocean, or the South China Sea 
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in the east. I’d walk down to the beach from my offi  ce within fi ve minutes. 
We had the Twenty-eighth Regiment of the White Horse Division on our 
right, or the south side, with its base along the shore. A little to the north, 
the giant Tuy Hoa U.S. Air Base sat with many artillery units and fi rebases 
nearby.5 I was happy to be stationed side by side with American forces. 
Having felt safe, I just wondered if the Viet Cong or Viet Minh could ever 
get me or my hospital. I would learn about this within no time.
I had a good sleep during the fi rst night, or at least half of the fi rst night. 
It might have been a pure coincidence. My very fi rst night in Tuy Hoa was 
like Viet Cong’s premeditated welcome ceremony for us new arrivals.
“Get up, get up, Lieutenant Jung!” Lieutenant Kim, my brand-new 
roommate, desperately shouted, while shaking violently my nearly coma-
tose body. I don’t know how long it took for me to fi nally grasp the essential 
reality that I was at one of the Korean Army’s forward bases in South Viet-
nam. Justifi ably, Lieutenant Kim was highly agitated by my unmilitary-like 
response, though he surely remembered that I had arrived at the base just 
that aft ernoon and before a few glasses of whisky.
Under Lieutenant Kim’s incessant encouragement, I fi nally got up from 
the canvas bed and timidly asked, “What’s going on?” “We are under the 
enemy attack! You have to follow me now.” Kim’s explanation was rushed 
and short. Well, that was all he knew at the moment. Within a minute, 
we came out into the night, where a rather colorful battle was under way. 
Although the night was confusingly noisy, I followed him in full speed, 
under only partial illumination supplied by the battle itself. I couldn’t ask 
any questions, but fi gured we were heading toward the compound’s east-
ern fence, over which the South China Sea slept. Running on the strange 
land I didn’t know anything about, it was challenging and dangerous. At 
the moment, I had no combat gear: no helmet, no rifl e, not even a pistol. I 
should have assigned those items to myself when I reported that aft ernoon. 
But I decided formally to take over the supply department the next day, 
leaving myself unarmed in the war zone just for the fi rst night.
As soon as we reached the edge of the compound, Kim pushed me into 
what appeared to be a personal foxhole. Alas, it was in name only. Appar-
ently the foxholes were dug quite awhile ago, but the company forgot to 
maintain them to be functional. My foxhole barely covered the lower part 
of my body. I was half exposed even in the foxhole. It was painfully clear to 
me that the hospital commanders did not expect to use the foxholes at all.
Sitting in the half-exposed foxhole with my empty hands, I observed 
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the night battle for the very fi rst time. I was a forced spectator of the night’s 
aerial battle, but I felt neither fear nor curiosity. Boldly, the Viet Cong initi-
ated the confrontation by launching a few artillery rounds into the Twenty-
eighth Korean Regiment base. Predictably, the allies of the area, the U.S. 
and ROK forces, responded to the provocation with their mighty fi re-
power: the sky was full of colorful tracers and burning fl airs. Th e air was 
thick with sounds of fl ying and exploding artillery shells. Phantom fi ght-
ers repeatedly bombed nearby Homba Mountain, while helicopter gun-
ships were busy patrolling the shore, sporadically fi ring their machine guns 
toward fi shing boats, warning them not to get too closer to the shore and 
thus the allied bases. It was a three-dimensional operation with full color 
and soundtrack. I hoped that forceful display of the allied fi repower should 
have suffi  ciently impressed the enemy to realize the futility of attacking the 
allied bases. Th e battle situation was over within an hour, however. Soon, 
the base recovered the calm and poise; all were ordered to go back to their 
living quarters, except of course sentries.
First thing in the morning, I opened the company warehouse and 
secured my personal weapons: a rifl e and a pistol. I thought it would be 
scandalous for me again to face an enemy attack without personal arms. 
As expected, all units in the zone of the regimental combat group were 
ordered to assemble for the area commander’s speech.
Colonel Lee, a thin but rather tall man, appeared upset and at the same 
time amused by the attack of the night before. “Th e enemy dared to attack 
our base. We can’t tolerate that, no matter what.” He ordered every unit 
to rebuild its combat bunkers and foxholes at once, and that all activities 
other than extreme essentials should be cancelled until the defense works 
were completed.
As ordered, we mobilized all available hands for this urgent project 
for the next fi ve consecutive days, building new command bunkers and 
numerous combat bunkers along the base’s entire fence. All bunkers were 
stocked with ammunition. Th e remnants of old foxholes were all cleared. 
During these days, the enemy artillery blasts continued every night. Inter-
estingly, the enemy artillery attacks lasted for fi ve consecutive nights—a 
few rounds of artillery blast between eleven and one, at midnight. Our 
artillery battalion was always quick and eff ective in directing counterat-
tacks, allowing the enemy only a short window of opportunity for their 
attacks. Although they sure were irritating distractions, the base inhabit-
ants suff ered no deaths and only a few light wounds.
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Th e Twenty-eighth Korean Regiment had suff ered perhaps the most 
painful defeat on September 25, 1967. In advance, the regimental head-
quarters informed the area units of the upcoming operation, a company-
strength thrust into the contested territory. Late that aft ernoon, we sent off  
the convoy trucks full of soldiers heading to the interior. Nobody showed 
any undue concerns over the convoys, as it had become a rather daily rou-
tine for our soldiers to go out and chase the enemy away. We were expect-
ing them to come home the next morning with POWs or even some kills. 
In that region, we were yet to encounter the enemy who could outfi ght our 
men.
Unfortunately, the operation didn’t pan out as the regiment command-
ers anticipated; in fact, the convoy was ambushed by the enemies waiting 
for them. Our wounded soldiers began to arrive at the hospital about two 
hours aft er the troops left  the base. Our landing site was full as helicop-
ters waited in the air to unload the wounded. When nurses in the wards 
informed me of bed shortages, I ordered to transfer any and all metal beds 
to the wards, even from the BOQ [Bachelor Offi  cers’ Quarters]. Still we 
were short of beds and space to put the wounded soldiers, as our wards 
were overfl owing. Standing in front of our emergency room entrance, Col-
onel Kim and I were barely able to hide our emotion. I was wondering if 
the regiment was all destroyed.
My position was the hospital’s S4, chief of supply department, which 
was responsible for the hospital’s logistic administration and other relevant 
works. A second-year fi rst lieutenant, I served for a fi eld engineering group 
and a medical battalion, where I commanded a large motor pool, prior 
to my transfer to the M.A.S.H. in South Vietnam. Directing the hospital’s 
supply department was not particularly challenging, as the hospital was 
a relatively small unit with 130 personnel; all supply depots were found 
nearby. But my actual duty was much more extensive than that of a typi-
cal unit: I had to run the mess hall and the motor pool, and to oversee the 
company’s combat preparations. I also was responsible for maintenance of 
all the hospital’s physical assets. Even securing the power supply fell under 
my domain. I was the designated fall guy for almost anything that went 
wrong in the hospital.
I spent most of my time maintaining the hospital’s 24-hour operation 
or carrying out a number of other works. We had a couple of small-scale 
construction works in the compound almost always. Although the design 
and material support came from the U.S. Army contractors, the P&E 
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[power and electric company] workers were all Vietnamese, for whom I 
had the responsibility of supervising. As one might imagine, they were far 
from enthusiastic in their works. Th erefore, I had to drop by to the work 
site oft en. Th ey were having lunch hours seemingly too many times, mak-
ing me angry.
Th e most risky and unique work for me was to recruit Vietnamese girls 
for the hospital’s kitchen and laundry department. I worked with the local 
offi  cials: they selected the village, and I would set up the schedule. For each 
visit, they never failed to remind me that I was entering a potentially hos-
tile zone. At the time, we had to assume that there were Viet Cong sympa-
thizers in most villages. Th ey could easily kill me and my men during our 
visit. Yet I chose not to arm ourselves, a three-man team plus a driver and 
an interpreter. My logic was that our safety should be the vehicle: an army 
ambulance with prominent Red Cross emblems on sides and back. How-
ever, if the enemy chose not to honor the sanctity of the assumed medical 
mission, we were to be sitting ducks regardless of whether we had weapons 
or not. My message was that we were on a peace mission if not a medical 
mission per se.
As we entered the village, we were met by the village offi  cials. Usually 
I found ten to thirty young girls already assembled on the court of a rather 
spacious home, more oft en than not the home of a village chief. I would 
greet them and present a cigarette to each girl, using both hands, while 
my interpreter followed me a step behind with his lighter’s fl ame on so the 
girl’s could smoke. To my astonishment, most girls accepted my little ges-
ture eagerly. Aft er the greetings, I asked their ages and education—that is, 
if they could read and write. I also explained the nature of the work and 
the selection process to the whole group. Th en I told them that they would 
hear our decisions from the county offi  ce. Only aft er we had returned to 
our patrolled zone did we feel the mission was accomplished.
About three months aft er I arrived, the hospital received an admin-
istrative order to set up a ward for the Communist POW [Viet Cong and 
NVA captive] patients. I was assigned the new task to establish a twenty-
bed ward.
Th e fi rst POW patient group arrived shortly with eleven or twelve 
men, all young local Viet Cong fi ghters. To my surprise, many of them 
didn’t show any gunshot wounds. Th ey followed our orders and soon 
started to salute me whenever I stopped by their ward. I instructed them to 
help themselves with their meals. Th ey would bring their meals from the 
A Korean Captain and His Hospital 183
kitchen to their ward, and returned utensils when they were fi nished. It was 
a simple chore that eliminated the need for our soldiers to serve them.
Th is rather strange but mutually accommodating coexistence under-
went a radical change when one of the most important POWs the 
Twenty-eighth Regiment ever captured was transferred to our hospital. 
A Communist major in the regular North Vietnamese Army [NVA], he 
was a vice commander of a battalion. As soon as he arrived, the POW 
ward underwent a total transformation. Th e POWs refused to self-serve 
their meals. I had to assign our soldiers to do the work. I was quite upset. 
Th eir rather pleasant, if strange, salute to me also vanished. My sergeant in 
charge informed me that the POW major told the Communist POWs what 
to do. Th e major had turned my POW ward into his own little kingdom 
overnight.
I decided to confront the culprit myself. Th e sly major was by no 
means surprised by my visit. Calmly he faced me with a long laundry list of 
demands. But fi rst he accused me of violating the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention, which I didn’t remember at all. Anyway, that was how he justi-
fi ed their refusal of self-help meals. He was not happy with my POW ward. 
His material demands were quite extensive and included bars of soap, 
toothpastes, and writing papers. I promised him that I would look at the 
issues, but reminded him that some supplies were limited even to my sol-
diers. His most troublesome demand, again using the Geneva Convention 
as the justifi cation, was going to the beach and bathing in the sea. Th ey had 
been given periodic showers, a generous gesture on my part, considering 
our less-than-adequate water supply. I rejected his beach bathing outright; 
I had no way to guard them securely in the South China Sea.
Once his demands were all presented, he initiated his ideological argu-
ment promptly. He denounced the South Korean Army for interfering in 
Vietnam’s internal aff airs.
“You, South Koreans, have no business in Vietnam. No business at all. 
We are not your enemy in any way and in any historic period. You are here 
as battle fodder for the American imperialists. So you should go back to 
your country immediately.” Apparently, he didn’t care about the fact that I 
was only a fi rst lieutenant, who had little voice in such a national or inter-
national decision. But since he provoked me fi rst, I had to respond. I told 
him that “You got it all wrong. We are here as a part of the allied forces to 
protect the democratically elected government of South Vietnam from the 
Communist attacks. In fact, you are the aggressor. You are trying to destroy 
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the legitimate government in Saigon. Th is is the war against aggressors and 
the international Communists. Moreover, we will prevail. Just watch us. We 
will wipe out your Viet Cong collaborators and North Vietnamese forces 
in the South.” He didn’t believe it and asked me, “You mean that the U.S. 
imperialists will win this war?” “Absolutely, we will win!” “No, no. Neither 
Americans nor Koreans will win this war. Matter of fact, you yourself will 
not return to your home safely. Believe me!”
My confrontation with the major was intense and far reaching. But in 
a way, I enjoyed the verbal battle with the die-hard Communist. I visited 
him regularly, not because I desired to hear his rambling harangues, but 
because I had to check the ward’s security status myself. It quickly became 
apparent that his favored response was “don’t know” on almost any subject 
related to military operation. Th ough tempted, I did not apply any physi-
cal measures on him to extract military information. Th rough frequent 
contacts, however, I was able to collect a few pieces on his background. 
A Hanoi native, he graduated from the North Vietnamese Military Acad-
emy. As an offi  cer who had earned his superior’s trust, he conducted him-
self fl awlessly even under such a dire circumstance. Once he surprised me 
with a confession that his superiors in Hanoi warned him to avoid, if pos-
sible, any battle contacts with South Korean forces. Th e reason was that the 
South Korean soldiers were all martial art experts. He was sure of this by 
watching us practicing martial arts every morning on our drill ground.
Th e NVA major did not look like a wounded man at all. Yet he was 
highly skillful in producing some phony symptoms, and thus succeeded 
in prolonging his hospital stay. Th e longer he stayed, the more trouble I 
would have. I ordered my sergeant to infi ltrate the POW group. Shortly, I 
managed to secure one reliable information source, a Viet Cong informer. 
Promptly he gave us extremely detailed information on the ward itself and 
particularly on the major’s conduct. Behind our back, the major was hold-
ing secret tribunals for Viet Cong POWs, doling out punishments to those 
who did not follow his orders to the letter. Apparently, he commanded the 
group with an iron fi st. In a couple of weeks, the informer spilled the big-
gest surprise: the major was planning an escape. I was shocked by the pos-
sible fallouts if his plan was carried out. I immediately upgraded the ward’s 
security by posting two sentries at all hours. But I knew well that the sen-
tries, no matter how many, should not be a guarantee against his escape 
attempt.
One night, when I was on duty, the informant sent an emergency note: 
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the major would escape that night. I immediately called the military police 
with an ultimatum. Th e MPs shortly arrived to take custody of the trouble-
maker. I was watching the transfer from the front of the ward. Th e major 
saw me, but he did not acknowledge my presence. However, he did not 
hide his hatred over my spoiling his plot. I never forgot his steady, pen-
etrating glance to me, one fi lled with the most poisonous and hateful hos-
tility I ever witnessed. Th ough he was an enemy, I secretly admired him 
for his exemplary conduct as an offi  cer throughout his captivity, including 
his bold escape plot. Indeed, I did not think that any other offi  cer would 
conduct himself in his POW captivity the way that this North Vietnamese 
offi  cer did.
It was a rather calm Sunday on a late January aft ernoon when I received 
a frantic call from a master sergeant. I rushed to the last patient ward 
and saw a small crowd of Korean men, about fi ve to six patients, stand-
ing against the wall. As I reached the crowd, I saw that a young Korean 
patient, half angry and half deranged, was threatening the crowd with two 
live grenades, and that their safety pins were already removed. Th e hapless 
patients and our security guards were completely immobilized by this dis-
gruntled Korean man and his two grenades. He wanted to talk to me. I was 
facing a hostage situation by one of our own Korean soldiers.
Th e patient, later identifi ed as Private Kim, somehow learned that I was 
the hospital logistic chief running the central kitchen. To my astonishment, 
he started to ramble about the quality of the hospital’s meals, and directly 
blamed it on me. Like the other men, I found myself promptly incapaci-
tated by fear of the two live grenades. I was not able even to attempt repu-
diating his totally inaccurate criticism, in a sense, but accepted his blame. I 
decided not to do anything to provoke this unstable soldier. His incompre-
hensible harangue went on for a while to further off end me. But perhaps 
bored by my total silence, the private shift ed his attack back to another 
complaint, that the doctors didn’t care about his illness, and that the doc-
tors did not give him any medicine. Our doctors later stated Private Kim 
did not need any medicine since he was here for a routine observation. 
Two doctors came, but they did not argue with Kim either. His impromptu 
hostage taking continued with his periodic threat to blow up the grenades, 
thus taking the lives of those standing next to him.
I felt completely powerless; I was unable to do anything at all. I had 
no idea how to defuse the explosive, potentially lethal, situation, although 
clearly I was the one who should take a decisive step. Even those military 
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policemen with their helmets and armbands were not able to utter a single 
word. We stood there listening to Kim’s increasingly incoherent rambling, 
while our eyes were all glued to the two grenades.
Against my desperate attempts to contain the potential danger, about 
ten soldiers from the engineering company of the Logistics Battalion 
walked in and joined the hapless congregation, making the potential casu-
alty pool even bigger. Like everybody present, the new men were curious 
about the situation and quickly found that the agitated man was holding 
live grenades.
But one of the men from the engineering company started talking and 
walking toward Kim. “Hey, what in hell are you doing? Are you crazy or 
something,” said this corporal. He sounded more dismayed than fearful. 
Everybody turned their heads to the man, for it was the fi rst time someone 
other than the private uttered words. He looked plain, with no particular 
characteristics. Kim appeared even more startled than his hostages as the 
corporal slowly approached him, seemingly disregarding the grenades.
“You stop there! Th ese grenades have no pins. Don’t you know?” But 
Kim’s threat didn’t do anything to the corporal. It seemed he didn’t care at 
all. “You are even more stupid than I thought. If you want to go, just go by 
yourself. Nobody will stop you. But don’t take all these innocent people.” 
Kim was unable to give a response to the man. In silence, he was blankly 
looking at the man, who stood just a step from him. It was a most aston-
ishing scene. Th e corporal said to him that “You really shouldn’t have done 
this. Let’s go there and get rid of those terrible things. You just follow me 
this way.” Th e corporal led the way and amazingly Private Kim followed 
him, off ering no resistance whatsoever, still holding his two live grenades. 
Th ey talked, but we couldn’t hear. Probably we all were too stunned to hear 
anything. It took only several minutes for the two men to reach the beach. 
Soon there were two muffl  ed grenade explosions with spouting water col-
umns in the South China Sea.
Th e hostage situation was fi nally defused without a casualty—but by 
a humble corporal. I, the hospital’s on-the-job combat commander, help-
lessly staged a show of shameful humiliation. Th e incident clearly demon-
strated a plain truth that real courage has nothing to do with either rank 
or level of education. It has everything to do with one’s big, warm heart. 
Needless to say, I had a diffi  cult time in reporting the incident to the com-
manding offi  cer.
Among my various duties, the most dreadful one was related to the 
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Korean soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifi ce on the battlefi eld.6 It was 
a duty I did not even know existed until I assumed the position. As the 
hospital’s property offi  cer, I was in charge of soldiers’ bodies while they 
remained in the hospital morgue awaiting their long journey back to their 
hometown in South Korea.
With profound anguish, many times I performed the duty of sending a 
letter and a package of his belongings to his parents. I still remember their 
most meager possessions: folded and worn letters from home, photos of 
parents and girlfriends, and a few dollars of military notes. It was the most 
sad, painful thing I did in South Vietnam. I even had to process a hand-
some second lieutenant who went to Vietnam on the same ship I was on. 
He was killed by a sniper shot. His medical report showed that he was hit 
on the precise midpoint of his forehead by a Viet Cong.
Th e war that was fought both in the front and in the rear refused to 
exclude anything from its target list. So our base was on the receiving end 
of the enemy’s periodic artillery showers. But shells did spare the hospital 
compound. Even the infamous Tet Off ense somehow avoided off ending 
our Red Cross emblem.7 Had there been a divine intervention? I am not 
sure. But it could have been.
Dr. Walter B. Jung in 2001.
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Chapter 19
“Loggie’s” War
Napalm, Fuel, Bombs, and Sweat
Lt. Col. Terry May told me about 1st Lt. Bill Nelson’s war story and what hap-
pened aft er his Vietnam duty.1 Aft er his discharge, Nelson resumed a teach-
ing career, transitioned into higher education, and along the way earned 
two master’s degrees and a Ph.D. Th en Dr. Nelson served as associate vice 
president at a major metropolitan university and prepared students for their 
future. He believes that the military off ered him substantial education and 
experience, and he still thinks frequently about his tour as a “loggie” in the 
Vietnam War.
Th e Vietnam War has sometimes been described as a logistician’s war. 
Nearly everything consumed by U.S. forces there, from ammunition for the 
war-fi ghters to envelopes for the unit administrative clerks, was at the end of 
incredibly long supply lines stretching back sixteen time zones and ten thou-
sand miles to the United States. Th e ratio of support troops to combat sol-
diers has been estimated as ranging from 6–1 to 12–1.2 Many stories have 
been documented about the war experiences of U.S. veterans who saw com-
bat in Vietnam. Less common, however, are stories from the veterans who 
were part of keeping those supply lines going. Th ese troops—the logisticians—
were responsible, daily, for accomplishing the miracles needed to feed, arm, 
fuel, and otherwise supply as many as a half million-plus service personnel 
stationed in Vietnam at the height of the war. In the informal vernacular of 
the U.S. military, these troops are sometimes referred to by others and them-
selves as “loggies” (log-ees). It is a term of pride and endearment attached, 
even today, to an absolutely pivotal component of the American military 
war-fi ghting infrastructure. Th is is the story of one such Vietnam War loggie. 
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First Lt. William Nelson’s story reveals how the U.S. Army placed extraordi-
nary responsibility on its junior offi  cers, particularly in a combat zone. His 
story also suggests that the ARVN troops lacked combat eff ectiveness, which 
increased the casualties of the American troops, and highlights some diff er-
ences in living conditions between the U.S. Army and Air Force.
1st Lt. William (Bill) Nelson
155th Transportation and Terminal Company, Cam Ranh Bay,
U.S. Army
I’d received my commission as a second lieutenant in 1965 through the 
Army ROTC program at California Polytechnic University, San Louis 
Obispo. Th en I went on an educational delay, taught high school for two 
years in California, and entered active duty in June 1967.
I volunteered for Vietnam duty soon aft er my completing the U.S. 
Army’s Transportation Offi  cers’ Basic Course at Fort Eustis, Virginia. Th at 
twelve-week orientation course on all aspects of the army’s Transporta-
tion Branch was designed to prepare us for platoon-leader duties. But we 
couldn’t have anticipated, then, just how unusual our army future would 
be. Th e reason I volunteered was to get a better assignment. I could have 
gone to Korea for thirteen months and be in charge of a truck company 
without combat pay. However, my assignment offi  cer said, “Or you can be 
in Cam Ranh Bay.” I thought you could get shot in Korea, too. And it’s cold 
there. I told him I thought I’d be better off  in Vietnam. So that’s how I got 
to South Vietnam.
I did have a lot of consternation and concerns. I was married nine 
months before I went, so I was concerned not only for what I was fac-
ing; whether it was going to be a life-threatening situation I was getting 
into; and what the eff ect would be on my wife, because we had just gotten 
married. I knew very little about the enemy forces at the time. Only that 
I guessed they were a serious foe. You could get yourself killed. It was an 
enemy to take seriously, one that could not be trusted. One that could not, 
in many cases, be identifi ed. Th e VC didn’t wear a uniform. How did you 
distinguish between the military and the civilian? Th at was my concern.
On March 19, 1968, I arrived in South Vietnam. My assignment was at 
Cam Ranh Bay, about two hundred miles north of Saigon.3 I was assigned 
on the ammo pier at Cam Ranh Bay as a ship and shore platoon leader on 
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the ammunition pier of the 155th Transportation and Terminal Company. 
I drew a unique job, fi lling a critical and little-known function: Military 
Stevedore Offi  cer, responsible for supervising the off -loading, storing, and 
moving inland of a wide variety of key war-fi ghting material arriving on 
ships and barges at Phan Rang, on the South China Sea coast. Th is included 
ammunition, bombs, napalm, jet fuel, artillery projectiles, small arms, plus 
general cargo and equipment. Th e army places extraordinary responsibil-
ity on its junior offi  cers, particularly in a combat zone. At age twenty-four 
and as a lieutenant, I was commanding a military port facility.
We had a rigorous duty schedule in the intense tropical heat. Our 
soldiers worked awfully hard. I worked with some very good people. We 
worked seven days a week, twelve hours a day, from midnight to noon. 
Th at was one shift . Th e other shift  was noon to midnight. And we rotated 
those every two weeks. Th e reason for that was that it got so hot. When 
you’re down in the hold of a ship, you’ve got steel all around, and when 
you’re moving canisters or bombs, you work awfully hard.
Th ree months later, on July 5, 1968, aft er I was promoted to fi rst lieu-
tenant, I was selected to command the Phan Rang Outport, down the coast 
from Cam Ranh Bay.4 I was there until DEROS [rotation to the States]. Our 
basic mission was to off -load LSTs, LCUs [large, military cargo watercraft ], 
barges; off -load ammunition and general cargo from those vessels, store 
it, and ship it via truck convoy to the Phan Rang Air Force Base, about a 
thirty-minute drive away.5 Part of that [mission] was to accept a ship that 
carried aviation gas and jet fuel.
We had a buoy that accepted that ship; we tied it up to the buoy. We 
didn’t have a port deep enough to bring it in to the barge pier. So, we’d 
go out in a LARC (lighter, amphibious, resupply, cargo; a sixty-three-foot 
wheeled amphibian craft  with a fi ve-ton carrying capacity), tie it up, and 
hook it (large rubber hose) up to a pump on the compound there. And 
then it was pumped on top of the ground, in about a six-inch pipe, to the 
Phan Rang Air Force Base. And that was another big part of our mission.
As Outport Commander, I had main control over a small documen-
tation unit, and then it was a contract operation with Alaska Barge and 
Transport, which later became PAC [Pacifi c Alaska Columbia]. Th ese 
were American civilians. Th ey did most of the off -loading. Th ey techni-
cally worked for me, but obviously there was a contract there, and they 
had a project director. I also had a truck platoon attached to me, out of 
an army compound adjacent to the Phan Rang Air Force Base. Th ey did, 
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indirectly, report to me. Also, we had an infantry company that patrolled 
the perimeter with dogs. I was part of the First Log (Logistical Com-
mand), with my commander at Cam Ranh Bay. I reported directly to that 
commander.
Duty there was also dangerous. Th e Viet Cong frequently mortared 
this important facility. We were always scared that the bombs (in storage 
on the compound) would blow up. Many times the beach was hit, the Out-
port was hit by the VC with some NVA commandos. One day, the VC blew 
up 150 tons of napalm on the beach. And they killed a [U.S.] dog handler 
and his dog during that attack.
Many things would happen there. Either our trucks would get pinned 
down, or the pipeline would be blown [by the Viet Cong, or VC]. Our 
compound was by the beach, and then there was a road, a pipeline follow-
ing the road, and then a banana grove. It was about a quarter to a half-mile 
away. Th e pipeline would be blown two to three times or so a week. Usu-
ally there’s a big fi re by the banana grove when the VC blew the pipeline 
at night. My troops had to run to the pumps, on the other end of the com-
pound, and turn them off  so it [the fi re] would burn itself out. We wouldn’t 
do anything further at night, because they would pin you down with small 
arms fi re. Th ere was no sense in going out at night. So, my soldiers would 
go out in the morning to fi x the pipeline. We never got shot at in the morn-
ing, at least that I can remember. It was always at night. So they went out 
the next morning, to replace two or three lengths of pipe. One day, when 
they got there with their wrenches and big pry bars to fi x that pipe, the VC 
had put a grenade under it. When they moved the pipe, the grenade went 
off  and killed two of them.
Th at truck company I was talking about had deuce-and-a-halfs (two 
and a half-ton trucks), and they had jeeps with machine guns on them. 
Th ey were [operational] twenty-four hours a day. Well, they’d get shot at in 
that doggone banana grove. One night they got pinned down. Th ey called 
back for support. Th e infantry could not leave because they were respon-
sible for the perimeter. Th ey didn’t have a response team. So I got my guys 
together and we were ready to go. When I got to the gate, our own guards 
said, “You can’t go.” Th ey [the guards] reported that the MACV (Military 
Assistance Command, South Vietnam) troops nearby were going. A half 
hour later they were fi nally gone, and (by then) it was all over. Twelve guys 
from the truck company were killed. Going to these and other funeral cer-
emonies was the worst part of my duties in Vietnam.
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I didn’t know why the South Vietnamese troops couldn’t get there 
sooner. It’s either a combination of a lack of training, lack of discipline, or 
lack of commitment. I don’t honestly know. A lot of that would have had 
to do with their MACV advisers, their U.S. advisers, and how they saw 
the South Vietnamese (soldiers) that they were managing and directing. A 
couple of times I experienced their military action. It showed they didn’t 
come through. I’m sure that they did some good things, but I can’t point 
to that because I didn’t have the opportunity to observe it. So, in some 
ways what I just said is a little contradictory to what I observed in them as 
individuals. Because, if you’re hard working and you’re committed to what 
you’re doing, that ought to transfer over to the military. Maybe it did, and 
maybe I just didn’t see it.
All I know is, we were hit that night, and we needed to respond because 
the VC hit the pipeline. Not only that, they hit the convoy, and we had to 
go out and help. Th ey [the South Vietnamese military] were supposed to 
do it, and a half hour later they were on the way. And they were just next 
door, just a couple hundred yards away, and it took them a half an hour to 
get organized to go do it.
Th e enemy was not always the only threat, however. Tropical storms 
could be devastating. One time we had a typhoon. I attended one of the 
intelligence briefi ngs at the [Phan Rang] air base. Th ey said, “You got to 
move. Th e surf is going to get so high you’ll be fl ooded out.” I came back 
and told everybody. And I said, “No way could we move. We can’t leave 
all these bombs and napalm sitting here.” So we decided to stay. Luckily, 
the typhoon got downgraded to a tropical storm. It destroyed part of our 
barge pier. What really hurt us was that the storm took out the road to the 
air base. Th at was the only direct route to the base. So I fi gured out another 
route, through this little village, then through Phan Rang and into the base. 
We had to be able to keep moving our stuff  (bombs, etc., to the airbase). So 
we put the bombs on the trucks to go that way.
Th en I get this doggone MACV major who calls me down on the beach, 
and he said, “You can’t do that.” “Why? Who’s gonna stop me?” And he told 
me that “the Province Chief is gonna stop you. He’s already complaining. 
He’s like the mayor of Phan Rang and he doesn’t like these bombs coming 
through his town.” So what I had to do from that time on, until the road 
was fi xed, was to move general cargo that wouldn’t blow up.
Th e life at the air force base seemed diff erent. Th ey had an offi  cers’ club 
at Cam Ranh Bay, entertainers’ visits, and many other fun things. I don’t 
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know whether to call it respect or envy, about how the air force lived. Th ey 
lived pretty well.
Another most vivid memory from my service in Vietnam comes from 
the middle of a November 1968 night. A barge loaded with fi ve hundred 
tons of napalm broke loose from its mooring buoy and drift ed some two-
plus miles down the shoreline into unfriendly territory. I got a call from 
the PAC project director, and he said, “We got a problem. We got a barge 
that’s gone adrift .” What had happened was that in the process of switching 
barges at the barge pier, with a tugboat, one of the barges, full of napalm, 
got loose. By the time that they found they could not get it back—they’d 
already been playing around with that barge for a couple hours trying to 
get it back—so here about midnight I got this call, “Can we get the LARC 
and go out and see what we can do?”
So we did. It was way down the beach, eight or ten miles down the 
beach. It was stuck up on the sand. We got pretty close to it and could see 
that there were possibly unfriendlies up on the barge. Well, the problem 
was a barge full of napalm, maybe fi ve hundred tons. We went back to 
get ropes and weapons. When we got back, some Vietnamese people were 
moving or stealing stuff  off  the barge. When they saw us, they ran away. 
I don’t know if they were the VC, or maybe just some local people get-
ting some plywood. Th ey stole some nose cones, but they did not steal any 
napalm. We were able to retrieve everything that was explosive. We didn’t 
know if we could pull the barge off  the sandbar. So we hooked up the barge 
to the LARC, turned it around and got it [the line] taut and cranked it [the 
engine] up and pulled that doggone barge off  the beach. We pulled it far 
enough so that the tug could get up close and get on to it.
I guess the important thing is that, fi rst of all, if we had lost that darned 
barge that would’ve been terrible. But if they would have got that napalm, 
what could they have done with all that napalm? But still, we were able to 
keep it out of the hands of the enemy. I guess that has to be real important. 
We received a commendation from the PAC for that.
I was pretty lucky, not wounded and not hurt. I was treated well. I had 
the opportunity to fulfi ll a position that really was for a captain, and I was a 
fi rst lieutenant. So I had the opportunity to do some things in the military 
that I would never have had the opportunity to do in a similar position in 
civilian life. Th e kind of responsibility I had, on my own. I was cultivated 
to stay in when a colonel, Colonel McQuinn, came down from Cam Ranh 
and spent the day with me; a nice guy and everything, trying to talk me 
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into staying in. Th e fact that he came down and spent a full day with me 
was pretty darned important to me. Even though I was the Outport Com-
mander, I was still just a fi rst lieutenant. I did not stay because my objective 
was to become a teacher, and I had volunteered for fi ve months aft er we 
were married to go to Vietnam.
I got back from Vietnam on March 13, 1969. I processed out at Fort 
Lewis, Washington. Th e fi rst thing I did aft er I went through the process-
ing was calling my wife and said, “I’m out of the service. I’ll be on whatever 
the next plane is.” My wife, my mother, and my brother came to the airport 
when I arrived. It was really great. I wore my uniform to Los Angeles.
To appreciate what you have was the biggest lesson. What my wife and 
I had before I went, and what she and I have had since. And, the fact that 
you can always go an extra mile, and always do more than you think you 
can. I probably think that way because even though I had a good deal [in 
Vietnam], it was twenty-four hours a day.
I’m very proud of my service in Vietnam.6 I think what I was able to do 
provided a great benefi t to the recipient of my responsibilities. I feel quite 
good about that. We were very important in terms of providing munitions 
to the air force and the army. I had a satisfaction of getting things done. 
I felt a concern for safety. I felt frustration in trying to deal with political 
realities. I had an emotional longing for home: my wife, my mother, and 
my brother. And I felt a strong tie with the men who reported to me. We 
depended on each other. And that was very important to me. I remember 
my wife said, “You sure talk about your men a lot.” I was better attuned 
to that culture in Vietnam than I was Stateside. Th at allowed me to func-
tion better, I think, in that situation than a comparable situation in the 
States. Th at has to do with leadership style, and that’s still my leadership 
style today. Th at was one of the factors that caused me to decide to get out 
of the army when I got back. Th at probably drove my decision, a lot.
Take advantage of everything you can. Th ere’s a great deal that the mil-
itary has to off er, from education to experience, the whole bit. Just take it 
seriously and make it a good experience. And it is an honorable experi-
ence. I was in the service slightly less than two years, and it had such an 
important impact on my whole life.
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Chapter 20
Support and Survival in Th ailand
M.Sgt. David Graves served in the U.S. Air Force during the Vietnam War. 
He told me that his motive for enlisting and serving in the military can be 
described by one word: honor. He had to join the services because of personal 
honor and his family heritage of service to this great nation. He showed me 
records of both of his great-great grandfathers’ service in the U.S. Civil War. 
His father fought in World War II in the Pacifi c, and his uncle fought in the 
Korean War. He believed that it was just his turn to go.
Master Sergeant Graves tells his story about the U.S. Air Force support 
and assistance in Th ailand.1 During the Vietnam War, the U.S. armed forces 
had a large number of support troops in Southeast Asia and off shore to assist 
the war eff ort in Vietnam. In 1968, about 100,000 men in the surrounding 
countries supported U.S. operations, including Th ailand, the Philippines, Tai-
wan, Guam, and Okinawa, Japan. Little has been written about the men and 
women who served as support troops in these countries and areas.
M.Sgt. David Graves
Ninety-fi ft h Squadron, U Tapao Air Base, Th ailand, U.S. Air Force
I actually began my military career in the U.S. Navy Reserve. Th ere were 
about eighty of us who joined the reserves in our high school senior year. I 
went to boot camp in the summer of 1961 in San Diego, California, straight 
out of high school, for thirteen weeks. Some of us stayed in the reserves, 
some went into the navy, and I went to college for one semester. For the 
fi rst part of my college experience, I remained very attentive and made 
the Dean’s Honor Roll. Before the start of the second semester, however, I 
enlisted in the U.S. Air Force.
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It had always been my dream to be in the air force, and I took my boot 
camp in February 1962 at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas for fi ve weeks. 
I then continued my training at Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi for 
technical school and what they called phase two basic training. By this 
time, my papers from the navy caught up with me and showed I’d already 
had thirteen weeks of basic training and fi ve weeks in the air force, for a 
total of eighteen weeks of basic training. So I took this information to the 
fi rst sergeant and asked him if I needed any more basic training. He agreed 
that I didn’t, so I did not have to go through phase two of basic training. I 
was only required to be put through technical school, where I trained in 
light ground radio, including facsimile machines, single sideband ground/
air stations, and man-portable equipment. I trained to perform service and 
repair on all kinds of ground communications equipment.
Out of technical school, I was assigned to the air force security service, 
which is still a sensitive subject that I’m not supposed to discuss much. 
When coming back to the U.S., I was stationed at Scott Air Force Base in 
Belleville, Illinois, for two and a half years in the communications fi eld.
In the fall of 1965, the U.S. was becoming more involved in the war in 
Vietnam, and my enlistment was due to expire in February 1966. I had a 
gut check that required me to choose whether I was going to be a civilian 
or if it was really my turn to serve my country in a more direct manner 
than what I’d ever considered before. Th e last day in September 1965, I 
took a reenlistment in the air force specifying that I wanted to go to Viet-
nam. Th is is simply where I felt I was needed. Vietnam was where I needed 
to go. It turns out that instead of being assigned directly to Vietnam, for 
whatever reason, I was sent to Th ailand aft er I received training in Okla-
homa City, Oklahoma, with the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] at 
Will Rogers Field. I was part of a project that was joint Air Force and FAA, 
named project MAT 322. Th is project was responsible for installing FAA 
civilian control towers in Southeast Asia. Whenever a tower was ready to 
be put together overseas, the project team came together to complete the 
tasks.
I went to Th ailand, arriving at Bangkok in May 1966. My squadron 
was not located at my base at U Tapao, Th ailand, close to Sadehip, because 
it was still under construction.2 I thought I’d get several days in Bangkok, 
which was a beautiful city. But instead the colonel said that the fi rst mobile 
COM out of Clark Field to the Philippines would include my base. We 
were sent to install original communications on the air base. I was one of 
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the fi rst hundred people at U Tapao, an airfi eld that became operational for 
KC-135s and B-52s by February 1967.
An interesting story I came across during my squadron’s mission 
included one Th ai boy. We laid a lot of landlines and cut a lot of ends off  
of a lot of wire, sometimes a thread and sometimes three to six inches of 
wire. Consequently, we’d have a lot of scavengers that would come around 
where we’d dump our refuse each day. I remember one boy, who was prob-
ably around thirteen years old and had a peg leg, like Long John Silver. 
I wondered about this kid. You can’t imagine a family of six on a Honda 
50cc machine, but I guarantee you the Th ais could get by real well on one. 
Th ey’d strip the insulation off  of this copper wire and sell it by the pound 
to the dealers in copperware, and that’s how they made their existence. Th e 
fi rst newspaper that came out at our air base (actually it was just a mimeo-
graphed sheet), there was a story about this young man. He’d been working 
the rice paddies with his dad one day, and a banded krate, one of the dead-
liest snakes in the world, bit him on the leg. His dad proceeded to take his 
machete and immediately removed his leg above the knee, which saved the 
boy’s life. Krates are one of the most aggressive of all the pit vipers, and we 
had several pit vipers to look out for in Th ailand.
I was totally a support troop, and yet there were tens of thousands of 
us in Th ailand that supported the war in a direct manner by supporting the 
aircraft  and tankers that took care of North Vietnam. Our stories may not 
be as exciting as the combat veterans’, and I certainly admire them above 
anybody, but I have come to realize that we did play a very important role 
in the war.
One of the worst memories I have of my service involved a fi rst ser-
geant. He was truly a gentleman, nice and knowledgeable, and very well 
liked and respected by those around him. We all got called together one 
morning and were told that our fi rst sergeant checked himself into a room 
in Sadehip, which was the nearby town, took a government-issued .45, and 
killed himself. Th e informers wouldn’t give us any details and wouldn’t go 
any further about the suicide, but that event will continue to stick out in 
my mind.
I found the Th ai people to be very energetic, very outgoing. Th e Th ais 
actually built the base at U Tapao. Th ere was a Th ai captain who was the 
head engineer. I got to know him very well and respected him a lot. Th e 
man was a genius at what he did. On the other side, I remember a book 
written about the Americans before we became really involved in Vietnam 
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called Th e Ugly American. It was written about an American who went 
into Th ailand and believed that he was a little better than the people that 
lived there and that the Th ais were second-class people, someone to push 
around, someone to talk ugly to. We never learned their language, and as 
far as I know, there were very few Americans that really could speak fl uent 
Th ai, and still are as far as I know. At the time I could speak a little Th ai, but 
I wasn’t in Th ailand long enough to learn anything about their language.
For me, I was fortunate enough to make a career out of what I learned 
in the military.3 I worked with communications and electronics work the 
entire time I was in the air force. I worked either in communications or 
electronic countermeasures, which was very interesting. When I got out 
M.Sgt. David Graves in 2004.
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of the air force, I got hired at Tinker Air Force Base in the test equipment 
lab and worked there until the FAA hired me back. Th e lesson I learned 
was that, if possible, try to learn a good trade while serving in the military 
because it can benefi t you your whole life. I really liked the way my service 
turned out, because I was able to use my service time to benefi t myself as 
well as my country. I was fortunate because when I came home in 1967, 
all of the big antiwar protests were not in full swing yet. I saw some people 
with signs, but they basically didn’t bother me and I didn’t bother them. But 
I didn’t care what they thought anyway, I would have done what I thought 
was best anyway and it didn’t matter what somebody else thought. Free-
dom is not free. It is very expensive. Somebody had to die for us to be here 
today, a lot of somebodies.
Th is page intentionally left  blank.
Chapter 21
Th ree Great Escapes
Many Americans came to believe that the RVN government suff ered from 
corruption, factionalism, personal connection and loyalty, and mismanage-
ment in the 1960s. At the local levels, including both province and township, 
the governments had similar (if not worse) problems. Mr. Nguyen Vung, a 
former army offi  cer, describes how bribery, kickbacks, and illegal deals took 
place in the provincial government and why so many offi  cials were involved 
in these scandals and corruption.1
Vung believed that there was a tripod of power—Americans, RVN gov-
ernment, and ARVN, tied together by the American cold war policies and 
commitment to the Vietnam War. In this triangle relationship, even though 
U.S. aid and involvement played the most important role, Americans needed 
a coalition that included the South Vietnamese government and military 
working together to win the war. Under American supervision, a military-
government bureaucracy was established. It sought to use political power and 
mutual interests to avoid the South’s collapse and Communist penetration. 
Th us, personal networks and loyalty were very important to maintain the 
system. As a result, corruption seemed inevitable since individuals in the gov-
ernment worked for their boss, not the Vietnamese people or the public. Th ey 
also intended to profi t from their service in exchange for supporting the sys-
tem. Mr. Vung tried to stay away from the problems and maintain a moral 
standard for himself.
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Nguyen Vung
Chief, Construction Project, Traffi  c and Transportation Department, 
Gih Dinh Provincial Government (South Vietnam)
On September 10, 1933, I was born in an educated family in Hanoi. My 
father, Nguyen Khang, graduated in 1927 from the University of Paris, 
France, with a bachelor’s degree in Economics. He could speak French, 
Spanish, Vietnamese, and Chinese languages. Aft er his return in 1931, he 
worked as the chief of the Taxation Department in the Northern Colo-
nial Administration of the French Indochinese Union.2 He supported the 
French government and its colonial policy. Aft er the Japanese occupied 
Vietnam in 1942, my father quit his job and opened a small shop selling 
ceramic products in Hanoi. I had one younger brother. Our parents com-
bined modern Western and traditional Vietnamese cultures together. We 
followed my parents, and everybody listened to my father. He taught us 
traditional calligraphy, Asian classics, Christianity, and French literature. I 
remember his saying, “Family fi rst, to keep family in your heart.”
Aft er the Pacifi c war suddenly ended in August 1945, the Viet Minh 
took over Hanoi and established a Communist regime in the North. My 
father closed down his shop, because the Communist revolution targeted 
the wealthy people and business owners in the city. Hanoi was in turmoil 
of both radical revolution and social disorders.
In 1946, the French came back to Vietnam and retook Hanoi. Th ey 
off ered my father the same job as he had for the colonial government 
before World War II. My father declined their job off er. He realized that 
a large number of the Viet Minh stayed in Hanoi as underground Com-
munist agents aft er the French takeover of the city. Th e returning French 
government had no control of the people and society, nor protection of its 
employees.
Th e Viet Minh organized anti-French movements and received popu-
lar support. Th e Communist agents assassinated many pro-French Viet-
namese, even their family members. Th ese collaborators either had worked 
or cooperated with the French government. Hanoi actually became a bat-
tleground, with the French control in daytime and the Communists at 
night. A lot of violence occurred at night in the city, such as robbery, rape, 
and murder. My father did not want to work for the French government 
because he wanted to protect his family.
My parents told me to stay at home aft er six o’clock in the evening. My 
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father said to us so many times that “You could get killed if you stay out-
side aft er the sun goes down.” Aft er he reopened the ceramic shop in early 
1947, his shop was robbed three times at night from February to August 
that year. I and my younger brother survived our middle and high schools 
during these turmoil years. Th en I went to the University of Hanoi in 1950. 
I graduated in the summer of 1954 and received my bachelor degree in 
architecture engineering.
On September 8, 1953, my uncle, Nguyen Dong, a Catholic priest, 
was killed by a gunman on his way back from his church aft er a night of 
Bible study. Th e whole family was shocked by my uncle’s death. My father 
believed that it was a planned assassination and a Communist terrorist act 
against pro-French Catholic churches. Although my father loved Hanoi, he 
decided to move to the South for the family’s safety.
In March 1954, my father closed the store and moved the family from 
Hanoi to Hai Phong as the fi rst step to leave the North. In May, they con-
tinued the southward journey by boat from Hai Phong to Saigon. Th en our 
family settled in Hoa Hung.3 I came down to the South in the summer aft er 
my graduation from the University of Hanoi. Th at was the fi rst escape by 
my family from the Communist-controlled North.
Aft er the Geneva Conference in the summer, the Communists con-
trolled North Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam was founded in the 
South. In the fall, a new Southern Republican Vietnamese government was 
founded in Saigon. My father worked in the Planning Department, Gih 
Dinh Province, Republic of Vietnam, from 1954 to 1965.4
At that time, the ROV government began to draft  all the youth for mil-
itary service. I joined the ARVN as an engineering offi  cer. From 1955 to 
1957, I worked for the army’s defense work at the Long Binh Airport.5 I got 
married in 1956 and moved to Th u Duc, Gih Dinh Province [present-day’s 
Ho Chi Minh City].6 I found an offi  ce job in the provincial government 
while I still served as an army reserve offi  cer.
From 1957 to 1973, I worked at the Transportation Department as the 
chief of construction projects. I was involved in many projects, including 
many building auctions, project bidding, and construction contracts. Many 
contractors and companies tried to get one of these government construc-
tion deals. In order to get their contracts, many of them brought gift s to 
my home, or off ered cash to my family. With my father as my role model, 
I didn’t accept any bribery or personal favor. I didn’t like corruption. I told 
them that I had a salary, and I worked for the government. I said to every-
208 Logistics Support
body, “If I can help, I will. It depends on the fairness and project, not per-
sonal relations or kickbacks.” My father saw what I was doing. He was very 
proud of me. I was not just following his steps, but also setting up the good 
example for my own kids. My fi rst daughter was born in 1957.
But the corruption as a common practice had been part of the govern-
mental system. Many of my colleagues believed that they were underpaid, 
and that they didn’t have any retirement or any future since the war didn’t 
go very well in the 1960s. Th eir only hope was to save some money to buy 
a passport and a foreign visa, in order to send their family members over-
seas. Th en they could leave Vietnam and join their family later in case the 
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South lost the war. I saw my offi  cemates making under-table deals, playing 
personal favors, signing illegal contracts, stealing the construction materi-
als, and even transferring government funds to private accounts.
I understood why some of them had to do this. Th ey got their jobs in 
the government through some kind of personal connection. When they 
were in the offi  ce, they needed to return the favor to those, usually a higher 
ranking offi  cial, who had helped them get the appointment. Th ey were will-
ing to be used as somebody’s tool to serve other people’s interests in order 
to keep the job. Some had spent a fortune for the lucrative job. Aft er in the 
offi  ce, they rushed to cash in to get their money back. It was a corrupted 
system, in which the government offi  ces served personal interests, rather 
than the nation’s or its people’s interests. It was based upon bureaucratic-
military cooperation through personal networks and loyalty. It became 
worse aft er Pres. Ngo Dinh Diem was assassinated with his brother in a 
military coup in 1963.7
Aft er 1965, we were very busy because many new construction proj-
ects were coming. Th en the government corruption continued and reached 
its high level. Th ey made the illegal deals right on the table, not under it 
like they had done before. Th ey brought the large amount of cash to the 
offi  ce, not to the home as they did before. My colleagues didn’t cancel what 
they were doing. Th ey didn’t pretend anymore. Th ey even worked together. 
Aft er work, they usually went together to the restaurants, bars, and hotels, 
having parties, ballroom dancing, and an escort service paid by their con-
tractors. Th ere was no more professionalism, not even any moral or ethical 
value in our offi  ce in the 1960s.
I knew I couldn’t stop it, but I didn’t want to be part of it. Th ey always 
asked me to go out with them. I always said no. Th ey felt embarrassed and 
became uneasy with me. Th ey didn’t understand that, educated and ideal-
istic, I was still working or fi ghting for a just society. If we were not better 
than the Communists, what were we fi ghting for? Some thought I was stu-
pid, and others considered I was a threat to what they had been doing.
In order to avoid any unnecessary problem in our working place rela-
tions, I enrolled in a MBA degree program at Phu Th o University. Th e 
program off ered evening classes in management and administration. My 
offi  cemates didn’t understand why I needed to go to school every evening 
aft er work during the wartime. I just didn’t want to be involved in their 
activities, not see their problems without saying anything. Two years later, 
I got my MBA degree from Phu Th o University. My father was so proud of 
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me. He knew that it didn’t matter what happened around me or in the war, 
I was still his son, the honest, hard-working person. My father died of can-
cer in 1966. I never forgot what he said to me, “Family fi rst and keep your 
family in your heart.”
Aft er the American government withdrew its troops from South Viet-
nam in 1973, the war situation was getting worse every day. So was the 
working condition in our offi  ce. More people tried to make money, or 
make a living, out of this war. I really had enough of the corruption and 
bureaucracy in the government. I resigned from my position in 1973.
Th rough a friend’s recommendation, I got a teaching job at Phu Th o 
University. I taught architecture, building design and construction, and 
some other classes as a university instructor. Even though this job didn’t pay 
that much, it became the best two years in my entire professional career. At 
least I could fi nd some fresh air in the polluted world where the war, poli-
tics, and corruption worked together. I could enjoy the academic freedom 
without worrying about the bureaucratic red tape or political accusation.
My teaching career, however, didn’t last long. On April 30, 1975, the 
Communist forces took over the capital city, and the ROV president issued 
his orders to all the ARVN troops to lay down their weapons and surrender 
to the NVA and PLAF at their locations. At fi rst I believed that I was lucky 
to have quit the government job before the fall of Saigon. I might not have 
to go to jail for my service since I had retired.
Th e Communist government, however, announced that all the mili-
tary personnel, government offi  cials, and those who had cooperated with 
the Americans had to do their time in prison. Soon I was arrested and sent 
to jail. But I was still lucky to stay in prison for only two years, instead of 
fi ve to seven years, since I had retired from the active service in the army.
While I suff ered a lot in jail, my wife and children encountered hard-
ships. Aft er I was arrested, my house and properties in Hoa Hung were 
seized by the Communist government. My wife had to take our children 
to live with one of her relatives. My elder daughter and son were expelled 
from their universities because their father had served in the enemy forces 
and government. Th ey joined my wife, working as manual laborers to sup-
port the family.
I was released from the jail in June 1977. Aft er my release, I talked to 
my wife about our family future. It became apparent that there was not 
much left  for us in this country under the Communist authorities. As a 
former enemy offi  cial, there was no trust, no good job, but a “bad profi le” 
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for me for the rest of my life. My problems would have a negative impact 
on my kids as well. Th ey didn’t have much future either. We needed to leave 
Vietnam.
Th rough a friend’s connection, I found a boat owner who was will-
ing to sail refugees out of the country. We had to pay him up front three 
ounces of gold for each person to get on his boat. We sold everything and 
put together only nine ounces of gold, enough for three persons. Who was 
leaving Vietnam fi rst? It was a painful but realistic decision. We decided 
that I would take my eldest son and eldest daughter with me. Th ey might 
be old enough to survive out of the country. My wife stayed in Vietnam 
with the other fi ve kids.
In December 1977, I took two children with me, leaving our home. 
We got on a small fi shing boat at the beach with three hundred people. It 
was very crowded with men, women, and kids, seated against each other 
like sardines in a can. Th e boat owner warned us that there was no talk, no 
move, and no baby cry. Escaping from the country was illegal. If the Com-
munist patrol gunboat found us, they would open fi re and kill us all in the 
sea. Nervous and quiet, we didn’t say anything while the boat left  the beach 
and sailed into the ocean in the middle of the night. Th is was my second 
escape from Communist-controlled Vietnam.
At dawn, we were told that we had left  the territorial waters of Vietnam 
and that we were in the international waters now. Everybody was so happy, 
hugging each other and laughing loudly, as if we had gotten our freedom. 
It was actually not yet.
All the boat owner did was to take the refugees to the international 
waters [high sea, outside of the twelve-mile territorial waters of Vietnam]. 
Th en, we, the “boat people,” just waited there. We had to wait for an inter-
national cargo ship to come to our rescue. According to international navi-
gation law, all the ships should rescue the wrecked boat and the people on 
board. Hopefully, the rescue ship would take us to a free country.
We waited for one day. Th e weather was nice, and the South China Sea 
was quiet. I checked on my kids, who were in as good a spirits as the others. 
Day two, some little babies became sick due to the hot weather and cried 
a lot. Day three, some of the boat people were running out of food and 
water. Th ey begged others to help their small kids. Nobody wanted to help 
because they didn’t know how long we had to wait in the ocean. I off ered 
a little help. I could tell from their eyes that my children didn’t blame me 
for giving away our own water and food. Instead they were proud of me. 
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It proved later that I was wrong. Days four and fi ve, there was no ship 
showing up at all. Th e people became impatient and worried. Some women 
became crazy when their babies were very sick. Th ey wanted to return, but 
the others insisted to wait. Th e boat owner said that we would sail back to 
Vietnam on the seventh day, if there was no ship or rain.
Th e sixth day was the worst day for all the boat people. We had no more 
food and, more importantly, no water. I worried about my daughter, since 
she had the fever for days. Th e medicine we took with us didn’t work at all. 
She just needed some water, which we didn’t have. One woman passed out 
when her sick baby died. Th ey just wrapped the body in some newspapers 
and threw her into the ocean. More kids were sick. Some adults were sick, 
too. Some guys started a fi ght over a bottle of water. One of them was cut 
badly by a knife. Again, there was again no ship or rain.
“A ship, a ship!” I was awaked by cheers early on the morning of the 
seventh day. It was a cargo ship! It was so big, beautiful, and coming our 
way. Th e boat owner launched an emergency signal. Everybody shouted 
and waved, with tears in many people’s eyes. I held my daughter up and let 
her share this moment. She smiled without saying any word.
While the ship was getting closer, the cheers suddenly came to a stop. 
Th e enthusiasm was freezing down to a chill. We saw the Soviet fl ag on the 
top of the ship! It was a Soviet ship. Th e Soviet Union, as a Communist 
country, had supported the Vietnamese Communist government during 
and aft er the war. “Are they fi ring on us?” my son asked me quietly when 
the ship approached our boat. It was worse. Th e Soviet captain sent his 
sailor/soldiers to our boat and took all of us back to Vietnam.
We were back in Vietnam! Nevertheless, although fl eeing the country 
was a crime according to the Communist government, it was during its 
second year of reconstruction, when it didn’t have facilities or manpower 
to contain the boat people like they would do later aft er 1978. We left  the 
harbor and accepted the boat owner’s off er, that he would make a second 
try without additional charge.
Most of us were back on his boat for the second time. Some didn’t 
make it. We brought with us a lot of food and water this time. On the third 
day of our second sail, a container ship from Panama rescued us and took 
us to Malaya [now Malaysia]. We were so lucky since we saw and heard a 
lot of “boat people” died in the storms, were robbed or raped by pirates, 
or committed suicide in the oceans. Th ey never had a chance to reach the 
land of freedom.
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Th e Malayan government had set up several refugee camps on three 
islands since a large number of Vietnamese boat people were arriving daily. 
Th e Malayan offi  cials worked with the U.S. refugee agents in the camps. 
We were registered, had physical checkups, and also fi lled out the applica-
tions for humanitarian organization programs sponsored by the U.S. gov-
ernment to help the South Vietnamese prisoners of war.
In 1978, my application was approved by the U.S. government, and I 
came to the United States of America. My third escape was a happy journey 
with my two kids to the United States. We settled in California. To support 
my kids, I worked a full-time job in an electrical company and a part-time 
job in the evenings and weekends. I also tried to improve my English by 
going to a Catholic church language school for immigrants. In 1982, my 
son fi nally graduated from a college in California. I was so glad that I could 
bring to my children a better life. But I still worried about my wife and 
other fi ve kids in Vietnam. In 1997, I eventually made a trip back to see my 
wife and other children. Th ey have been always in my heart.8
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Chapter 22
Chinese Railroad Engineering 
Operations
Col. Hou Zhenlu and his regiment had been busy working in Vietnam for 
fi ve years, from 1965 to 1970, as China’s railroad engineering troops. Th ey 
fought hard to keep rail transportation moving as Beijing supplied Hanoi 
throughout the Vietnam War. From 1965 to 1973, China shipped to Vietnam 
1.86 million small arms, 60,000 artillery pieces, 16 million artillery shells, 
1.1 billion rounds of ammunition, 15,000 vehicles, 552 tanks, 320 armored 
vehicles, 155 airplanes, 148 naval vessels, 180 surface-to-air missiles, and 
many other weapons and pieces of equipment, including communication 
and command equipment, medical instruments, missile radars and launch-
ers, engineering equipment, and repair and rebuilding facilities. All of these 
weapons and equipment could arm 2 million men.1 China also took care of 
most of the NVA’s logistics, including food, clothing, fuel, and many other sup-
plies. According to one of the agreements signed by the NVA and the PLA, for 
example, the Chinese would provide each Vietnamese soldier 800 grams of 
rice, 80 grams of meat, 30 grams of fi sh, and other food items every day. Th e 
Chinese also agreed to provide three sets of uniforms and three pairs of shoes 
for each Vietnamese soldier every year. Th e estimated value of the Chinese 
aid during these years was about $5 billion.
During the U.S. Operation Rolling Th under, a massive bombing cam-
paign against North Vietnam, railroads were the primary targets for U.S. 
air strikes. As the American attacks intensifi ed, they cut major rail lines and 
made Hanoi desperate for help. According to Chinese intelligence, U.S. air 
raids paralyzed the fi ve main railroads in North Vietnam, totaling 1,100 kilo-
meters. Rail shipping totaled only one hundred tons a day in April 1965, 
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much less than the minimum of three thousand tons a day needed for North 
Vietnam. Th e Chinese report suggested building three new east-west railway 
lines linking the two major north-south railroads; moving the train stations 
out of the cities, where they were vulnerable to U.S. air strikes; and replac-
ing all the outdated Vietnamese rails with new standard rails. Without these 
urgent improvements, the report warned, the existing Vietnamese railroads 
would not be able to deliver Chinese and Soviet military aid to the front 
lines.2
Upon Ho Chi Minh’s request in May 1965, Mao Zedong agreed to send 
the Chinese railroad engineering troops to North Vietnam to keep the rail-
ways open. On June 9, 1965, the First Division of the Chinese railroad engi-
neering troops began to enter North Vietnam, and numbered 30,000 men 
by July. As a regiment commander in the First Division, Colonel Hou’s story 
explains the plans and operations of the Chinese troops, their problems, and 
their learning experience in China’s longest foreign war.3
Col. Hou Zhenlu
Sixtieth Regiment, First Railroad Engineering Division,
Railroad Engineering Corps, PLA (China)
I was born in 1925 in Shandong Province, China, and joined the Chinese 
Communist army during World War II. Fighting against Japan’s occupa-
tion, I served as a private and later as a sergeant in the PLA. In the Chi-
nese Civil War of 1946–1949, I became a lieutenant and participated in the 
Shanghai off ensive campaign in the spring of 1949. When China sent its 
troops to the Korean War, my unit, the 174th Regiment, Fift y-eighth Divi-
sion, Twentieth Army, Ninth Army Corps, was part of the second wave, 
which entered Korea in November 1950, fi ghting against the UN/U.S. 
forces. Later that month, we engaged with the U.S. First Marine Division 
at the Chosin Reservoir, one of the bloodiest battles in the Korean War. 
In 1952, I was promoted to captain. When we returned back to China in 
1953, the PLA high command told us that we had won the Korean War, 
and taught America a hard lesson. Th ey won’t bother China anymore. We 
won’t have to fi ght another war against America. I never thought, nobody 
did, that China would fi ght America again in the Vietnam War twelve years 
later.
In 1958, when the PLA established the Railroad Engineering Corps, I 
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was transferred to the PLA-REC and promoted to major. My battalion as a 
railroad construction unit participated in the construction of the railways 
in 1959–1962, preparing a cross-strait campaign against Taiwan and other 
enemy-held off shore islands. In 1963, however, we began to receive infor-
mation on the war situation in Vietnam. In 1964, we heard some rumors 
that China might send its troops to Vietnam to support the Vietnamese 
Communists fi ghting American forces.
It became offi  cial in early 1965 when the PLA high command started 
its mobilization of the troops for the Vietnam War. On April 17, the CCP 
Central Military Commission [CMC] issued the orders to establish the 
“Chinese Volunteer Forces for Aiding Vietnam and Resisting America.” 
Following the CMC orders, the General Staff  established three forces of the 
Chinese Volunteer Forces the next day.4 Among the others was the “Chi-
nese People’s Volunteer Engineering Force” [CPVEF], including the PLA’s 
railway engineering, civil engineering, and communication troops. Th e 
CPVEF had fi ve divisions, with the railway engineering troops as the First 
Division.5
Having selected the best engineering units from eleven railway engi-
neering divisions in the PLA Railway Engineering Corps, the First Divi-
sion included eight railway engineering regiments, one railway prospecting 
team, and a dozen antiaircraft  artillery battalions, about 30,000 troops,6 
with Gen. Long Guilin as the commander, Guo Yenlin the political com-
missar, and Li Qingde the deputy commissar. My battalion was part of the 
selected troops in the First Division. Our main tasks were to construct and 
improve the railways, train stations, bridges, and tunnels in North Viet-
nam; build warehouses, telephone lines, underwater cables, and commu-
nication centers for the NVA commands; construct antiaircraft  defense, 
antifl ood works, and commanding headquarters for the NVA troops; pro-
tect them from U.S. bombing; and repair them in case of any damage to 
guarantee railway transportation and communication between China and 
Vietnam.7
On April 27, the Chinese government signed the fi rst agreement with 
the North Vietnamese delegation in Beijing regarding the dispatch of Chi-
nese troops to Vietnam to construct new railways and repair railroads 
north of Hanoi. According to this agreement, China would also supply 
Vietnam with transportation equipment and all the construction materials 
needed for railway building and repairs. Th ereaft er, more agreements fol-
lowed, including one hundred projects for new railways, train stations, and 
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distribution centers construction and reconstruction. In total, the Chinese 
would maintain 554 out of 1,100 kilometers, almost one-half of the rail-
ways in North Vietnam.8
From June 23, 1965, the CPVEF’s First Division, about 30,000 troops 
in two groups, began to cross the borders from Youyiguan in the east and 
Hekou in the west. Youyiguan is a Chinese border city in Guangxi Prov-
ince, about 180 kilometers from Hanoi. Aft er entering Vietnam, our group 
in the east traveled south along the Youyiguan-Hanoi line. Th e western 
group traveled south along the Lao Cai-Hanoi line. Lao Cai is a Vietnam-
ese city in Bao Th ang, across the border from Hekou, Yunnan Province, 
about 230 kilometers to Hanoi. Both deployed their troops along the two 
major rail lines and began their reconstruction and repair works in North 
Vietnam.
We were regular Chinese troops as engineering units, but not wearing 
PLA uniforms. We wore blue worker uniforms with no Chinese badges 
during the mission in Vietnam. By March 1966, China had dispatched 
130,000 troops to Vietnam.9 Later, the CPVEF became part of the “Chinese 
Supporting Forces” [CSF], which included all of the Chinese railway engi-
neering, civil engineering, antiaircraft  artillery, and logistics divisions in 
Vietnam. Unlike the artillery divisions, which were rotated back to China 
aft er twelve to eighteen months in Vietnam, our railway engineering divi-
sion stayed for fi ve years, until June 1970.
Continuous U.S. air raids remained our major issue. Th e division com-
mand categorized the U.S. air strikes into three diff erent phases. Th e fi rst 
phase that began in July 1965 and lasted until June 1966 became known 
as “intermittent bombing.” Th e U.S. airplanes bombed each target with a 
short intermission of seven days. According to the division statistics, dur-
ing these twelve months, the U.S. Air Force launched 99 air raids with 576 
waves, totaling 2,165 sorties, against 355 targets along the 554-kilometer 
Chinese sections of the railways. Th e U.S. airplanes dropped 2,178 bombs, 
327 of which hit the targets, about 15 percent. Th e second phase, from July 
1966 to May 1967, was categorized as the “continuous bombing.” Th e U.S. 
airplanes raided and bombed almost every day without any break. Th e air 
raids totaled 323 in these eleven months, with 2,891 waves, including 9,262 
sorties. Th e U.S. airplanes dropped 5,992 bombs against 815 targets, and 
960 bombs, or 16 percent, hit the targets. Th e third phase, from June 1967 
to March 1968, the “bombing in waves” phase, was the heaviest of all the 
years. Th e air raids averaged twice a day, in some cases fi ve times a day. Th e 
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U.S. Air Force launched 545 air raids with 1,744 waves, totaling 12,000 sor-
ties against 1,369 targets. Th e airplanes dropped 18,000 bombs, and 2,241, 
about 12.4 percent, hit the targets. For the Chinese sections, about 180 out 
of 554 kilometers of the railways were destroyed or damaged, more than 
30 percent.10 Th e U.S. air strikes against the Chinese troops were much 
heavier than we had experienced during the Korean War.
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Major Railroads in North Vietnam, 1965–1973
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As Korean War veterans, our commanding offi  cers asked the troops 
to build the headquarters in the caves along the mountain ranges. All the 
troop living quarters had to be away from the worksites, warehouses, and 
rail lines. Each battalion had its own air-defense team with antiaircraft  
artillery and machine guns. Each company had its own outposts and warn-
ing system connected with the division warning network. As our antiair-
craft  defense capability increased, the U.S. bombing hit target percentage 
reduced from 15.9 percent in 1965, down to 14.6 percent in 1966, 13.3 per-
cent in 1967, and 9.5 percent in 1968.11
Th e U.S. bombing almost cut off  the two major rail lines, the Hanoi-
Youyiguan (or He-You, the eastern line) and Hanoi-Lao Cai (or He-Lao, 
the northwestern line) railroads. When the Chinese railway engineering 
troops arrived in late June 1965, many parts of the railways were severely 
damaged and not functioning. Moreover, the tracks were French-built 
meter gauge [1,000 mm] rails, and hard to be replaced. Th e division com-
mand decided to reconstruct these two old railways with the standard 
track gauge [1,435 mm] by adding the third rail to the meter gauge tracks. 
We called the new railways the “three legs tracks,” which could double the 
shipping capacity by using both Vietnamese and standard locomotives and 
cargo cars. Meanwhile, the rail transports continued without interruption 
during the railway makeovers.
On July 7, reconstruction began. Our division concentrated its troops 
on one part at a time. Th us, their antiaircraft  defense teams could guard 
the section from air raid and sabotage. Aft er fi nishing one section, then 
the troops moved on to another. Th e most diffi  cult task was reconstructing 
bridges. Th ese two lines had 196 bridges, including 61 large- and medium-
size bridges, totaling 5,262 meters, over many rivers in the North. Th e 
bridge battalions had to reconstruct each bridge before the additional third 
rail could be added.
By December 23, 1965, our division had completed reconstruction of 
363 kilometers of two rail lines by spending 757,500 work days. Th e recon-
struction signifi cantly increased shipping capacity. In our eastern section, 
the Hanoi-Youyiguan line almost doubled its annual transport capacity, 
an increase from 1.4 million tons to 2.8 million tons. Th e reconstruction 
also improved these two railroads by adding dozens of new train stations, 
bridges, and tunnels.
Our division headquarters also designed a new strategic, standard 
gauge railroad between Kep and Th ai Nguyen to serve as an east-west cir-
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cuitous supplementary link between the Hanoi-Th ai Nguyen and Hanoi-
Youyiguan north-south lines. Th e new railway line, fi ft y-fi ve kilometers 
long and serving as a wartime railroad, traversed mountains and forest. 
Th e First Division had to construct four tunnels, totaling 4.7 kilometers, 
four train stations, and several bridges along the Kep-Th ai Nguyen [or Ke-
Tai, central] line. Our division began the construction in October 1965 and 
fi nished it on December 2, 1966, with a total of 1.5 million work days. Th e 
construction established a rail network north of Hanoi. According to Chi-
nese statistics, when the last unit of the division left  Vietnam in June 1970, 
the division had completed 117 kilometers of new railway lines and estab-
lished twenty new railway stations.
According to the agreements, the Chinese railway engineering force 
maintained, repaired, and improved the four major railroads north of 
Hanoi, including Hanoi-Youyiguan, Hanoi-Lao Cai, Kep-Th ai Nguyen, and 
Dung-Th ai lines, totaling 554 kilometers. Our division also built numer-
ous emergency bridges, detour lines, bypass links, totaling ninety-eight 
kilometers. We also constructed many defense works and underground 
warehouses along the four major railroads to guarantee the shipment and 
communication despite the heavy U.S. bombing. We had built thirty-nine 
new rail bridges, fourteen tunnels, and laid eight kilometers of underwater 
cable.
Our railway engineering troops provided emergency repairs to all the 
damage north of Hanoi along the four major railroads aft er each bombing. 
We applied lessons learned during the Korean War with rushed repairs on 
the damaged railways during and aft er the U.S. air raids. According to our 
division’s estimates, from June 1965 to October 1968, the American air-
planes dropped 288,000 bombs along these railways. In the peak month 
of June 1967, the American planes dropped 9.6 tons of ordnance per kilo-
meter of these railways, and 2.5–6.3 tons per meter of the major railway 
bridges. Chinese antiaircraft  defenses and their railway repair were inex-
tricably intertwined.
Heavy bombing forced the division command to modify its original 
plan to keep all the railroads working. Th e new plan focused on keeping 
the northern lines open. On August 11, 1967, the U.S. Air Force heavily 
bombed the Long Bien Bridge (or Paul Dewey Bridge), one of the most 
important railway bridges north of Hanoi. Th e French-built 1,681 meters-
long bridge was seriously damaged by the bombing. Some Soviet experts 
estimated a minimum of three months to repair the bridge and reopen to 
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the rail traffi  c. Th e NVA headquarters requested our division to repair the 
bridge. Th e division sent one bridge battalion and an engineering com-
pany, totaling one thousand troops. Despite frequent air raids, the Chinese 
troops worked day and night and completed their repair within eighteen 
days. On September 30, the rail traffi  c resumed over the bridge. Later the 
bridge was bombed again and was out for 186 days. However, since the 
bridge battalion had built one temporary bridge and two ferries to cross 
the river, the railway transport was interrupted only for four days.
Between August 1965 and February 1969, the First Division had 
accomplished 1,178 repair missions for damaged railways and facilities, 
disarmed 3,100 time-delay bombs, rebuilt 157 kilometers of destroyed rail-
way tracks, built 39 new rail bridges, constructed 14 tunnels, laid 8 kilo-
meters of underwater cable, and repaired 1,420 kilometers of railroad 
telephone lines. I was promoted to colonel in 1969 in the Vietnam War.
Th e First Division, like other Chinese divisions, however, still suff ered 
casualties from continuing U.S. air raids. We lost 297 offi  cers and men 
to the air strikes. During a railway repair job right aft er an air raid, for 
instance, the Fift h Regiment lost more than twenty offi  cers and soldiers to 
an undiscovered time bomb. In the meantime, 1,634 men were wounded by 
bombing, including the commander. On August 21, 1966, General Long, 
commander of the First Division, rode in a jeep with his staff , guards, and 
translator. U.S. aircraft  attacked his vehicle while they were on their way 
from the headquarters to a worksite along Route 1. His staff  and driver 
were killed, and Long was wounded. His guard, also wounded, took him to 
a nearby NVA fi eld hospital and saved his life. On August 24, General Long 
returned to China and was hospitalized for a year.12 Our troops stayed in 
Vietnam until 1970.
Conclusion
Perspectives on the War
Th e cold war globalized the Vietnam War, leading a number of countries 
to send forces to support either the Communist North or the anti-Com-
munist South. For both sides, the international contributions became part 
of their eff orts for victory. By 1968, Communist military cooperation had 
made the PLAF and NVA stronger and more capable of attacking the U.S. 
and ARVN units in the South. In the meantime, however, China demon-
strated the limits to its cooperation when its army suddenly terminated 
military operations and withdrew all of its troops from Vietnam. Chinese 
leaders never considered military cooperation a separate issue from their 
relationship with the Russians. Th e stories reveal how the American esca-
lation put more pressure on the Communist coalition and worsened rela-
tions between Beijing and Moscow.
Hanoi recognized the competition between Moscow and Beijing for 
the leadership in the Asian Communist movement. Each claimed a posi-
tion as a key supporter of the Vietnamese Communists’ struggle against 
the American invasion. Th e Vietnamese welcomed both Chinese and 
Soviet troops into North Vietnam, increasing the competition between 
the two Communist giants. American intelligence never fully understood 
the nature and seriousness of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Intelligence chiefs 
had predicted a possible improvement in the relationship between Mos-
cow and Beijing during the Vietnam War. In September 1965, a Special 
National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) argued that with rapidly increas-
ing demands for air defense in North Vietnam, “China will need Soviet 
support and protection. Greater Soviet involvement might reluctantly be 
desired to deter the U.S. Th is is an additional factor likely to promote a 
constructive resolution of previous Sino-Soviet frictions over the speed, 
scope, and method of aiding Hanoi and bolstering South China bases.”1 
It is evident in these chapters that the Chinese and Soviet air defenses in 
North Vietnam against America’s Rolling Th under air campaign did not 
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improve their relations. Chinese and Russian offi  cers never united to sup-
port Vietnam, which instead became another battleground between the 
two contesting Communist states.
To obtain the maximum material support for its war eff ort, the DRV 
tried to maintain a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Th e seri-
ous competition between the Chinese and Soviets generated more mate-
rial, fi nancial, and military technology with which the PLAF and NVA 
could modernize their forces. According to the stories, one of the primary 
advances in Viet Cong military organization was the establishment of local 
units based on village structure to mobilize the peasants in the South. Even 
though the Viet Cong was rich in manpower, the peasant soldiers were 
illiterate and poorly trained. Th e PLAF’s command structure was chaotic, 
and oft en favored personal relationships and local interests. In the mid-
1960s, however, the Viet Cong incorporated many new factors into their 
military organization, including Russian and Chinese arms and Northern 
offi  cers to train the peasant soldiers. In addition, the PLAF troops gained 
battlefi eld experience. By the Tet Off ensive of 1968, the PLAF and NVA 
had experienced some important transformations in terms of command, 
organization, operation, logistics, and training in South Vietnam. Some of 
this book’s accounts refl ect how the PLAF and NVA changed from a peas-
ant, guerrilla army into a regular army by expanding its operations. Th e 
Viet Cong command shift ed from local to regional defense, from small- to 
large-scale operations that became more off ensive and aggressive in nature. 
As the war progressed, more and more local troops joined major opera-
tions with North Vietnamese troops.
Another important factor was that large numbers of the Northern 
Communist troops, including some of the best NVA units, infi ltrated into 
the South through the 1960s. A few chapters reinforce evidence that these 
troops were trained and armed by the Chinese and Russians. Many of their 
offi  cers were seasoned veterans of the French Indochina War and familiar 
with the South. Th e NVA command eventually replaced the PLAF com-
mand in South Vietnam in the late 1960s, and aft er the Tet Off ensive the 
PLAF was integrated with the NVA. Between 1963 and 1975, the NVA 
and PLAF mobilized more than 8 million Communist troops against the 
United States, ARVN, and their allies. Th ey suff ered an estimated 4 million 
casualties, including 1 million military deaths.2
Th e Vietnamese Communist forces had previously fought in wars 
against Japan and France, but they knew little about American forces. Th e 
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combat experience the NVA gained against the U.S. forces bolstered the 
Vietnamese military modernization in accordance with the Chinese and 
Russian models. Aft er the conclusion of the Tet Off ensive, the NVA high 
command began to emphasize the role of technology and fi repower. In 
the early 1970s, the NVA increased the number of special units, such as 
artillery, tank, engineering, and missile regiments, with available Soviet 
military resources. Eventually, they were moving away from their tradi-
tional people’s war and instead engaged in mobile warfare and strategic 
attacks with stronger fi re support and better infantry training. Th e Viet-
nam War thus began Vietnam’s military modernization. In this respect, 
the United States turned out to be a “useful adversary” in the Vietnam 
War.3
Th e Communist military coalition, however, did not survive the Paris 
peace negotiations that began in May 1968. On November 17, Chinese 
chairman Mao Zedong suggested to Vietnam’s Premier Pham in Beijing 
that some of the Chinese troops withdraw back to China.4 Aft er further 
discussions between the NVA and the PLA, the Chinese troops began 
returning to China in March 1969.5 By July 1970, all of the Chinese AAA 
troops had withdrawn. One of the Vietnamese leaders later recalled that “I 
know the [VWP] Party had long ago decided to form an alliance with the 
Soviet Union. Th e movement in this direction started way back in 1969, 
and the passing away of Ho Chi Minh paved the way for offi  cially making 
the decision. However, there was no open declaration, because Chinese 
assistance was still needed.”6
Th e Vietnamese Communists’ victory was a direct result not only of 
international Communist military support, but also of the political and 
social circumstances in the South. Th e South Vietnamese stories tell us 
that the military cooperation between the United States and ARVN did not 
intend to militarize the Southern population. Instead, it intended to protect 
the population by separating them from the war and relocating the peas-
ants from their villages. Unfortunately, many Vietnamese peasants did not 
want to leave their homes and the land they had farmed for generations. 
Th e increasing rural resistance by the peasants undermined the grassroots 
support for the South Vietnamese government and ARVN troops. More 
and more peasants and their families turned to the Viet Cong for help and 
fought against ARVN troops.
American soldiers in South Vietnam were oft en critical of the perfor-
mance of the ARVN. Even though the majority of the South Vietnamese 
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were not sure about the Communists’ taking over, they desperately wanted 
an end of the American War and some long due political reforms. Th ey did 
not fully support their government. As a result, judging from these recol-
lections, the RVN failed to act as a nation with the same degree of patriotic 
mobilization as the North. It appears that failure in nation-building cost 
the South Vietnamese state its legitimacy. With America’s increasing sup-
port from the late 1950s, the RVN had a chance to promote major reforms 
short of revolution; its failure contributed to the rise of the NLF and PLAF 
in the South in 1960. For the South Vietnamese, the most important prob-
lems of the war were not military, but connected to political and economic 
developments.
Th e RVN government’s refusal to reform and its brutal suppression of 
the peasant and student movements alienated many ARVN soldiers and 
shook their loyalty. Moreover, the young recruits, as seen in earlier chap-
ters, were further disillusioned by their commanding offi  cers’ corruption, 
mismanagement, and, worst of all, failure against the Communist insur-
gency. Religious diversity and urban-rural gaps further separated the men 
from the offi  cer corps. Lacking enthusiasm and low in morale, the ARVN 
veterans stated that they felt like they were fi ghting a war for their com-
manders, government, and the Americans, rather than themselves and the 
Vietnamese people. Th e Americanization of the ARVN in the early 1970s 
led to its dependence on the U.S. forces. Most of the veterans agreed that 
the ARVN troops needed a strong fi ghting spirit, and that having one could 
have brought about a diff erent result for their country. However, the cor-
ruption in the bureaucracy and battlefi eld failure proved the ARVN could 
not protect its government and South Vietnam from further attacks by 
the PLAF and NVA. Its assumed failure and incompetence infl uenced the 
Johnson administration’s military escalation of the Vietnam War in order 
to help the hopeless South Vietnamese.
If the South Vietnamese Army had problems in the early 1960s, so did 
the American armed forces that came to its rescue. From the beginning, 
the U.S. policy was aimed to support the government and ARVN in their 
fi ght against the Communist aggression. Nearly 80 percent of U.S. aid was 
military support through the 1960s. Th e U.S. spent at least $180 billion 
in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.7 Nevertheless, from 1963 to 1973, the 
American military found itself engaged in a “limited war” against a “total 
war” of the Communist world. According to the veterans, the U.S. forces 
utilized military technology and fi repower, especially air power, in most 
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battles. Th is allowed them to both minimize casualties and draw on the 
vast industrial and technological capacity of the United States.
American air power forced the PLAF and NVA to take to the jungle, 
hills, and mountains, and they found tremendous diffi  culties supplying 
their troops due to frequent air raids and bombing. During most of the 
1960s, the Communist troops had to employ hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, 
harassing the Americans and ARVN to make the war as costly as possible 
for their enemies, while protecting their bases and population. Th is defen-
sive strategy prolonged the war and eroded the morale and fi ghting spirit 
of the American troops.
As Vietnam’s terrain diff ered from that of previous wars, so did the 
soldiers. Early in the confl ict, the U.S. Army fi elded the best-trained and 
-equipped force in its history. Units initially deployed together. Having 
trained together Stateside, they possessed the cohesion needed in com-
bat. According to our stories, however, as the war escalated, it became an 
army of replacements. Th is resulted from one of the war’s most controver-
sial legacies, the rotation system. Unlike the soldiers of World War II, who 
only went home upon death, severe wounds, or the end of the war, the sol-
diers in Vietnam served a one-year tour of duty. Th e policy resulted from a 
desire to limit U.S. casualties.8 Th ough sound in theory, the policy aff ected 
unit cohesion. An infantry unit conceivably underwent a complete change 
in a ten-month time span. With the constant rotation of troops in and out 
of Vietnam, combined with injuries and deaths, a diff erent group of sol-
diers fought each year of the war. One consistent complaint among veter-
ans concerned the lack of esprit de corps. Pride and a sense of belonging are 
key components of eff ective military units. Without sustained membership 
in the units, however, this proved diffi  cult to obtain.
At home, the prolonged war fueled political instability and an antiwar 
movement. All of the U.S. veterans mentioned that, aft er the Tet Off en-
sive, a majority of Americans began to question the U.S. war policy toward 
Vietnam. More and more American people believed that the U.S. govern-
ment had made a mistake in sending troops to Vietnam. Soon the public 
disaff ection grew into political crisis in the government. In March of 1968, 
President Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection. Th e pres-
idential candidates from both parties promised their voters that, if they 
won, they would bring the war to an end. Aft er the failure of the Vietnam-
ization eff ort by the Nixon administration in 1969–1971, the U.S. govern-
ment decided to end its military cooperation with the ARVN and RVN 
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government through a peace settlement with the Communists. In early 
October 1972, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the North Vietnam-
ese negotiators fi nally reached an agreement that provided for U.S. with-
drawal sixty days aft er a cease-fi re, the return of American POWs, and 
some political arrangements in the South. On January 27, 1973, the North 
Vietnamese and American governments signed the Paris Accord. Th e last 
American troops were pulled out of South Vietnam by March. More than 
58,000 Americans had died in the long war, and over 313,000 more had 
been wounded.9 Many Americans at home seemed more relieved that it 
fi nally had ended than worried about what would happen to South Viet-
nam thereaft er.
During the Paris peace negotiations in 1968–1973, Moscow further 
strengthened its military and economic assistance to Hanoi. From 1969 
to 1971, the Soviet Union signed seven economic and military aid agree-
ments with North Vietnam.10 Aft er the American withdrawal in 1973, the 
Soviet Union continued its material and military support to North Viet-
nam, which was winning the war against the South. On April 30, 1975, the 
NVA streamed into Saigon and claimed victory in the long civil war. Aft er 
the war, Moscow’s continuing commitment to Vietnam further drained 
Soviet resources. In the meantime, the Soviet threat and confl icts pushed 
the Chinese leaders to improve their relations with the United States. Th eir 
strategic needs eventually led to the normalization of the Sino-American 
relationship in the 1970s. In terms of the impact it had upon East Asia 
and the global cold war, the Sino-American rapprochement dramatically 
shift ed the balance of power between the two superpowers. While policy-
makers in Washington found it possible to concentrate more of America’s 
resources and strategic attention on the Soviet Union, Moscow’s leaders, 
having to confront the West and China simultaneously, seriously overex-
tended the Soviet Union’s strength and power.
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Oral History of the Men and Women of CBB and FRUMEL (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Cryptology History, National Security Agency, 1996).
 5. Lieutenant Nhieu did not know at that moment that only a small number of 
the naval offi  cer-students could go to America for their further training.
 6. Th e naval base at Saigon provided basic training for new recruits of the River 
Force. Th e naval troops at the base were also responsible for handling operations 
in the Rung Sat “Special Zone,” a maze of rivers and swamps south of Saigon.
 7. In 1970, the U.S. Navy began its ACTOV (Accelerated Turnover to the 
Vietnamese) as part of the Vietnamization program. It included training of Viet-
namese naval offi  cers by the U.S. Navy both in South Vietnam and in the United 
States.
 8. Th e ARVN Navy consisted of the Sea Force, or Fleet Command, and River 
Force. Th e River Force had twenty-eight bases along the major rivers at Saigon, 
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My Th o, Vinh Long, and Can Th o. It successfully controlled key waterways in the 
South during the war.
 9. Aft er 1971, the U.S. Navy transferred 571 naval vessels to the ARVN Navy, 
which began to assume the coastal operations from the U.S. Navy. Th e United 
States also transferred to the ARVN Navy complete control of the high seas sur-
face patrol operations.
4. Communist Regulars from the North
 1. Interviews by the author in New Orleans, Louisiana, June 2004, when Sgt. 
Tran Th anh visited his granddaughter, Connie Tran. Th ere were four meetings/
interviews through bi-lingual translators between Vietnamese and English. Con-
nie and Tran Li provided the translations.
 2. For further reading on the NVA, see the NVA offi  cial history, Merle L. Prib-
benow, trans., Victory in Vietnam: Offi  cial History of the PAVN (Lawrence: Univ. 
Press of Kansas, 2002); Michael Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the 
NVA (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992); and Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army 
of Vietnam (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986).
 3. For more details on the NVA, also see Sandra C. Taylor, Vietnamese Women 
at War: Fighting for Ho Chi Minh and the Revolution (Lawrence: Univ. Press of 
Kansas, 2003), and Bao Ninh’s historical novel from the NVA perspective, Th e Sor-
row of War (New York: Riverhead, imprint of Penguin Group, 1996).
 4. Th e military death total includes both NVA and Viet Cong. For more 
details, see Moss, Vietnam, table C, 384.
 5. Th e Vietnamese Communist Party was founded on February 3, 1930, with 
Ho Chi Minh as its chairman. In October 1930, it became the Indochinese Com-
munist Party (ICP). At its Eighth Plenum in May 1941, the ICP formed the “Viet 
Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi” (League for the Independence of Vietnam), well 
known as the “Viet Minh” during World War II in 1941–1945 and the First Indo-
chinese War in 1946–1954. Th e ICP ceased to exist in 1945, but came back in 
1951 as the “Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam” (Vietnamese Workers Party). In 1976, it 
changed its name back to the Vietnamese Communist Party. See Tucker, Vietnam, 
89–90, 191.
 6. Th e NVA missile troops developed fast in the 1960s with help from the 
Soviet Union. Th e NVA had twelve antiaircraft  missile regiments in the early 
1970s. See Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance 
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987).
 7. In October 1964, the NVA sent more infantry troops to South Vietnam and 
directly engaged with the U.S. and ARVN forces. Nguyen Nhi, Con Gai Nguoi Gac 
Den Bien (Daughter of the Service Man) (Dallas, Tex.: Vhnt Publishing, 1999), 
211–219.
 8. Th e DRV government at fi rst kept secret North Vietnam’s infantry move-
ment to and engagement in South Vietnam. Entering the South publicly at the 
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time might have risked a U.S. invasion by its ground troops. Not until much later 
did the DRV publicly recognize that the NVA had entered the South to assist the 
People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) of South Vietnam in the war. Young, 
Th e Vietnam Wars, 160–161.
 9. Among the major off ensive campaigns was the attack on Ban Me Th uot in 
the spring of 1975.
5. People’s War against Americans
 1. Interviews by the author at TP Longxuyen, An Giang Province, Vietnam, in 
June 2006. Tran Li was the translator.
 2. For further reading on the NVA mobilization, see William J. Duiker, Viet-
nam: Revolution in Transition, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995); and 
Duong Th u Huong’s historical novel from the Communist Vietnamese perspec-
tive, Novel Without a Name (New York: Penguin, 1996).
 3. Th e “people’s war” is one of the military strategies for a weak army to fi ght 
a stronger opponent, or a foreign invading force, by mobilizing the entire popula-
tion to engage in the war. For its defi nition and the PAVN experience, see Gen. Vo 
Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army (New York: Bantam, 1962).
 4. Th e Ho Chi Minh Trail began to play a major role in the North’s infi ltration 
and transportation to the South in the spring of 1965. Hoang Khoi, Th e Ho Chi 
Minh Trail (Hanoi, Vietnam: Gioi Publishers, 2002), 51–52.
 5. For further reading on the NVA’s deployment and operation in South 
Vietnam, see John Prados, Vietnam: Th e History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–
1975 (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2009); and Mark Atwood Lawrence, Th e 
Vietnam War: A Concise International History (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2008).
 6. Captain Hao’s father was born in 1924 and served in the People’s Army 
of Vietnam (PAVN or NVA) from 1953 to 1979 as an offi  cer, rising to the rank 
of a two-star general. He had retired from the NVA and lived in Hanoi when the 
author interviewed his son, Captain Hao, at Longxuyen, An Giang, in June 2006.
 7. From 1965 to 1968, the NVA and PLAF had set up a joint command to 
coordinate their military operations. Aft er the spring of 1968, the PAVN took over 
the command of the Communist military operations in South Vietnam.
 8. Before the Tet Off ensive campaign, the PLAF had carried most of the fi ght-
ing in the South. During the Tet, the PLAF troops suff ered such heavy casualties 
that the NVA took over the major operations thereaft er.
 9. Th e Battle of Ia Drang was the fi rst major engagement of the U.S. ground 
forces in South Vietnam. From November 14 to November 18, 1965, the U.S. 
Army’s First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) fought against a large number of the 
NVA-PLAF troops in the Ia Drang Valley. Th e U.S. troops suff ered 534 casualties, 
including 234 dead. Th e NVA-PLAF casualties were estimated to be over 2,500. 
For more details, see Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were 
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Soldiers Once . . . and Young: Ia Drang—Th e Battle Th at Changed the War in Viet-
nam (New York: HarperCollins, 1992).
10. Plei Me (also called Plei Mei), about forty-four kilometers southwest Pleiku, 
was a strategic point in the Central Highlands. Th e siege of the ARVN camp by the 
PLAF-NVA troops led to the U.S. First Cavalry Division’s fi rst major battle in the 
Ia Drang Valley. See Michael P. Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam: A Comprehen-
sive Guide to the Firebases, Military Installations and Naval Vessels of the Vietnam 
War, 1945–75 (Central Point, Oreg.: Hellgate Press, 2002), 5–411.
11. Pleiku, a city about 225 miles northeast Saigon, was an important strate-
gic point in South Vietnam during the war. It had a U.S. Air Force base, airport, 
hospital, and ammo depot, the U.S. Army’s Fourth Division headquarters, and the 
ARVN’s II Corps headquarters. See Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam, 5–412.
6. No Final Victory, No Family Life
 1. Interviews by the author at My Th anh, Vietnam, in June 2006. Tran Li was 
the translator.
 2. For more details about the regrouping of the Southern carders to the North, 
see Stein Tonnesson and Christopher E. Goscha, “Le Duan and the Break with 
China,” in Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond 
Asia, ed. Priscilla Roberts, 453–486 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006).
 3. Ho’s words quoted in Gen. Phung Th e Tai, Remembering Uncle Ho, 148.
 4. For further reading on NVA and PLAF offi  cers, see Pribbenow, trans., 
Victory in Vietnam, and Dang Th uy Tram, Last Night I Dreamed of Peace, trans. 
Andrew X. Pham (New York: Harmony Books, 2007).
 5. Dang Cong San Viet Nam (Vietnamese Communist Party Committee), 
Dang Vien Cao Nien Tuoi Dang (Generals of the Vietnamese Communist Party) 
(Long Xuyen, An Giang, Vietnam: Dang Bo Th anh Pho, 2002), 155.
 6. By the end of 1952, the NVA had six infantry divisions and one artillery 
division, the 351st Division. For more details about the Chinese military assistance 
to Viet Minh in the French Indochina War, see Li, A History of the Modern Chinese 
Army, chapter 7.
 7. General Huynh then served in the U Minh Artillery Training Department 
at the NVA No. 9 Quan Khu Artillery Training Center.
 8. Dang Cong San Viet Nam (Vietnamese Communist Party Committee), 
Dang Vien Cao Nien Tuoi Dang (Generals of the Vietnamese Communist Party), 
32.
 9. Ibid.
7. Russian Missile Offi  cers in Vietnam
 1. As a veteran of China’s Ministry of Public Security in Beijing, Anthony 
Song worked in the Foreign Aff airs Bureau’s Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
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Division for more than ten years in the 1980s–1990s. He was in charge of approv-
ing and issuing Chinese travel documents to the diplomats and military mission-
aries from the former Soviet Union and its satellite states. He had many friends 
and stayed in touch with them aft er he retired from the Ministry of Public Secu-
rity. Song has lived in Boston, Massachusetts, with his family since 2000.
 2. Interviews by the author in Kyiv, Ukraine, in July 2005. Anthony Song was 
the translator.
 3. For further reading on the Soviet involvement, see Gaiduk, Th e Soviet 
Union and the Vietnam War.
 4. Th e title of the book is War Experience in Vietnam, 1965–1973, published 
in Moscow in 2006. It includes personal accounts of Soviet offi  cers who served in 
Vietnam during the war, though none of them mention the word “Vietnam” in 
their stories. Rather, they use “that country.”
 5. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large portion of the archives of 
the former Soviet government have become accessible, including the Presidential 
Archive (known offi  cially as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or 
APRF), the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and documents of the Com-
munist Party Central Committee. However, many key documents in the archives of 
the General Staff  of the Soviet Armed Forces are still waiting for declassifi cation.
 6. For example, Gaiduk has employed the American archives, including the 
Presidential Papers in the Johnson Library and the National Security Archives at 
Washington, D.C., on this topic for his well-written book Th e Soviet Union and the 
Vietnam War, 60–61.
 7. Th e sources in Chinese indicate that the 1965 Moscow-Hanoi agreement 
requested that the Soviet Union send four thousand Russian military personnel 
that spring, including fi ve hundred air force technicians and logistic offi  cers who 
would station in China, north of the Chinese-Vietnamese border. Beijing rejected 
the proposal and refused any Soviet military establishment inside China. Th en Bei-
jing helped to ship most of the Soviet military aid and personnel by rail through 
China in 1965–1968. Th e fi rst group of Soviet offi  cers, totaling 282, crossed the 
country and arrived in North Vietnam in April 1965. Later, Beijing and Moscow 
reached several agreements on the Soviet personnel transfers, including a max-
imum of 400 each time and that they were not to carry weapons. Among the 
important Chinese archives are the International Liaison Division Records, the 
PRC Ministry of Railway Administration Archives, and the PRC Ministry of For-
eign Aff air Archives, Beijing, China.
 8. Director of Central Intelligence, “SNIE 10-11-65: Probable Communist 
Reactions to a U.S. Course of Action, September 22, 1965,” in National Intelli-
gence Council (NIC), Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–1975 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Offi  ce, 2005), 294–296.
 9. Th e Soviet leaders, including Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet general secre-
tary himself, made off ers several times in late 1964 and early 1965 to send Soviet 
personnel or volunteers to Vietnam, if the war circumstances warranted this and 
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Vietnam requested it. However, in early 1965, during a meeting with Ilia S. Scher-
bakov, the Soviet ambassador to North Vietnam, DRV Deputy Foreign Minister 
Hoang Van Loi disclosed that, while the Vietnamese people expressed their grati-
tude for the Soviet off er of volunteers, as yet they did not need any, though they 
would request them later if this became necessary. Th eir conversations are quoted 
in Gaiduk, Th e Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 38.
10. During 1965–1973, the Soviet Union had trained more than ten thousand 
Vietnamese offi  cers in missile equipment, air defense, aviation engineering, and 
other military technology areas. For details, see Li Danhui, “Cooperation and 
Confl icts between China and the Soviet Union during the Vietnam War,” in Li 
Danhui, ed., Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng (China and the Indochina Wars) 
(Hong Kong: Tiandi Tushu [Heavenly Earth Books], 2000), 129–130.
11. Th e U.S. Air Force lost another F-111 on April 22, 1968.
8. Th e Dragon’s Tale
 1. Interviews by the author in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province, China, in July 
2002.
 2. Between 1955 and 1963, Chinese military aid totaled 320 million yuan. 
Yuan is the Chinese currency, or Renminbi (RMB). It had an exchange rate of 3:1 
with U.S. dollars back then. Th us, 320 million yuan RMB equaled roughly $106 
million at the time.
 3. For further reading on China’s involvement, see Chen Jian, Mao’s China 
and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2001); and Zhai, 
China and the Vietnam Wars.
 4. In 1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward as a new economic policy 
to industrialize China. Th e policy failed and China experienced a serious eco-
nomic depression on a gigantic scale in 1959–1962. Th e resulting famine claimed 
more than 20 million lives. Th e Chinese government, however, blamed it on the 
bad weather and called it a three-year “natural disaster.” For more details, see John 
K. Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, enlarged ed. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1998), 372–382; and also Jonathan D. Spence, Th e 
Search for Modern China, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1999), 552–553.
 5. Th e People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the name for all Chinese armed 
forces, including army, navy, air force, and missile troops. See Xiaobing Li, Allan 
R. Millett, and Bin Yu, trans. and eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (Lawrence: 
Univ. of Kansas Press, 2001), 25–30, 66.
 6. All Chinese military services were divided into nine regional commands 
from the 1950s to the 1980s. Th e PLA armies and divisions were under a cer-
tain regional command. Each command was named aft er the city where its head-
quarters was located. Th ey were PLA Shenyang Regional Command (Northeast 
China), Beijing Regional Command (North China), Jinan Regional Command 
(East China), Nanjing Regional Command (Southeast China), Fuzhou Regional 
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Command (Southeast China Coast and the Taiwan Straits), Guangzhou Regional 
Command (South China), Kunming Regional Command (Southwest China), 
Wuhan Regional Command (Central China), and Lanzhou Regional Command 
(Northwest China). See Fang Zhu, Gun Barrel Politics: Party-Army Relations in 
Mao’s China (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1998), 86–108.
 7. For more information on the PLA’s political instructor/commissar system, 
see Paul H. B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine: 
1949–1999,” and Xiaobing Li, “PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations during 
the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954–55 and 1958,” in Chinese Warfi ghting: Th e PLA 
Experience since 1949, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. 
McDevitt, 23–55, 143–172 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003).
 8. For China’s involvement in the Vietnam War, see Qiang Zhai, “Reassess-
ing China’s Role in the Vietnam War: Some Mysteries Explored,” in China and the 
United States: A New Cold War History, ed. Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li, 97–118 
(New York: Univ. Press of America, 1998).
 9. Aft er the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August 1964, the United States esca-
lated its intervention in South Vietnam. At the same time, it shift ed its war eff orts 
increasingly against North Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). 
Th e United States’ heavy bombing against the North in 1964–1965 made the DRV 
desperate for help. In April 1965, Le Duan, fi rst secretary general of the North 
Vietnamese Communist Party, and Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, defense minister of the 
DRV, rushed to Beijing to ask China to increase its aid and send troops to Viet-
nam. On behalf of the Chinese leadership, Liu Shaoqi, president of the People’s 
Republic of China and vice chairman of the CCP, replied to the Vietnamese visi-
tors on April 8 that “it is the obligation of the Chinese people and party” to support 
the Vietnamese struggle against the United States. “Our principle is,” Liu contin-
ued, “that we will do our best to provide you with whatever you need and whatever 
we have.” In April, China signed several agreements with the DRV government 
delegation concerning the dispatch of Chinese support troops to North Vietnam. 
In May, Ho Chi Minh paid a secret visit to Mao Zedong and asked Mao to help the 
DRV repair and build twelve roads in the area north of Hanoi. Th e Chinese leader 
accepted Ho’s request.
10. Th e NVA command disliked the rotation policy. Th e Vietnamese believed 
that the Chinese did not shoot down enough American airplanes to protect North 
Vietnam. Th us, they invited the antiaircraft  missile troops from the Soviet Union. 
Th ey knew that the Soviet Union and China were rivals in the Communist camp, 
competing for the leadership of the worldwide Communist movement as well as 
infl uence over Vietnam. Each claimed itself to be a supporter of the Vietnamese 
Communists’ struggle again the American invasion. So the Vietnamese brought 
both Communist armies into North Vietnam, increasing the competition between 
the Chinese and Soviet Communists. Th e Chinese high command ordered its 
troops to intensify their training so as to shoot down more American airplanes 
than the Soviets could.
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11. Vietnam has fi ft y provinces, which were divided among the South and 
North during the war. Hao Binh was a northern province southwest of Hanoi. 
See Tap Ban Do Hanh Chinh, Viet Nam (Vietnam Administrative Atlas) (Hanoi, 
Vietnam: Nha Xuat Ban Ban Do [Ban Do Cartographic Publishing House], 
2005), 14.
9. Chinese Response to the U.S. Rolling Th under Campaign
 1. Maj. Gen. Qin Chaoying (PLA, ret.), secretary general of the China Soci-
ety of Strategy and Management (CSSM), provided me with a long list of Chi-
nese Vietnam War veterans for my interviews and research during our meetings at 
CSSM in Beijing in the summer of 2005.
 2. Interviews by the author in Chengde, Hebei Province, China, in July 2006.
 3. Le Duan quoted in a conversation with Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and 
other Chinese leaders in Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen 
Vu Tungand, and James G. Hershberg, eds., “77 Conversations between Chinese 
and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977,” Cold War Interna-
tional History Project, Working Paper No. 22, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wil-
son International Center for Scholars, 1998), 95.
 4. An August 1966 SNIE (Special National Intelligence Estimate) still believed 
that “For some time Chinese military personnel have been present in North Viet-
nam; current strength is estimated at 25,000 to 45,000. Th ey include AAA troops, 
engineers, construction crews, and various other logistical support groups” (Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, “SNIE 13-66: Current Chinese Communist Intentions 
in the Vietnam Situation, August 4, 1966,” in National Intelligence Council (NIC), 
Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–1975, 349).
 5. Interviews by the author in Chengde, Hebei Province, China, in July 2006.
 6. Mao, “Faith in Victory Is Derived from Struggle,” conversations with a 
party and government delegation from the DRV on October 20, 1965, in Minis-
try of Foreign Aff airs and Party Archives and Manuscript Research Center of the 
CCP Central Committee, comps., Mao Zedong on Diplomacy (Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1998), 435.
 7. Chen Pai, Yuezhan qinliji (My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War) 
(Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe [Henan People’s Press], 1997), 22.
 8. For further reading on the Chinese military operation in the Vietnam War, 
see Ryan, Finkelstein, and McDevitt, eds., Chinese Warfi ghting; and Li, A History 
of the Modern Chinese Army.
 9. For more details of China’s arms purchase from the Soviet Union, see Mshl. 
Xu Xiangqian, “Th e Purchase of Arms from Moscow,” in Mao’s Generals Remem-
ber Korea, trans. and ed. Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu, 143–145 (Law-
rence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2001).
10. Th e PLA experienced several reorganizations during the Cultural Revo-
lution of 1966–1976. See Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong 
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de renmin jiefangjun (Th e PLA in the Cultural Revolution) (Beijing: Zhonggong 
dangshi ziliao chubanshe [CCP Historical Document Press], 1989), 370–371.
11. Also see Mshl. Xu Xiangqian, “Th e Purchase of Arms from Moscow,” in Li, 
Millett, and Yu, trans. and eds., Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, 144–146.
12. Gen. Yao Fuhe, commander of the Sixty-fourth AAA Division, “Battles of 
Bravery and Wisdom,” in Qu Aiguo, Bao Mingrong, and Xiao Zuyue, eds., Yuanyue 
kangmei: zhongguo zhiyuan budui zai yuenan (Aid Vietnam and Resist America: 
China’s Supporting Forces in Vietnam) (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe [Military 
Science Press], 1995), 17.
13. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun 
(Th e PLA in the Cultural Revolution), 292–294.
14. Chen Pai, Yuezhan qinliji (My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War), 21.
15. Th e American statistics of U.S. airplanes lost in North Vietnam are diff erent 
from those in Communist sources. According to the Chinese sources, from 1965 
to 1968, the Chinese antiaircraft  troops engaged in 2,153 battles, shooting down 
1,707 American airplanes and damaging 1,608. American offi  cial sources say that 
the United States lost 918 aircraft  in 1965–1968 (Moss, Vietnam, 236).
16. Chen Pai, Yuezhan qinliji (My Personal Experience in the Vietnam War), 
68–69.
17. Gen. Yao Fuhe, commander of the Sixty-fourth AAA Division, “Battles of 
Bravery and Wisdom,” in Qu Aiguo, Bao Mingrong, and Xiao Zuyue, eds., Yuanyue 
kangmei; zhongguo zhiyuan budui zai yuenan (Aid Vietnam and Resist America: 
China’s Supporting Forces in Vietnam), 19.
10. Russian Spies in Hanoi
 1. Maj. Gen. Robert J. Kodosky, Col. Konstantin Preobrazhensky, and other 
former KGB agents attended the International Conference on “Intelligence in the 
Vietnam War” at the Vietnam Center at Texas Tech University, in Lubbock, Texas, 
on October 20–22, 2006.
 2. Interviews by the author in Silver Spring, Maryland, in September 2007. 
Both of us spoke Chinese and English during the interviews.
 3. For further reading on KGB and Soviet military intelligence during the Vietnam 
War, see Cowley, ed., Th e Cold War, Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, Th e 
Sword and the Shield: Th e Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New 
York: Basic Books, 1999); and Gaiduk, Th e Soviet Union and the Vietnam War.
 4. For more details on the KGB organization, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, Th e 
Sword and the Shield, 318–364.
 5. In February 1965, Soviet premier Alekei Kosygin visited Hanoi and signed an 
agreement with the Vietnamese government to increase Russian military aid. Th ereaf-
ter, the Soviet Union intensifi ed its military assistance and involvement in the Vietnam 
War. For more details, see Gaiduk, Th e Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 59, 61–62.
 6. In fact, the Soviet intelligence service began to train and help the Chinese 
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Communist agents in the 1930s and 1940s. Th e CCP back then was an under-
ground and antigovernment Communist movement. In 1949, the CCP founded 
the PRC, a Communist state.
 7. Col. Nikita Karatsupa served in the KGB provincial offi  ces in the 1950s and 
in the headquarters offi  ce in the early 1960s. Because of his achievements and suc-
cess, he was awarded the highest Soviet decoration, the Golden Star of the Hero 
of the Soviet Union, in 1965. Th en Colonel Karatsupa came to Hanoi for his new 
assignment. His case shows that the KGB had given its intelligence in Vietnam the 
top priority and sent its best agents to Hanoi.
11. Long Days and Endless Nights
 1. Interviews by the author with a graduate student research assistant in 
Moore, Oklahoma, February 2004.
 2. For further reading on the U.S. Army in the Vietnam War, see Ingo Trau-
schweizer, Th e Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (Law-
rence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2008); and James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi , 
Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
 3. For the “16F40 MOS,” 16F is the air-defense artillery, 40 is the rank of ser-
geant, and MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) stands for his fi eld of training.
 4. Th e quad fi ft ies were a group of four mounted .50 caliber machine guns. Th e 
M-42 duster is a self-propelled armored vehicle with a pair of 40 mm cannons.
 5. Tuy Hoa is a coastal city on QL-1, midway between Qui Nhon and Nha 
Trang and about ninety kilometers south of Qui Nhon. One of the major U.S. Air 
Force bases was located outside the city and included the U.S. Army antiaircraft  
artillery support units. See Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam, 5–525.
 6. Two Bits was a landing zone with an airfi eld about two kilometers from the 
intersection of QL-1 and Hwy. 514. Landing Zone English was originally known as 
Area Dog and LZ Dog, along the west side of QL-1, about three kilometers north-
east of the An Lo River. Landing Zone Uplift , at Deo Nhong Pass, was along QL-1, 
about eight kilometers northeast of Phu My. Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam, 
5–172, 5–526, 5–528.
 7. QL-19 is the highway running east and west that goes from Quin Nhon 
to Pleiku through the Mang Yang Pass and An Khe Pass. See Tap Ban Do Hanh 
Chinh, Viet Nam (Vietnam Administrative Atlas), 54.
 8. Sgt. David McCray earned the National Defense Ribbon, Vietnam Service 
Medal, and Vietnam Campaign Medal with three campaign stars, along with a 
Good Conduct Medal.
12. And Th en Th ey’re Gone . . . Just Like Th at
 1. Interviews by the author with a graduate student research assistant in 
Edmond, Oklahoma, in March 2006.
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 2. For further reading on President Johnson’s policy, see James H. Willbanks, 
Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left  and South Vietnam Lost Its War (Law-
rence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2008).
 3. “Th e Arizona Territory” is the nickname for the An Hoa Basin, the area 
between the rivers in Dai Loc and Duc Districts. Th e name refl ects the area’s wild 
west characteristics and danger, like that in early Arizona. It was noted for its 
dense foliage, booby traps, mines, and ubiquitous enemy forces. For more details, 
see Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam, 5–20.
 4. Hill 65 is along Route 4, about twenty-eight kilometers southwest of Da 
Nang. It covered Th uong Duc Corridor approaches to Da Nang. See Kelley, Where 
We Were in Vietnam, 5–224.
 5. Munson pointed out the connection between the Vietnam War and the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union during the interviews. “While that relationship seems obvi-
ous to me, it hasn’t occurred to many others. I’m dissatisfi ed with the fact that here 
we are, thirty-plus years later, and it’s a matter of public acceptance that the war was 
wrong, and we lost. I don’t believe either one of those things. Certainly we lost politi-
cally. Also, the North captured the South. Th e troops who were there allowed neither 
of those things. One of my friends had a hat embroidered with the words: ‘Vietnam: 
1970–1971. We were winning when I left .’ We weren’t losing—we just left . Th at had 
nothing to do with us veterans. None of us were fans of the war, believe me, and we 
didn’t like being there, but the war was what my country was asking me to do. Th is was 
the one [war] that occurred during my generation. Without necessarily understanding 
it all, we were part of it, did a pretty good job, and both got and gave full measure.”
 6. Munson received the Navy-Marine Corps Medal for rescuing the heli-
copter pilot. Munson also earned the Navy Achievement Medal with Combat 
“V” (for valor) device, Combat Action ribbon, Vietnam Cross of Gallantry, Viet-
nam Service Medal, and Vietnam Campaign Medal. Munson is now a retired 
Marine offi  cer and successful investment representative with a nationally promi-
nent company.
13. No John Wayne Movie
 1. Interviews by the author with a graduate student research assistant aft er Lt. 
Gary Doss’s presentation at Edmond, Oklahoma, in November 2003.
 2. Moss, Vietnam, tables C, D, and E.
 3. Da Nang was one of the six autonomous municipalities of the Republic of 
Vietnam. It became the northern commercial center and the second largest south-
ern city aft er Saigon. In the 1960s, the city had one of the major U.S. Air Force 
bases and many other American military facilities, such as an Air Force heliport 
and hospital; an Army base, depot, and ammunition supply points; and a Navy 
base, seaport, hospital, and support facility. For more details, see Kelley, Where We 
Were in Vietnam, maps 7, 44, and 45, and pages 5-129–130.
 4. Chu Lai is not a Vietnamese name. Rather, the U.S. Marine offi  cers named 
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it per Chinese Mandarin pronunciation. Chu Lai base site, about fi ft y-fi ve miles 
southeast of Da Nang, is near today’s Nui Th anh, Quang Nam Province. In 1965, 
the U.S. Marine Corps built an airfi eld there. See Tap Ban Do Hanh Chinh, Viet 
Nam (Vietnam Administrative Atlas), 48; and Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam, 
maps 7 and 43, and page 5-108.
 5. Ky Ha was one of the U.S. Marine air facilities. Marine Air Group (MAG) 
36 fl ew helicopters from Ky Ha to protect the Da Nang Air Force Base and provide 
logistics, transport, and rescues to marine units. Kelley, Where We Were in Viet-
nam, page 5-283; Tap Ban Do Hanh Chinh, Viet Nam (Vietnam Administrative 
Atlas), 48.
 6. Originally it was called “Archie’s Angels,” for their fi rst commander, Col. 
Archie Clapp. Aft er Colonel Clapp left  the group, the name was changed to “Ugly 
Angels” aft er a wounded marine heard the beating rotor of a Sikorsky coming to 
save him and exclaimed, “Th at’s the ugliest angel I’ve ever seen.”
 7. In fact, the U.S. armed forces employed helicopters in the Korean War of 
1950–1953. Despite some limitations, the helicopter played a major role in that 
war. Th ey were used for battlefi eld observation, air-sea rescue, transport of men 
and supplies, and for the evacuation of the wounded. Because of the fi lm and tele-
vision series M*A*S*H, there is no more enduring image of the Korean War for 
most Americans than a helicopter landing at a MASH unit with wounded soldiers. 
For more details, see Richard Peters and Xiaobing Li, Voices from the Korean War: 
Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers (Lexington: Univ. Press 
of Kentucky, 2004), 41–42, 105, 106.
 8. At Ky Ha Marine Air Facility, MAG-36 fl ew H-34 helicopters.
 9. Doss returned to the United States in 1967 and continued to serve in the 
marines through January 1970. In recent years, he volunteers with the YL-37 
Group Foundation (a Marine veterans organization) as a spokesperson and for-
mer public relations offi  cer.
14. More Th an Meets the Eye
 1. Interviews by the author with a graduate student research assistant at the 
University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, Oklahoma, in August 2002–February 
2003.
 2. For further reading on U.S. intelligence in the Vietnam War, see Hiam, 
Who the Hell Are We Fighting?; James L. Gilbert, Th e Most Secret War: Army Sig-
nals Intelligence in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Offi  ce, 
2003); and Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers.
 3. Th e conference on “Intelligence in the Vietnam War” at the Vietnam Center 
at Texas Tech University, in Lubbock, Texas, on October 20–22, 2006, was cospon-
sored by the National Center for the Study of Intelligence and Texas Tech Univer-
sity. For more details on the conference, see www.intelligence.vietnam.ttu.edu.
 4. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, ix.
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 5. For further reading on veteran families, see Donna Moreau, Waiting Wives 
(New York: Atria, 2005); Jessica Redmond, A Year of Absence: Six Women’s Stories 
of Courage, Hope and Love (New York: Elva Resa, 2005); and Larry H. Addington, 
America’s War in Vietnam: A Short Narrative History (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. 
Press, 2000).
 6. Aft er military retirement he served as assistant vice president for academic 
aff airs at the University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, Oklahoma. Besides his 
story, May also interviewed other Vietnam veterans in Oklahoma, two of whose 
stories are included in this volume. He made an important contribution to this 
collection. Lieutenant Colonel May passed away on December 27, 2003.
15. Medevac and Medcap Missions and More
 1. Interviews by Lt. Col. Terry May in 2000, who contributed Peterson’s story 
in 2003.
 2. For further reading on the U.S. Marine Corps air force in the Vietnam 
War, see Andrew Wiest, ed., Rolling Th under in a Gentle Land (New York: Osprey, 
2006), Robert F. Dorr, Marine Air: Th e History of the Flying Leathernecks in Words 
and Photos (New York: Berkley Caliber Books, 2005); and Ronald B. Frankum Jr., 
Like Rolling Th under: Th e Air War in Vietnam, 1964–1975 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman 
and Littlefi eld, 2005).
 3. Monsoons are seasonal winds that aff ect the weather and rainfall of South-
east Asian countries like Vietnam. Between May and September, the monsoon 
winds go southwest, bringing most of the annual rainfall to the region. In Decem-
ber–February, the monsoon winds go northeast. See D. R. SarDesai, Southeast 
Asia: Past and Present (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2003), 7.
 4. Th e USO brought many famous entertainers to Vietnam to entertain the 
American troops. Some of the entertainers came from Hollywood and others from 
Broadway.
 5. U.S. Marines Air Group (MAG) 16 stationed at the Da Nang Air Base dur-
ing that time. It provided transportation and air support to the First Marine Divi-
sion. See Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam, 5–129.
 6. Th e Marble Mountain is about three miles southeast of the Da Nang Air 
Base. See Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam, maps 44 and 45.
16. Drowning Tears with Laughter
 1. Second Lt. Judy Crausbay Hamilton was invited many times to talk to the 
students in the History of the Vietnam War, the Cold War in Asia, Modern South-
east Asia, and other history classes at the University of Central Oklahoma.
 2. Interviews by the author with an undergraduate student research assistant 
in Edmond, Oklahoma, February 2004.
 3. Judy Crausbay Hamilton received the Meritorious Service Medal from the 
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U.S. government in February 2006 to honor her service as a U.S. Air Force fl ight 
nurse and a U.S. Army nurse during the Vietnam War.
 4. For further reading on American women in the Vietnam War, see Lynda 
Van Devanter, Home before Morning: Th e Story of an Army Nurse in Vietnam (Bos-
ton: Massachusetts Univ. Press, 2001); Olga Gruhzit-Hoyt, A Time Remembered: 
American Women in the Vietnam War (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1999); and 
Keith Walker, A Piece of My Heart: Th e Stories of 26 American Women Who Served 
in Vietnam (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1999).
 5. Ron Smith, 101st Airborne, from Gainesville, Texas, to Judy Crausbay 
Hamilton, on June 17, 1994. Quoted from the original letter from Hamilton’s 
collection.
 6. Peggy Durham, “Cityan Earns Flight Experience ‘Hard Way,’” Th e Okla-
homa Journal (February 7, 1967), 2–3.
 7. Ibid., 6.
 8. National Guard Bureau, “Guard Aero Med Team Meets Unexpected Crisis,” 
Th e National Guardsman (March 1967): 11–14.
 9. Maj. Gen. L. E. Weber then was the Adjutant General of the Air National 
Guard. Th e quote is from the original letter of General Weber to Judy Crausbay 
Hamilton on February 9, 1967.
10. Th e Ninety-fi rst Evacuation Hospital was a semi-mobile army hospital with 
325 beds. It was located at Tuy Hoa from December 1966 to July 1969, and then it 
relocated at Chu Lai from July 1969 to November 1971. According to some works, 
it was under the command of I and II Corps. For example, see Kelley, Where We 
Were in Vietnam, 4–10.
11. Tuy Hoa, as a coastal city, had one of the major U.S. Air Force bases in 
South Vietnam. Th e 101st Airborne and its headquarters were stationed at the Tuy 
Hoa Air Force Base.
12. Can Th o is about one hundred kilometers southwest of Saigon. It was the 
largest population center of the Mekong Delta and was the center of all U.S. opera-
tions in the areas under IV Corps command.
17. Life and Death of an ARVN Doctor
 1. Interviews by the author with Dr. Jessica Sheetz-Nguyen in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, in March 2007.
 2. Aft er the Vietnamese Communists won the war, all the offi  cers and soldiers 
who served in the ARVN during the war were sent to jail for fi ve to seven years. 
Dr. Nguyen Canh Minh was jailed for four years because he served in the ARVN 
hospital.
 3. Th e Vietnamese National Army totaled 150,000 men by 1950, including 
three infantry divisions.
 4. Dr. Minh received many medals, honors, and awards. He considers the 
Courageous Combatant Medal to be his best.
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 5. Th e city of Can Th o, about sixty miles southwest Saigon, was the largest 
population center of the Mekong Delta. As the center of all U.S.-ARVN operations 
in the Mekong Delta, it hosted the headquarters of the U.S. IV Corps and ARVN 
Fourth Tactical Zone.
 6. Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong was commander of the Fourth Corps from 
August 21, 1970, to May 4, 1972. Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khoa Nam was its commander 
from October 30, 1974, to April 30, 1975, when the ARVN surrendered to the 
PAVN aft er the fall of Saigon.
 7. Phu Quoc Island is the largest island in South Vietnam, about thirty-one by 
sixteen miles. As the major ARVN POW camp, in 1968–1970 it held 35,000 Com-
munist prisoners of war.
 8. While the Vietnamese Communists took over the South, the Cambodian 
Communists also established their regime in that country, on April 17, 1975, and 
named it the Democratic Kampuchea. From 1975 to 1979, the Khmer Rouge 
implemented radical policies that led to the deaths of some 1.7 million people 
from starvation, disease, overwork, and execution. Th e Khmer Rouge was driven 
from power by a Vietnamese invasion in 1979 and fi nally collapsed in 1999.
18. A Korean Captain and His Hospital
 1. Interviews by the author in Bellingham, Washington, in September 2005.
 2. Th e South Korea (Republic of Korea) government sent two infantry divi-
sions, totaling 60,000 troops, to South Vietnam in 1967–1973.
 3. For further reading on the South Korean troops in the Vietnam War, see 
Ahn Jung-hyo, “A Double Exposure of the War,” in Philip West, Steven I. Levine, 
and Jackie Hiltz, eds., America’s Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and 
Memory (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); Robert M. Blackburn, Mercenaries 
and Lyndon Johnson’s “More Flags”: Th e Hiring of Korean, Filipino and Th ai Soldiers 
in the Vietnam War (Jeff erson, N.C.: McFarland, 1994); and Ahn Jung-hyo’s won-
derful historical novel, White Badge (New York: Soho Press, 1989).
 4. Th e “White Horse Division” was the nickname of the ROK Ninth Infantry 
Division. Th e division operated in Vietnam from 1965 to 1973.
 5. Tuy Hoa is a coastal city midway between Qui Nhon and Nha Trang. It had 
one of the few U.S. bases constructed by the U.S. Air Force under its own direction 
and with its own assets. Th e Korean Twenty-eighth Regiment had its headquarters 
next to the Ninth MASH unit.
 6. During the 1965–1973 Vietnam War, 4,407 South Korean soldiers were killed.
 7. Aft er his tour in Vietnam in 1966–1967, Captain Jung served as the medi-
cal supply offi  cer in the ROK Th irty-fi ft h Division in 1967–1969. For the last two 
years of his service, in 1969–1971, he taught military logistics at the South Korean 
Army Medical School for offi  cers taking basic and advanced courses and train-
ing. As a captain, he petitioned his release from the ROK Army and obtained it 
in 1971.
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19. “Loggie’s” War
 1. Interviews by Lt. Col. Terry May in June–July 2002, who contributed the 
story in 2003.
 2. For further reading on U.S. support to the Vietnam War, see George C. 
Herring, America’s Longest War: Th e United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, 4th 
ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001); and Wallace Terry, ed., Bloods: Black Veterans 
of the Vietnam War: An Oral History (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985).
 3. Cam Ranh Bay, about 180 miles northeast of Saigon and 20 miles south of 
Nha Trang, was the site of a major U.S. port facility, including a U.S. Army complex 
and a major U.S. Air Force base. Th e army complex consisted of the main canton-
ment, two personnel replacement depots, the army logistics areas, and an army port 
(CP 050–155). For details, see Kelley, Where We Were in Vietnam, 5–83, 5–84.
 4. According to Nelson, the position was normally held by a captain and not 
at all a typical situation for a lieutenant.
 5. Phan Rang is about 160 miles northeast of Saigon and 25 miles southwest 
of Cam Ranh Bay. Th e U.S. Air Force had a jet-capable airfi eld about 3 miles from 
Phan Rang.
 6. Bill Nelson was awarded the Bronze Star medal for meritorious service in 
Vietnam.
20. Support and Survival in Th ailand
 1. Interviews by the author with a graduate student research assistant in 
Moore, Oklahoma, in February 2004.
 2. U Tapao is near the coast, about 130 kilometers southeast from Bangkok, 
Th ailand, and 640 kilometers northwest of Saigon, South Vietnam. Th e U.S. Air 
Force built a major bomber/fi ghter-bomber base at U Tapao.
 3. David Graves is still very proud of the awards he received, including the 
Good Conduct Medal, an Outstanding Unit Citation, a Vietnam Service Medal, 
and a Republic of Vietnam Service Medal.
21. Th ree Great Escapes
 1. Interviews by the author and an undergraduate student research assistant 
in Dallas, Texas, in July 2002.
 2. At that time, Vietnam and French Indochina were divided under three dif-
ferent colonial administrations: northern, middle, and southern.
 3. Hoa Hung is a small town along the Song Tien River in the west of Tien 
Giang Province. See Tap Ban Do Hanh Chinh, Viet Nam (Vietnam Administra-
tive Atlas), 69.
 4. Gih Dinh was one of the provinces in the Republic of Vietnam in the South 
from 1955 to 1975. It was annexed by Ho Chi Minh City in 1976.
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 5. Long Binh is about twelve miles northeast Saigon. It was a strategic point 
in the war and had the largest U.S./ARVN military base in South Vietnam, includ-
ing an airport, supply depot, heliport, hospital, and jails. Th e headquarters of the 
ARVN’s II Corps was at Long Binh.
 6. Th u Duc, north Ho Chi Minh City, was part of Gih Dinh Province before 
1976. See Tap Ban Do Hanh Chinh, Viet Nam (Vietnam Administrative Atlas), 65.
 7. Gen. Duong Van Minh became the RVN president in November 1963 aft er 
he and Gen. Tran Van Don led a military coup to overthrow the Diem regime.
 8. Nguyen Vung was killed in a motorcycle accident in Bien Hoa, Vietnam, 
during his third trip back home in 2003. At that time, he had done the paper-
work and was about to bring his wife and remaining children to the United States. 
Th ey fi nally arrived in the United States a year later, according to his son Nguyen 
Hoang.
22. Chinese Railroad Engineering Operations
 1. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun 
(Th e PLA during the Cultural Revolution), 409.
 2. Many veteran offi  cers mentioned this report. Also, interview with Col. Yan 
Guitang (PLA, ret.) in Xi’an, Shaanxi, China, on July 29, 2006. He served as a 
staff  member for the delegation and toured Vietnam fi ve times between 1959 and 
1966.
 3. Interviews by the author in Changchun, Jilin Province, China, in July 
2006.
 4. For more details, see Qu Aiguo, “Military Operations of the Chinese Sup-
porting Forces in Vietnam,” in Li Danhui ed., Zhongguo yu yindu zhina zhanzheng 
(China and the Indochina Wars) (Hong Kong: Tiandi Tushu [Heavenly Earth 
Books], 2000), 47.
 5. Th e CPVEF had established six divisions. Its Second Division, an engi-
neering division, consisted of three engineering regiments, one hydrology brigade, 
one maritime transportation brigade, one communication engineering brigade, 
one truck transportation regiment, and a few antiaircraft  artillery units, totaling 
12,000 men. Th e Th ird Division was mainly comprised of PLA Air Force engi-
neering troops for the construction of a large air base. Th e Fourth, Fift h, and Sixth 
Divisions of the CPVEF were all comprised of road construction engineering 
troops, including sixteen regiments with 80,000 men.
 6. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun 
(Th e PLA during the Cultural Revolution), 358, 362–363.
 7. Also, interview with Col. Yan Guitang (PLA, ret.) in Xi’an, Shaanxi, China, 
on July 29, 2006.
 8. For the statistics, see Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming zhong 
de renmin jiefangjun (Th e PLA in the Cultural Revolution), 421.
 9. For more detailed statistics, see Qu Aiguo, Bao Mingrong, and Xiao Zuyue, 
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eds., Yuanyue kangmei: zhongguo zhiyuan budui zai yuenan (Aid Vietnam and 
Resist America: China’s Supporting Forces in Vietnam), 12.
10. For more details on U.S. bombing, see Li Qingde, “Unbreakable Railway 
Lines,” in Qu Aiguo, Bao Mingrong, and Xiao Zuyue, eds., Yuanyue kangmei: 
zhongguo zhiyuan budui zai yuenan (Aid Vietnam and Resist America: China’s 
Supporting Forces in Vietnam), 83–85.
11. Li Qingde, “Unbreakable Railway Lines,” 91.
12. For more details about Long’s story, see Long Guilin, “Show the Valor and 
Spirit Again,” in Qu Aiguo, Bao Mingrong, and Xiao Zuyue, eds., Yuanyue kang-
mei: zhongguo zhiyuan budui zai yuenan (Aid Vietnam and Resist America: Chi-
na’s Supporting Forces in Vietnam), 76–77.
Conclusion
 1. Director of Central Intelligence, “SNIE 10-11-65: Probable Communist 
Reactions to a U.S. Course of Action, September 22, 1965,” in National Intelligence 
Council (NIC), Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948–1975, 304.
 2. Moss, Vietnam, table C, 384.
 3. I borrow the term “useful adversary” from Th omas J. Christensen’s research 
on grand strategy in Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilizations, 
and Sino-American Confl ict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 
1996), 1–2.
 4. Mao Zedong, “We Agree with Vietnam’s Policy to both Fight and Negotiate,” 
in Ministry of Foreign Aff airs and Party Archives and Manuscript Research Cen-
ter of the CCP Central Committee, comps., Mao Zedong on Diplomacy, 442–443.
 5. Han Huaizhi, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo (Contemporary 
Chinese Military Aff airs), 1:550.
 6. Truong Nhu Tang, minister of justice of the Provisional Republican Revo-
lutionary Government (PRRG), quoted in Tang with David Chanoff  and Doan 
Van Toai, Yu Hanoi fendao yangbiao (Parting Company with Hanoi) (Beijing: Shi-
jie zhishi chubanshe [World Knowledge Press], 1989), 229.
 7. Moss, Vietnam, 361–363.
 8. Th e U.S. Army actually began its rotation system in the Korean War of 1950–
1953. Th e policy was based upon studies of World War II soldiers’ experiences.
 9. Moss, Vietnam, table C, 384.
10. Gaiduk, Th e Soviet Union and the Vietnam War, 215, 231.
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Many of the narratives bear the lingering spirit and 
influence of the ideology imposed on the veterans by 
their respective governments. Some of the veterans 
still follow official accounts, glorifying the Communist 
victory in Vietnam or praising Western political 
involvement in the war. Among the stories are several 
Communist accounts that humanize and contextualize 
the war’s events while shedding light on aspects of 
the war previously unknown to Western scholars. 
An interview with a former KGB agent reveals that 
Russia’s support of North Vietnam was far greater 
than Western historians previously have speculated. 
Another account, by a captain in the Chinese army, 
details the experience of the Chinese troops who 
fought alongside the North Vietnamese.
While much of the scholarship on the Vietnam War 
focuses on battles, political maneuvering, and combat 
strategies, Xiaobing Li presents a collection of stories 
from people who witnessed the war firsthand. Voices 
from the Vietnam War focuses on personal combat 
experiences, offering a deeper understanding of 
America’s longest war. 
XIaObIng LI, professor of history and director of the 
Western Pacific Institute at the University of Central 
Oklahoma, is the author of A History of the Modern 
Chinese Army and coauthor of Voices from the Korean 
War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese 
Soldiers. He served in the People’s Liberation Army  
in China.
Cover design by Jen Huppert Design
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F or more than thirty years, Vietnam was ravaged by war, resulting in nearly 1.5 million military casualties and more than 4 million 
civilian casualties. From the French Indochina War 
(1946–1954) to the Communist victory in 1975, 
the land and people were the victims of constant 
battle and were irrevocably altered by the effects of 
devastating violence. Voices from the Vietnam War: 
Stories from American, Asian, and Russian Veterans 
assembles the accounts of soldiers, spies, and medical 
workers who experienced firsthand the years of 
conflict in Vietnam.
Few oral histories of the Vietnam War allow civilians 
or Communist supporters to tell their stories, 
and the resulting scholarship is often one-sided. 
Xiaobing Li, a native of China and a former soldier 
in the People’s Liberation Army, spent seven years 
gathering hundreds of accounts from survivors of 
the war, filling gaps in the narrative, and providing 
new insights into the events of the war. Voices from 
the Vietnam War offers the personal accounts of 
twenty-two individuals, spanning three continents 
and representing multiple political beliefs and 
perspectives—American, Chinese, Russian, North  
and South Korean, Vietnamese, and Viet Cong.
(COnTInUEd On baCK FLap)
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“Xiaobing Li successfully finds a fresh and intriguing niche for his collection of twenty-
two individual Vietnam War stories. This should make a first-rate supplementary text.”
—RObERT J. McMaHOn, 
author of  The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II
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